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Since 2015 the Prawo i Sprawiedliwość (PiS) government in Poland has engaged in a process 
of rule of law backsliding, viz., it has eroded various forms of checks and balances in order to 
entrench itself in power. It has, inter alia, disabled effective judicial review, replaced judges 
in courts across the country, and introduced a disciplinary regime for recalcitrant judges. This 
process poses a threat to the very existence and functioning of the European Union: by 
controlling the judiciary, the regime can pick and choose which EU laws will be complied with. 
Such selective compliance undermines fundamental concepts upon which the very 
functioning of the EU’s legal order is based such as, inter alia, mutual trust, autonomy, and 
supremacy.  
However, despite this threat, the EU’s institutions have thus far been unable – or unwilling – 
to adequately resolve this crisis. By considering the implementation of the Rule of Law 
Framework and Article 7 TEU, this thesis will present four key lessons the EU must adhere to 
in its future dealings with backsliding Member States. Namely, the EU must resort to hard 
enforcement; be responsive to the time-sensitivity of backsliding; ensure its tools are 
accessible; and avoid leaving the protection of its values solely to the protection of 
intergovernmental institutions. These lessons are believed to be integral to neutralising the 
threat posed by backsliding and persevering the integrity of the EU’s legal order.
 
Unwilling or unable? 
Assessing the failure of the Rule of 






A thesis submitted for the degree of Master of Jurisprudence 





The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. No quotation from it should be published 





Contents ..................................................................................................................................... 3 
Abbreviations ............................................................................................................................ 6 
Acknowledgements ................................................................................................................... 7 
Introduction ............................................................................................................................... 8 
Scope of the thesis ................................................................................................................ 15 
Structure ............................................................................................................................... 16 
Chapter 1: Development of the Rule of Law Framework and Article 7 TEU ......................... 18 
1. Introduction .................................................................................................................. 18 
2. The formation of Article 7 and the Haider Affair .......................................................... 20 
2.1 First implication: amendments to Article 7 ........................................................... 22 
2.1.1 Preventative arm ............................................................................................ 24 
2.1.2 Sanctioning arm.............................................................................................. 26 
2.2 Second implication: Article 7 as a ‘nuclear’ tool ................................................... 27 
3. Thinking up alternatives: the failure of the infringement’s procedure ........................ 29 
4. The Rule of Law Framework introduced ....................................................................... 31 
4.1 Stage 1: Assessment: Informal Dialogue and Opinion ............................................... 33 
4.2 Stage 2: Recommendation ......................................................................................... 34 
4.3 Stage 3: Follow-up ...................................................................................................... 34 
5. Conclusion ..................................................................................................................... 35 
Chapter 2: The Tools in Practice ............................................................................................. 37 
1. Introduction .................................................................................................................. 37 
2. The Rule of Law Framework: January 2016 – December 2017 .................................... 39 
2.1 Dialogue initiated: informal dialogue, Opinion and the first recommendation ... 39 
2.2 Dialogue continued: the second recommendation ............................................... 43 
4 
 
2.3 Yet more dialogue: the third recommendation .................................................... 45 
2.4 The fourth recommendation and the end of the Rule of Law Framework ........... 48 
3. Article 7 TEU: December 2017 onwards ....................................................................... 52 
3.1 Article 7(1) TEU in action: three hearings in 2018 ................................................ 54 
3.1.1 Format of the hearings ................................................................................... 56 
3.2 Events post December 2018: a challenge to the EU’s functioning ....................... 59 
3.2.1 The Council’s response (or lack thereof)........................................................ 64 
4. Conclusion ..................................................................................................................... 66 
Chapter 3: The Rule of Law Framework’s Ineffectiveness ..................................................... 68 
1. Introduction .................................................................................................................. 68 
2. The Framework’s first goal: preventing a deterioration .............................................. 69 
2.1 Enforcement Spectrum .......................................................................................... 69 
2.1.1 The Rule of Law Framework as a soft enforcement tool ............................... 73 
2.2 Soft enforcement as a response to the rule of law crisis ...................................... 75 
2.3 Hard enforcement as a response to the rule of law crisis ..................................... 78 
2.3.1 The difficulties of hard enforcement ............................................................. 81 
3. The Framework’s second goal: supplementing Article 7 .............................................. 85 
3.1 The utility in dialogue ............................................................................................ 86 
3.2 Time-sensitivity and the problem with in(sufficient)action .................................. 89 
3.2.1 Commission discretion as a challenge to efficacy .......................................... 91 
4. Conclusion ..................................................................................................................... 93 
Chapter 4: Article 7’s Ineffectiveness ..................................................................................... 95 
1. Introduction .................................................................................................................. 95 
2. The failure to initiate the tool: a neutered deterrent .................................................. 96 
3. Article 7’s qualifications .............................................................................................. 100 
3.1 The need to restrict Article 7 ............................................................................... 101 
5 
 
3.2 High procedural thresholds ................................................................................. 104 
3.3 The intergovernmental qualification ................................................................... 108 
3.3.1 Diplomatic expediency as an excuse for inaction ........................................ 111 
3.3.2 Article 7’s incompatibility with the logic of the internal market ................. 113 
4. Conclusion ................................................................................................................... 116 
Conclusion ............................................................................................................................. 120 
Lesson 1: soft enforcement is ineffective against defiant, backsliding states ................... 120 
Lesson 2: rule of law crises are time sensitive .................................................................... 121 
Lesson 3: tools protecting the EU’s values must be accessible .......................................... 122 
Lesson 4: Member States lack adequate commitment to the EU’s values ........................ 123 
A light at the end of the tunnel .......................................................................................... 124 





CJEU   Court of Justice of the European Union 
CT   Constitutional Tribunal  
DC   Disciplinary Chamber 
NCJ   National Council of the Judiciary 
PiS   Prawo i Sprawiedliwość (Translation: Law and Justice) 
RLF   Rule of Law Framework 
SC  Supreme Court  
Acknowledgements 
 
Writing this thesis has been a journey; one which would not have been completed without 
the help of so many. I am deeply grateful to my supervisors, Professor Roger Masterman and 
Professor Robert Schütze. Being able to work with you was a privilege, and your expertise, 
feedback, patience, and guidance were invaluable to me. You have inspired me to continue 
down the road of academia. I owe this success to you.  
I would also like to thank those who have provided me with indispensable feedback 
throughout the year. Professor Bojan Bugarič, Professor Conor Gearty, Dr Hailey Hooper and 
Dr Petra Minnerop. To Dr Katarzyna Granat for devoting her time to clarifying the intricacies 
of the Polish legal system, and to Dr Matteo Bonelli for sharing his thesis with me. I must also 
single out Dr Irene Wieczorek who went above and beyond academic guidance, always ready 
to share her wisdom, and whose counselling expertise is unmatched.  
A special thank you is also reserved for those who have shown me their undying support and 
encouragement throughout this experience. My friends, peers and colleagues at Durham Law 
School. The boys at 19 CSH: Callum Begg, James Randall and Richard Brooks. SPG, you were 
there when I needed you most. To my friends and family, who motivated and never doubted 
me. Damian Polański and Klaudia Bagińska, Viktoria, Olivier, Daniel and Sylwia Polańscy, 
Miłosz Szybiak, Rebecca Reville, Aisha Rutherford, Karen Sizer and Kacper Jurczak. Thank you 
for your support and words of kindness.   
Last, but certainly not least, I must emphasise how indebted I am to Aileen Editha. This year 
has thrown a series of challenges my way, and carrying on was not always easy, but with every 
challenge you were there to support me – academically and emotionally. I could not have 
done this without you.
Introduction  
 
The European Union (EU) is a unique ‘supranational constitutional order’.1 This supranational 
characteristic has partly been shaped by the developments in the EU’s legal system, which is 
particularly distinguishable through the principles of autonomy and supremacy.2 The former 
dictates that the EU’s legal system operates independently of national and international law, 
setting its own legal rules and provisions which must be respected in its own legal sphere.3 
This is complemented by the concept of supremacy, which requires that provisions of 
domestic law cannot undermine or counteract EU law, and therefore must be disapplied in 
the event of a clash.4 These concepts inter alia allow the EU to create binding and 
authoritative rules within its own legal space.5  
However, in the past decade the operation, functioning – and possibly the very existence – of 
the EU’s supranational legal order has become threatened by developments within certain 
Member States.6 This threat began to materialise after Hungary’s turn to illiberalism following 
the election of Fidesz in 2010,7 and has intensified since 2015, when the Prawo i 
Sprawiedliwość (PiS, translation: Law and Justice) government was elected in Poland. Both 
 
1 Jan-Werner Müller, 'Should the EU Protect Democracy and the Rule of Law inside Member States' 
(2015) 21 ELJ 141, 145. 
2 See Joseph HH Weiler, 'The Transformation of Europe' (1991) 100(8) Yale LJ 2403, 2413-2419; Justin 
Lindeboom, 'The Autonomy of EU Law: A Hartian View' (2021) 13(1) Eur J Legal Stud 271, 277-278. 
3 See, e.g., Case 26/62 Van Gend en Loos v Netherlands Inland Revenue Administration [1963] ECR 1; 
Opinion 2/13 on Accession to the ECHR EU:C:2014:2454, paras 166-170; Opinion 1/17 EU:C:2019:341, 
paras 109-111. 
4 Case 6/64 Flaminio Costa v ENEL [1964] ECR 585. See also Miriam Aziz, ‘Sovereignty Lost, Sovereignty 
Regained? The European Integration Project and the Bundesverfassungsgericht’ (2001) EUI Working 
Papers RSC No 2001/31, 3 <http://hdl.handle.net/1814/1740> accessed 29 August 2021. 
5 See Lindeboom (n 2), 278-279, 282. 
6 See, e.g., Robert Grzeszczak and Stephen Terrett, 'The EU's Role in Policing the Rule of Law: 
Reflections on Recent Polish Experience' (2018) 69 NILQ 347, 349; Franco Peirone, 'The Rule of Law in 
the EU: Between Union and Unity' (2019) 15 Croat YB Eur L & Pol 57, 98. See also Armin von Bogdandy 
and Luke Dimitrios Spieker, ‘Countering the Judicial Silencing of Critics: Article 2 TEU Values, Reverse 
Solange, and the Responsibilities of National Judges’ (2019) 15 EuConst 391, 406. 
7 See Nóra Chronowski and Márton Varju, 'Constitutional Backsliding in Hungary' (2015) 3 Tijdschrift 
voor Constitutioneel Recht 296; László Sólyom, 'The Rise and Decline of Constitutional Culture in 
Hungary', in Armin von Bogdandy and Pál Sonnevend (eds), Constitutional Crisis in the European 
Constitutional Area: Theory, Law and Politics in Hungary and Romania (Hart Publishing 2015) 5-32. 
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regimes adopted a similar approach, both actively undermining the independence of their 
judiciaries, in turn violating separation of powers and the rule of law. In Poland, for instance, 
this was achieved through the dismantling of effective judicial review by turning the 
Constitutional Tribunal (CT) into a supporter of the regime; creation of new judicial 
appointments procedures which allowed the regime to appoint judges not on merit but upon 
regime sympathy; the lowering of retirement ages so as to force out independent judges and 
make room for political appointments; the introduction of a disciplinary regime in order to 
sanction any recalcitrant (read: independent and impartial) judge.8 In so doing, these regimes 
have actively ‘sought to undermine liberal democracy’ by dismantling checks upon their 
power.9 Accordingly, the events transpiring in Poland and Hungary have been referred to as 
‘rule of law backsliding’: a ‘process through which elected public authorities deliberately 
implement governmental blueprints which aim to systematically weaken, annihilate or 
capture internal checks on power with the view of dismantling the liberal democratic state 
and entrenching the long-term rule of the dominant party’.10  
These developments violate the values upon which the EU is based.11 Indeed, Article 2 TEU 
stipulates that the EU ‘is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, 
democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights’ and clarifies that these 
‘values are common to the Member States’. These values comprise the foundations of the EU 
and are crucial to its very functioning.12 
 
8 See Chapter 2. 
9 Bojan Bugarič, 'The Right to Democracy in a Populist Era' (2018) 112 AJIL Unbound 79, 80.  
10 Laurent Pech and Kim Lane Scheppele, 'Illiberalism Within: Rule of Law Backsliding in the EU' (2017) 
19 CYELS 3, 10. See also, Patrick Lavelle, 'Europe's Rule of Law Crisis: An Assessment of the EU's 
Capacity to Address Systemic Breaches of Its Foundational Values in Member States' (2019) 22 Trinity 
CL Rev 35, 37; Bojan Bugarič, ‘A Crisis of Constitutional Democracy in Post-Communist Europe: “Lands 
In-Between” Democracy and Authoritarianism’ (2015) 13 ICON 219; Jan-Werner Müller, ‘Eastern 
Europe Goes South: Disappearing Democracy in the EU’s Newest Member States’ (2014) 93(2) Foreign 
Affairs 15.  
11 See Bojan Bugarič, ‘Protecting Democracy inside the EU: On Article 7 TEU and the Hungarian Turn 
to Authoritarianism’ in Carlos Closa and Dimitry Kochenov (eds), Reinforcing Rule of Law Oversight in 
the European Union (CUP 2016) 83.  
12 See Gábor Halmai and Kim Lane Scheppele, ‘The Tyranny of Values or the Tyranny of One-Party 
States?’ (Verfassungsblog, 25 November 2019) <https://verfassungsblog.de/the-tyranny-of-values-
or-the-tyranny-of-one-party-states/>  accessed 4 May 2021; Armin von Bogdandy, ‘Fundamentals on 
Defending European Values’ (Verfassungsblog, 12 November 2019) 




Thus, if Member States consistently undermine the rule of law – one of the EU’s fundamental 
values13 – the EU’s constitutional framework will be at risk.14 The damage posed to the 
functioning and integrity of the EU legal order through backsliding – more specifically, the lack 
of judicial independence – is evident in inter alia two ways.  
First, it undermines the assumption of mutual trust. Indeed, the EU’s legal framework is based 
upon ‘mutual legal interdependence and mutual trust among its members’.15 In other words, 
the functioning of the EU’s legal order is based upon the assumption that the Member States 
are all equally committed to the values in Article 2 TEU and, in sharing a common set of values, 
they will accordingly respect and uphold laws introduced by the EU that aim to implement 
and enforce these values. This is complemented by ‘mutual recognition of judicial decisions.’16 
Accordingly, the absence of judicial independence in one Member State may undermine the 
application of mutual trust and signal an end to ‘Europe’s regulatory and judicial 
interconnected space’.17 We can see this problem materialise in the context of European 
Arrest Warrants.  
In the LM case the CJEU, responding to a question posed by the Irish High Court as to whether 
it had to comply with a European Arrest Warrant issued by Poland given the constant 
undermining of judicial independence there and the risk this posed to an individual’s right to 
a fair trial, held that the absence of judicial independence could serve as a ground for refusal 
to surrender.18 The CJEU’s decision may be understood as indicative of the importance that 
 
13 European Commission (Commission), ‘Further strengthening the Rule of Law within the Union: State 
of play and possible next steps’ (Communication) COM/2019/163 final, 1. 
14 See, e.g., Gábor Halmai, ‘How the EU Can and Should Cope with Illiberal Member States’ (2018) 
38(2) Quaderni Constituzionali 313, 325; Pech and Scheppele (n 10) 11. 
15 Christophe Hillion, ‘Overseeing the Rule of Law in the EU: Legal Mandate and Means’ in Closa and 
Kochenov (n 11) 61. See also Opinion 2/13 (n 3) paras 167-168, Commission Communication (n 13) 2; 
Carlos Closa, ‘Reinforcing EU Monitoring of the Rule of Law’ in Closa and Kochenov (n 11) 16-18; Müller 
(n 1) 145. 
16 Dimitry Kochenov and Laurent Pech, 'Monitoring and Enforcement of the Rule of Law in the EU: 
Rhetoric and Reality' (2015) 11 EuConst 512, 520-521. See also Article 67 TFEU.  
17 Kochenov and Pech (ibid); Lavelle (n 10) 36-37. See also Laurent Pech and Kim Lane Scheppele, 
‘Open Letter to the President of the European Commission’ (Verfassungsblog, 11 December 2019) 
<https://verfassungsblog.de/open-letter-to-the-president-of-the-european-commission/>  accessed 
24 August 2021; Commission, ‘A new EU Framework to strengthen the Rule of Law’ (Communication) 
COM/2014/0158 final, 4.  
18 Case C-216/18 PPU, Minister for Justice and Equality v LM (Deficiencies in the system of justice) 




judicial independence has for the very functioning of the European Arrest Warrant system.19 
Indeed, given its basis in mutual trust,20 the mechanism rests on the assumption that all 
national courts have the capacity to ensure equal protection of rights to the individual.21 It is 
by virtue of this guarantee that national courts can then operate on the basis of sincere 
cooperation and presumption in favour of surrendering individuals under the European Arrest 
Warrant.22 After all, the system is based on these courts exchanging information in good 
faith.23 If then, a national court issuing such a warrant is suspected of not being sufficiently 
independent, this undermines the assumption of mutual trust and stands as an obstacle to 
the operation of sincere cooperation between national courts and EU institutions which is 
required for the functioning of mechanisms such as the European Arrest Warrant. Simply put, 
a judiciary which is not independent precludes the possibility of seamless judicial cooperation 
which is required for the functioning of inter alia the EU legal sphere of freedom, security, 
and justice.24 Commissioner Věra Jourová was therefore right when she stated that, ‘if one 
national system of judiciary is broken, the EU system is broken.’25  
Secondly, backsliding threatens the validity of EU laws. Indeed, because the enforcement of 
EU law relies on national courts, viz., the laws adopted at EU level cannot be transposed into 
domestic legal systems by the EU, and therefore compliance with these norms rests solely 
 
demanding (ibid para 73; Dimitry Kochenov and Petra Bárd, ‘The Last Soldier Standing? Courts vs 
Politicians and the Rule of Law Crisis in the New Member States of the EU’ in Ernst Hirsch Ballin, 
Gerhard van der Schyff and Maarten Stremler (eds), European Yearbook of Constitutional Law 2019: 
Judicial Power: Safeguards and Limits in a Democratic Society (TMC Asser Press 2020) 274). 
19 LM (n 18) para 55; Leandro Mancano, ‘You’ll Never Work Alone: A Systemic Assessment of the 
European Arrest Warrant and Judicial Independence’ (2021) 58 CML Rev 683, 688-691, 708-710. 
20 Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant and the surrender 
procedures between Member States, 2002/584/JHA, [2002] OJ L 190/1, recital 10. 
21 Case C-168/13 PPU, Jeremy F. EU:C:2013:358, paras 49-50. 
22 See LM (n 18) paras 57-58; Mancano (n 19) 688. 
23 Mancano (n 19) 704-705. 
24 Armin von Bogdandy, ‘Principles and Challenges of a European Doctrine of Systemic Deficiencies’ 
(2020) Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law (MPIL) Research Paper 
2019-14, 9 <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3431303>  accessed 24 August 
2021. See also Eugene Regan, ‘The role of the principles of mutual trust and mutual recognition in EU 
law’ [2018] Il Diritto dell’Unione Europea 231, 231; Kochenov and Bárd (n 18) 272. 
25 Věra Jourová, ‘Equipping Europe with better tools to defend the rule of law and democratic values’ 
(EC Press Corner, 8 July 2020) 




with Member States and their courts,26 a problem arises where a judiciary in one Member 
State purposefully misconstrues, misapplies or openly undermines a provision of EU law.27 It 
means that the application of this particular provision will be undermined. The events 
developing in Poland illustrate this threat well.28  
After the adoption of the Law on the Supreme Court (SC) in December 2017, a Disciplinary 
Chamber (DC) was introduced into the structure of the SC, staffed completely with judges 
appointed by a politicised judicial appointments body.29 The regime began to use this pseudo-
Court to bring disciplinary proceedings against judges who criticised the regime’s judicial 
reforms.30 In response, and at the request of the Commission, the CJEU issued an interim 
relief order in April 2020 requiring disciplinary proceedings to cease.31 In turn, the DC began 
to discipline judges through alternative means, such as through the fabrication of bogus 
criminal charges as reasons for the revocation of judicial immunities (which also meant a 
suspension of their judicial duties and a lowering of their salaries).32 The decision was 
therefore creatively ignored.  
Moreover, the DC brought a case to the CT to assess whether interim relief orders concerning 
the structuring of a judicial system in a Member State were binding.33 In other words, the 
 
26 See Case C-64/16 Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses v Tribunal de Contas 
EU:C:2018:117, paras 32-37, and Aleksandra Kustra-Rogatka, ‘The Rule of Law Crisis as the Watershed 
Moment for the European Constitutionalism’ (Verfassungsblog, 14 November 2019) 
<https://verfassungsblog.de/the-rule-of-law-crisis-as-the-watershed-moment-for-the-european-
constitutionalism/> accessed 24 August 2021. 
27 See, e.g., Aida Torres Pérez, ‘From Portugal to Poland: The Court of Justice of the European Union 
as watchdog of judicial independence’ (2020) 27(1) MJ 105, 108-109; von Bogdandy and Spieker (n 6) 
415. Armin von Bogdandy and Michael Ioannidis, ‘Systemic Deficiency in the Rule of Law: what it is, 
what has been done, what can be done’ (2014) 51(1) CML Rev 59, 64.  
28 For further discussion, see Chapter 2 Section 3.2. 
29 Commission, ‘Commission Recommendation (EU) 2018/103 regarding the rule of law in Poland 
complementary to Recommendations (EU) 2016/1374, (EU) 2017/146 and (EU) 2017/1520’ [2018] OJ 
L 17/50, para 25 (hereinafter “Recommendation 4 2017”). 
30 Katarzyna Gajda-Roszczynialska and Krystian Markiewicz, ‘Disciplinary Proceedings 
as an Instrument for Breaking the Rule of Law in Poland’ (2020) 12 HJRL 451, 466.  
31 C-791/19R Commission v Poland (disciplinary regime for judges) EU:C:2020:277. See also Laurent 
Pech, ‘Protecting Polish judges from Poland’s Disciplinary “Star Chamber”: Commission v. Poland 
(Interim proceedings)’ (2021) 58(1) CML Rev 137. 
32 Adam Bodnar and Paweł Filipek, ‘Time is of the Essence’ (Verfassungsblog, 30 November 2020) 
<https://verfassungsblog.de/time-is-of-the-essence/>  accessed 24 August 2021; Laurent Pech, Patryk 
Wachowiec, and Dariusz Mazur, ‘Poland’s Rule of Law Breakdown: A Five-Year Assessment of EU’s 
(In)Action’ (2021) 13 HJRL 1, 31-32. 
33 Constitutional Tribunal, Judgment of 14 July 2021, P 7/20. 
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improperly appointed DC (whose suspension was ordered by the CJEU) sought affirmation 
from the politicised CT that the decisions of the CJEU were not binding. Unsurprisingly, the CT 
decided with the DC; interim relief orders issued by the CJEU regarding the functioning and 
operation of the Polish justice system were held to be contrary to the Polish Constitution. 
Therefore, decisions to that effect would be deprived of primacy and direct applicability.34 
The ruling constituted a response to the CJEU’s interim relief order which – along with any 
other interim relief order concerning the operation of the Polish judiciary forthwith – is likely 
rendered inapplicable in Poland. In other words, the regime used its subordinated judicial 
machinery to deprive EU law’s application in the Polish legal sphere. This undermines the 
crucial concepts of supremacy and autonomy. 
Rule of law backsliding may therefore lead to dysfunction in the EU’s legal order. Namely, for 
the EU’s legal order to persist, the EU needs to ensure that it is the one to define its laws (in 
line with the concept of autonomy), and that its laws and their interpretations or validity 
cannot be undermined at the domestic level (in line with the concept of supremacy).35 A legal 
order can hardly be such if it is unable to enforce its own rules. If EU law is unable to be 
applied and interpreted uniformly, the EU’s legal rules will lack legal certainty, thereby further 
detracting from the validity of these norms as they themselves will be contrary to the rule of 
law.  
Therefore, to borrow Scheppele, Pech and Kelemen’s metaphor, rule of law backsliding has 
started a fire in the EU’s constitutional framework.36 Taking this metaphor further, it is 
possible to argue that what started off as a relatively small flame in the legal system of one 
 
34 ibid. This refers not to the direct applicability as a doctrine of EU law, but as a principle stated in the 
Polish Constitution. See The Constitution of the Republic of Poland (2 April 1997) (hereinafter “Polish 
Constitution”), Article 91. 
35 See, Roland Bieber and Francesco Maiani, ‘Enhancing Centralized Enforcement of EU Law: Pandora’s 
Toolbox?’ (2014) 51 CML Rev 1057, 1057-1058; Joined Cases C‑748/19 to C‑754/19 Prokuratura 
Rejonowa w Mińsku Mazowieckim v WB and others EU:C:2021:403, Opinion of AG Bobek, para 138; 
Michał Ziółkowski and Barbara Grabowska-Moroz, ‘Enforcement of EU Values and the Tyranny of 
National Identity – Polish Examples and Excuses’ (Verfassungsblog, 26 November 2019) 
<https://verfassungsblog.de/enforcement-of-eu-values-and-the-tyranny-of-national-identity-polish-
examples-and-excuses/> accessed 24 August 2021; Hillion (n 15) 60-61.  
36 Laurent Pech and Kim Lane Scheppele, ‘Never Missing an Opportunity to Miss an Opportunity: The 
Council Legal Service Opinion on the Commission’s EU budget-related rule of law mechanism’ 
(Verfassungsblog, 12 November 2018) <https://verfassungsblog.de/never-missing-an-opportunity-to-
miss-an-opportunity-the-council-legal-service-opinion-on-the-commissions-eu-budget-related-rule-
of-law-mechanism/>  accessed 24 August 2021. 
14 
 
Member State37 has turned into a fully-fledged fire which is burning, i.e. harming, the 
functioning of the EU legal order. Accordingly, in order to protect and preserve its unique 
supranational legal order, the EU must extinguish this fire.38 However, despite the start of 
rule of law crisis in 2010, over a decade later nothing substantial has been achieved on the 
ground.39 On the contrary, Poland joined Hungary in its backsliding in 2015, exacerbating the 
threat to the EU. This has led Kochenov to question whether the EU is ‘content’ with the 
situation, or if it is simply ‘powerless.’40  
The EU’s institutions are constantly creating new tools,41 and condemning the events in 
Poland and Hungary. It therefore prima facie is not a matter of acceptance. Thus, Kochenov 
posits, powerlessness may be to blame.42 However, if the EU is indeed powerless, this is not 
to say that it needs to remain powerless.43 One could view the EU’s hitherto unsuccessful 
remedies to rule of law backsliding as a process of trial and error. Niklewicz makes an 
interesting point in this context:  
An old adage attributed to Prussian Field Marshal Helmut von Moltke the 
Elder says that “no plan survived contact with the enemy”. Although this 
rather militaristic parallel might seem exaggerated or inappropriate, its logic 
 
37 See Chapter 2, Section 2.1. 
38 Müller (n 15) 145-146; Bugarič (n 11) 92-93.  
39 See Laurent Pech, ‘Protecting Polish Judges from Political Control’ (Verfassungsblog, 20 July 2021) 
<https://verfassungsblog.de/protecting-polish-judges-from-political-control/> accessed 24 August 
2021; V-Dem Institute at University of Gothenburg, ‘Autocratization Turns Viral: Democracy Report 
2021’ (2021), 20 <https://www.v-dem.net/media/filer_public/74/8c/748c68ad-f224-4cd7-87f9-
8794add5c60f/dr_2021_updated.pdf> accessed 24 August 2021. 
40 Dimitry Kochenov, ‘Busting the Myths Nuclear: A Commentary on Article 7 TEU’ (2017) EUI Working 
Paper No LAW 2017/10, 2 <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2965087> 
accessed 24 August 2021.  
41  See, e.g., Commission, ‘The EU Justice Scoreboard. A tool to promote effective justice and growth’ 
(Communication) COM/2013/160 final; Commission Communication 2014 (n 17); Council of the 
European Union (Council), ‘Press Release, 3362nd Council meeting, General Affairs’, Brussels, 16 
December 2014, Doc 16936/14, 20-21; Commission, ‘Strengthening the rule of law through increased 
awareness, an annual monitoring cycle and more effective enforcement’ (EC Press Corner, 17 July 
2019) <https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_19_4169> accessed 24 August 
2021; Parliament and Council Regulation 2020/2092 of 16 December 2020 on a general regime of 
conditionality for the protection of the Union budget [2020] OJ LI 433/1. For an assessment, see 
Laurent Pech, ‘The Rule of Law in the EU: The Evolution of the Treaty Framework and Rule of Law 
Toolbox’ (2020) RECONNECT, Working Paper No 7 
<https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3608661> accessed 24 August 2021. 
42 Kochenov (n 40). 
43 The doctrines established in Van Gend en Loos (n 3) are proof of this. See Von Bogdandy (n 24) 21. 
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is correct. The mechanisms designed to protect the Union’s core values from 
being breached have failed: the EU should acknowledge this and move on. 
There are ways to fix the EU defences in the area of the rule of law. The EU 
institutions can still prove that they mean… it when they say that they care 
about the essence of liberal democracy.44 
Accordingly, and in line with this assessment, the purpose of this thesis is to consider why the 
EU has thus far failed to resolve rule of law backsliding in Poland, and to illustrate a series of 
lessons the EU must draw from this experience. These lessons, if adhered to, are believed to 
strengthen the EU’s capacity to protect its future functioning by addressing backsliding within 
its Member States in a more efficacious manner.  
Scope of the thesis  
While the EU’s anti-backsliding toolkit is constantly developing, the scope of this thesis is 
confined to an assessment of two mechanisms, viz., the Rule of Law Framework (RLF) and 
Article 7 TEU.45 The former is a monitoring tool which allowed the Commission to assess a 
situation in a Member State and issue recommendations with the hope that a ‘structured 
dialogue’ would be sufficient at preventing a deterioration in the rule of law. In its final stage 
the mechanism could lead to the activation of Article 7 TEU, although the conclusion of this 
mechanism is not a requirement for the initiation of Article 7. This latter mechanism may itself 
be broken down into a further two: a preventative and a sanctioning mechanism.46 Article 
7(1) TEU aims to prevent threats to the EU’s values from becoming violations either through 
recommendations issued by the Council to a Member State or through the issuing of a 
warning that a Member State is posing a ‘clear risk of a serious breach of the values found in 
Article 2 TEU’. Its sanctioning mechanism is found in Articles 7(2) and 7(3) TEU. If the European 
Council can attain unanimity and declare that a Member State has violated the EU’s values in 
a ‘serious and persistent’ manner (Article 7(2) TEU), the Council may then (in a separate 
procedure) issue sanctions under Article 7(3) TEU.  
 
44 Konrad Niklewicz, ‘Safeguarding the rule of law within the EU: lessons from the Polish experience’ 
(2017) 16 EurView 281, 288; Lawrence Freedman, Strategy: A History (OUP 2013) 104. 
45 Commission Communication 2014 (n 17) and Article 7 TEU. 
46 See Wojciech Sadurski, Poland’s Constitutional Breakdown (OUP 2019) 223. 
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The RLF and Article 7’s preventative arm have been used against Poland (to varying extents) 
and have failed to resolve backsliding. With the EU’s reservations regarding the initiation of 
its mechanisms against Hungary – a serious problem in itself, but one which is beyond the 
scope of this thesis47 – we may focus on the inability of these mechanisms to resolve 
backsliding in Poland. Given the aim of the thesis to extract lessons from the EU’s experience, 
such a narrow scope – focusing on two mechanisms in the context of one backsliding State – 
is believed to be appropriate as it allows for a more comprehensive engagement with the 
tools and the reasons for their ineffectiveness.  
Structure 
Chapter 1 will engage in a contextual assessment of the RLF and Article 7 TEU in order to 
explain how the mechanisms developed and how they were to function. First, the origins of 
Article 7 and its amendments following the Haider Affair – where the EU’s Member States 
imposed a series of unilateral diplomatic sanctions on Austria for forming a government with 
FPÖ, a far-right political party – will be discussed. It will also be highlighted how this episode 
led to the unfounded perception of the tool as ‘nuclear’ and unusable. Subsequently, it will 
be illustrated how the EU’s search for alternative tools began, which is what ultimately led to 
the formation of the RLF.  
Chapter 2 will engage in a contextual assessment of the RLF and Article 7 TEU in Poland. In 
order to illustrate how the mechanisms were implemented and how they failed, the chapter 
will first present how the Commission’s attempts at dialogue through the RLF were met with 
defiance and hostility from Poland. Secondly, it will be illustrated how the Council has failed 
to effectively utilise Article 7(1) TEU, activated by the Commission after it acknowledged the 
RLF’s inability to bring about change in Poland. The Council has failed to make use of the tools 
available under the preventative arm; it has construed a deficient format for its hearings; and 
it appears to have delegated the task of protecting the EU’s values completely to the EU’s 
other institutions, thereby illustrating a failure to acknowledge the severity of the crisis and 
the threat posed by backsliding.  
 
47 See Gábor Halmai, 'The Fall of the Rule of Law in Hungary and the Complicity of the EU' (2020) 12 
Italian J Pub L 204, 211. 
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Chapter 3 considers the reasons for the ineffectiveness of the RLF and draws lessons from its 
implementation. The chapter focuses on the RLF’s soft law nature, and the discretion left to 
the Commission under the mechanism which allowed it to engage in protracted dialogue. In 
assessing the former aspect, it will be argued that tools which lack a sanctioning or hard 
enforcement element are unsuitable for enforcing compliance when dealing with 
uncooperative actors. As to the latter, it will be highlighted that the Commission’s protracted 
discussions and its failure to escalate the EU’s response – dialoguing with Poland to no effect 
for almost two years – gave the Polish government more time to entrench itself in power and 
thereby limited the EU’s ability to resolve rule of law backsliding. This is because the more 
time regimes have to entrench themselves in power, the more difficult it will be to instigate 
change or to reverse the damage. 
Chapter 4 considers the reasons for the ineffectiveness of Article 7 TEU and draws lessons 
from its implementation. First, it will be argued that the EU’s failure to activate Article 7 in a 
timely manner weakened the EU’s capacity to resolve backsliding and neutered Article 7’s 
sanctioning arm given the unanimity threshold being rendered unattainable after Poland 
joined Hungary in its backsliding. The chapter will subsequently consider issues regarding the 
construction of the tool, i.e. its high procedural thresholds which render the tool inaccessible 
and unusable and its intergovernmental nature which renders decisions over the protection 
of the EU’s values prone to being outweighed by diplomatic expediency or financial 
considerations of States, thereby allowing matters of fundamental concern to the EU to be 
devalued and trivialised.  
The thesis will conclude by reiterating the lessons drawn the implementation of these tools. 
In short, the EU must resort to stricter means of enforcement when dealing with 
uncooperative actors. It must acknowledge the time-sensitivity of rule of law backsliding and 
therefore be pragmatic and react appropriately to its failures and ensure minimal delay in 
using its tools. It should not introduce mechanisms which are unusable, such as tools with 
unattainable procedural thresholds. More importantly, though, it should not rely solely on 
intergovernmental decision-making when its own values are at stake. These lessons may not 
be novel, but it is argued they are crucial for the EU’s future handling of the rule of law crisis. 
 
Chapter 1: Development of the Rule of 
Law Framework and Article 7 TEU  
 
1. Introduction 
Initially the EU’s main tool for enforcing compliance came in the form of the infringement’s 
procedure, now found in Articles 258-260 TFEU.1 This mechanism allows the Commission to 
bring a case to the CJEU if a Member State commits ‘specific violations of EU law’.2 The CJEU 
may in turn instruct the Member State on the measures it must adopt to remedy the breach,  
and if it refuses to comply with this legal obligation, the Commission may request the CJEU to 
impose penalty payments or a lump sum as a form of sanctions.3 However, this mechanism 
was initially confined only to the enforcement of the ‘acquis’, viz., ‘the rules of EU law’,4 and 
while the Court was able to enforce human rights as law,5 it appeared that certain values were 
not encapsulated in the EU’s acquis and were therefore unenforceable under the 
infringements procedure.6 
Accordingly, with the EU lacking a tool explicitly capable of enforcing all of its core values,  
‘[t]he initial version of the Treaties relied on the presumption of compliance by the Member 
States with the – then non-codified – values of the Communities, expressed in [inter alia] the 
 
1 Dimitry Kochenov and Laurent Pech, 'Better Late than Never: On the European Commission's Rule of 
Law Framework and Its First Activation' (2016) 54 J Common Mkt Stud 1062, 1062. 
2 ibid. 
3 Article 260 TFEU. 
4 Dimitry Kochenov, ‘Article 7: A Commentary on a Much Talked-About “Dead” Provision’ in Armin von 
Bogdandy and others (eds), Defending Checks and Balances in EU Member States: Taking Stock of 
Europe’s Actions (Springer 2021) 113. See also Laurence W Gormley, ‘Infringement Proceedings’ in 
András Jakab and Dimitry Kochenov (eds), The Enforcement of EU Law and Values: Ensuring Member 
States’ Compliance (OUP 2017) 66-70.  
5 See Case 11-70 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft v Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle für Getreide und 
Futtermittel [1979] ECR 1125, paras 3-4; Robert Schütze, An Introduction to European Law (3rd edn, 
OUP 2020) 84-6 
6 Kochenov (n 4) 133.   
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Schuman Declaration.’7 The values of the (now) EU would therefore be respected only if all of 
its Member States were equally committed to upholding them. The validity of this 
presumption, however, became questionable in the wake of the EU’s future expansions. With 
the inclusion of new states, and especially ex-USSR satellite states, it became increasingly 
untenable to maintain the presumption of compliance with the values of the rule of law and 
democracy.8 In other words, the EU’s growth meant that it was more difficult to ensure a 
homogenous grouping of Member States, all equally committed to these values. While the 
EU had already introduced the Copenhagen Conditionality criteria in 1993, which obliged 
potential applicant States to satisfy a series of requirements, such as ‘stability of institutions 
guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of 
minorities’,9 this would only work at shaping the internal functioning of States prior to their 
entry into the EU. Once they joined, the EU’s capacity to police and enforce these values 
would be limited.10 In turn, it became apparent that the EU would require a tool for the 
protection of its values in the event that Member States began to undermine them.11 
The first tool introduced to resolve this problem is now found under Article 7 TEU. This tool, 
however, proved unable to resolve the rule of law crisis (owing to the refusal of the EU’s 
institutions to activate it) and after the failure of the infringements procedure to do the same, 
the EU resorted to the creation of the RLF.  
The aim of this chapter is to provide a contextual explanation over the development and 
functioning of Article 7 TEU and the RLF. This will in turn allow us to consider whether they 
were used correctly against Poland, and to subsequently begin considering their 
ineffectiveness. 
 
7 ibid. See also Joseph HH Weiler, ‘Deciphering the Political and Legal DNA of European Integration’ in 
Julie Dickson and Pavlos Eleftheriadis (eds), Philosophical Foundations of European Law (OUP 2012) 
146-149. 
8 Kochenov (n 4) 134; Bojan Bugarič, ‘Protecting Democracy inside the EU: On Article 7 TEU and the 
Hungarian Turn to Authoritarianism’ in Carlos Closa and Dimitry Kochenov (eds), Reinforcing Rule of 
Law Oversight in the European Union (CUP 2016) 85-86; Wojciech Sadurski, 'Adding Bite to a Bark: The 
Story of Article 7, E.U. Enlargement, and Jorg Haider' (2010) 16 Colum J Eur L 385, 391. 
9 See European Council, ‘Conclusions of the Presidency’, Copenhagen, 21-22 June 1993, SN 180/1/93 
REV 1, 13; Sadurski (ibid) 425-426. 
10 Wojciech Sadurski, Poland’s Constitutional Breakdown (OUP 2019) 199-202. 
11 Kochenov (n 4) 134-135; Bruno de Witte and Gabriel N Toggenburg, ‘Human Rights and Membership 
of the European Union’ in Steve Peers and Angela Ward (eds), The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights 
(Hart Publishing 2004) 59. 
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First, Article 7 TEU – as the first mechanism introduced for the protection of the EU’s values 
– will be considered. This discussion will be made in the context of the Haider Affair – a crucial 
moment in the history of the EU’s enforcement capacity which shaped not only how Article 7 
would function but also influence the decision of the EU’s bodies not to use the tool against 
Hungary (when the violations there started in 2010) or Poland (when the violations started in 
2015). The section will therefore begin by providing an account of the Haider Affair. 
Subsequently, its implications on both the mechanism’s functioning, as well as its efficacy will 
be considered. Namely, it will be illustrated how Article 7 was amended following the Haider 
Affair, and in considering its negative implications, it will be highlighted that the mechanism 
was perceived as unusable, thereby leading the EU to consider alternative mechanisms for 
the enforcement of its values. 
Secondly, the failure of the infringement’s procedure – the other main enforcement tool 
available to the EU’s institutions – will be illustrated.  
Lastly, with the EU’s original enforcement tools ineffective, calls arose for the creation of a 
new mechanism. In turn the Commission created the RLF. The final section will therefore 
explain how this new tool was to operate.  
2. The formation of Article 7 and the Haider Affair  
Article 7 TEU was the first mechanism devised at EU level aimed at protecting the values 
stipulated in Article 2 TEU.12 To this day it ‘remains the only provision in the Treaties 
specifically tackling the issue of Member States’ respect for the founding values of the 
Union.’13 It is therefore the primary tool in addressing the rule of law crisis.  
In its initial form, as introduced through the Amsterdam Treaty, the mechanism (now found 
in Article 7 TEU) was purely a sanctioning one – if the European Council could, by unanimity, 
determine that a Member State had violated the EU’s values in a ‘serious and persistent 
manner’, the Council could then impose sanctions against that Member State.14 However, it 
soon became apparent that ‘the provision [was] unusable in the event [where] a swift 
 
12 Bugarič (n 8) 86. 
13 Matteo Bonelli, ‘A Union of Values: Safeguarding Democracy, the Rule of Law and Human Rights in 
the EU Member States’ (PhD thesis, Maastricht University 2019) 174. 
14 ibid 176; Sadurski, 2010 (n 8) 388. 
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reaction to a breach was necessary’.15 This is evident when considering the events of the 
Haider affair, where sanctions were imposed on Austria, but outside of Article 7’s framework.   
After the 1999 Austrian elections the far-right FPÖ party helped form the governing coalition. 
The issue was that the leader of FPÖ, Jörg Haider, and various officials within the party had 
been known to make xenophobic statements.16 In turn, the EU’s Member States responded 
by issuing a series of diplomatic sanctions,17 purely based on the statements made by 
members of the FPÖ party.18 Article 7 could not have been used as it required the existence 
of a ‘serious and persistent’ breach, and the situation in Austria, while potentially 
problematic, had not led to any violations of the EU’s values.19 The EU’s Member States 
therefore acted pre-emptively, and in secrecy from the European Parliament and 
Commission, imposed a series of bilateral sanctions on Austria.20 These meant that the EU’s 
14 Member States would ‘not promote or accept any bilateral official contacts at political 
level’ with the Austrian government; there would ‘be no support in favor of Austrian 
candidates seeking positions in international organizations’ and ‘Austrian Ambassadors in EU 
capitals [would] only be received at a technical level’.21 Soon after the imposition of these 
sanctions, a report published by the “three wise men” illustrated that there was no evidence 
that entering into a coalition with FPÖ created a threat for the EU’s values and the sanctions 
were soon revoked.22 This abrupt response from the Member States of the EU, in imposing 
sanctions pre-emptively, became associated with ill judgment.23 The bilateral sanctions by the 
 
15 Kochenov (n 4) 135. 
16 See Günter Wilms, ‘Protecting fundamental values in the European Union through the rule of law: 
Articles 2 and 7 TEU from a legal, historical and comparative angle’ (EUI 2017) 69.  
17 On the rationales behind these sanctions see Sadurski, 2010 (n 8) 399; Michael Merlingen, Cas 
Mudde and Ulrich Sedelmeier, ‘The Right and the Righteous? European Norms, Domestic Politics and 
the Sanctions Against Austria’ (2001) 39(1) J Common Mkt Stud 59, 60-61; Miklós Haraszti, ‘Haiderism 
East of Austria: Reaction, Impact, and Parallels’ (2000) 7(3) Constellations 305, 309. 
18 Bugarič (n 8) 86.  
19 Cécile Leconte, ‘The Fragility of the EU as a ‘Community of Values’: Lessons from the Haider Affair’ 
(2005) 28(3) W Eur Pol 620, 638-639.  
20  ibid; Sadurski, 2010 (n 8) 400. 
21 Statement from the Portuguese Presidency of the EU on behalf of the XIV Member States, Lisbon, 
31 January 2000. See also Wilms (n 16) 69. 
22 Martti Ahtisaari, Jochen Frowein and Marcelino Oreja, Report, Paris, 8 September 2000, paras 113, 
116 <https://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrc/docs/ngos/HOSI-1.pdf> accessed 25 August 2021. 
(hereinafter ‘three wise men report’). 
23 Wilms (n 16) 70, Kochenov (n 4) 135, Bugarič (n 8) 91-93, Michael Blauberger and R Daniel Kelemen, 
‘Introducing the debate: European Union safeguards against member states’ backsliding’ (2017) 24(3) 
J Eur Pub Pol 317.  
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members of the European Council were imposed without the support of, or consultation with, 
the European Parliament or Commission, and without any violation of the EU’s values having 
materialised – they therefore lacked ‘an appropriate legal basis’.24 In turn, the use of sanctions 
became viewed as ‘counterproductive’,25 and it became questionable whether the EU could 
viably enforce its values in the future.26 
This unfortunate episode is significant in two respects.27 First, and positively, it led to the 
amendment and restructuring of Article 7. Secondly, it created a perception of Article 7 as a 
‘nuclear’ tool which should never be used. 
2.1 First implication: amendments to Article 7 
While the sanctions imposed on Austria were not formally imposed by the EU, but unilaterally 
by its Member States, it soon became apparent that the EU needed a monitoring mechanism 
which would allow for engagement with a potential crisis from the outset before an actual 
violation materialises, in order to avoid such a fiasco from taking place in the future.28 It is for 
this reason that the Nice Treaty saw an inclusion of an additional, preventative arm, into the 
mechanism. Therefore, after the Haider affair and subsequent treaty amendments,29 Article 
7 would possess two mechanisms – a preventative one and a sanctioning one. But while it 
possesses two types of mechanisms, the treaty provision itself is split into three related albeit 
separate stages.  
The first stage, found in Article 7(1) TEU, aims to establish a dialogue with a Member State – 
in the form of hearings before the Council – before a violation of the EU’s values occurs.30 The 
culmination of Article 7(1) constitutes an official ‘warning’ by the EU,31 that the situation in a 
Member State is concerning and may lead to a violation of the EU’s values. Prior to this 
 
24 Bugarič (n 8) 91, Wilms (n 16) 70. 
25 Wilms (n 16) 70. 
26 Bugarič (n 8) 92. See also Erin K Jenne and Cas Mudde, ‘Hungary’s Illiberal Turn: Can Outsiders Help?’ 
(2012) 23(3) J Dem 147. 
27 Kochenov (n 4) 135. 
28 Three wise men report (n 22) para 117; Bonelli (n 13) 179.  
29 Via the Nice Treaty and later the Lisbon Treaty. See Bonelli (n 13) 180. 
30 See Three wise men report (n 22) para 117; Bonelli (n 13) 179.  
31 Commission, ‘Respect for and promotion of the values on which the Union is based’ 
(Communication) COM/2003/606 final, 7; Leonard Besselink, ‘The Bite, the Bark and the Howl Article 
7 TEU and the Rule of Law Initiatives’ in Jakab and Kochenov (n 4) 134. 
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warning, the Council may issue recommendations to the Member State instructing it on how 
to resolve the problem.  
What may follow, is an official denouncement under Article 7(2) TEU, in which ‘the existence 
of a serious and persistent breach by a Member State of the values referred to in Article 2’ is 
established. If this denouncement is made, the third stage would see an imposition of 
sanctions on the violating Member State, as stipulated in Article 7(3) TEU.  
The three stages are related, as they may be initiated progressively, starting with the official 
warning, progressing through to the denouncement, and ending with sanctions. Furthermore, 
sanctions under article 7(3) may not be initiated without a prior denouncement under article 
7(2). 
However, they are separate in that the denouncement itself (Article 7(2) TEU) need not follow 
the official warning (Article 7(1) TEU), and the sanctions (Article 7(3) TEU) need not follow 
even if a denouncement is made.32 This all depends on the political will of the institutions 
tasked with the enforcement of the mechanism. This separation is possible because Article 
7(1) TEU is activated by the Council of Ministers (with the Parliament’s consent); Article 7(2) 
TEU requires a unanimous vote in the European Council (with the Parliament’s consent), and 
the ability to impose sanctions is left not to the denouncing body (the European Council), but 
to the Council of Ministers.  
While there are three possible stages, as already acknowledged, they are often grouped into 
a ‘preventative’ arm, and a ‘sanctioning’ arm. The former relating to Article 7(1) TEU, and the 
latter referring to the combination of Articles 7(2) and 7(3) TEU. 
Before we progress to a breakdown of these two mechanisms, it should also be noted that in 
order to increase the efficacy of the tool and in supporting the provision’s effet utile, Article 
7 was given a very broad scope which would allow the EU to address violations that fell 
‘outside the scope of EU law’.33 Simply put, the provision can address violations of the EU’s 
values – such as the rule of law – taking place solely in a domestic capacity. This was crucial 
for the effective functioning of the mechanism.34 As highlighted by the Commission, Article 7 
 
32 Commission Communication (n 31) 4.  
33 Bonelli (n 13) 174; Commission Communication (n 31) 5. 
34 Kochenov (n 4) 138. 
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had to be applicable even to purely internal situations, as grave violations of the EU’s values 
may ‘undermine the very foundations of the Union and the trust between its members, 
whatever the field in which the breach occurs’.35 Indeed, if the scope of this provision was 
instead confined to activities falling within the scope of EU law, it would fail to ‘address 
serious breaches of values’.36 The EU would be unable to consider the cumulative impact of 
all the violations, instead focusing only on the measures falling within the scope of the EU’s 
acquis. Thus, the severity and systemic nature of these violations would be more difficult to 
prove, in turn rendering the mechanism too cumbersome, impractical and ineffective to use. 
The added effect of this broad scope is therefore that – since all domestic activity falls within 
the scope of Article 7 – a Member State cannot refute the EU’s supervision by claiming that it 
is acting within a sphere of sole domestic competence or rely on arguments of sovereignty 
and the need to respect national identity, as would otherwise be required by the Treaties.37 
2.1.1 Preventative arm 
The first mechanism, found in Article 7(1) TEU, is characterised by a ‘preventative mechanism 
(for the determination of a clear risk of a serious breach of EU values, not followed by any 
other sanctions)’.38 This is a predominantly dialogic mechanism: 
The idea at the basis of the procedure is not to sanction a Member State breaching EU 
values, but rather to signal the existence of a “risk” for the country in question as well 
as for the EU as a whole. The finding of a “clear risk of a serious breach” would have 
the effect of increasing the pressure on the country in question, asking it to take action 
in order to address the risk of a breach, but would also signal the willingness to work 
together towards a common solution, rather than punishing and isolating a Member 
State.39 
 
35 Commission Communication (n 31) 5 (emphasis added); Laurent Pech and Kim Lane Scheppele, 
'Illiberalism within: Rule of Law Backsliding in the EU' (2017) 19 CYELS 3, 5. 
36 Bonelli (n 13) 182. See, in particular, the inability of early infringement proceedings to address the 
crisis in Hungary. (Section 3)  
37 Bonelli (n 13) 186, Kochenov (n 4) 137, and see also Jan-Werner Müller, 'Should the EU Protect 
Democracy and the Rule of Law inside Member States' (2015) 21 ELJ 141, 144. 
38 Sadurski, 2019 (n 10) 223 (emphasis added). 
39 Bonelli (n 13) 182. 
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In order to initiate Article 7(1) TEU, first a ‘reasoned proposal’ must be issued by the 
Commission, Parliament or a third of Member States, proving that there exists a ‘clear risk’,40 
and that this risk was of a ‘serious breach’,41 of the values in Article 2 TEU. 
Subsequently, the Member State must be heard before the General Affairs Council. A 
Member State against which Article 7(1) has been initiated may be called in before the 
General Affairs Council for a hearing at any time, provided that the incumbent Council 
Presidency decides to organise such a hearing.42 These hearings allow the Member States’ 
violations to be brought to light, and therefore allow the Council to become familiar with the 
situation. The Council may in turn decide to issue recommendations to the Member State (on 
how to resolve such violations),43 or, at the final stage, issue an official warning, that a ‘clear 
risk of a serious breach’ is present. Both options follow the same procedure for adoption and 
require a four-fifths majority in the Council (22 out of 27 Member States)44 after the European 
Parliament gives its consent. The situation in the Member State would then have to be 
‘regularly’ reviewed by the Council,45 and it could lead to an activation of Article 7(2) TEU, but 
it is important to note that the ‘two procedures… are separate, and a previous activation of 
Article 7(1) TEU is not an essential requirement for the second decision under Article 7(2)’.46 
Therefore, simply put, the preventative arm of Article 7 constitutes ‘a warning signal to an 
offending Member State before the risk materialises’.47 It is to signal to the Member State 
that the EU is officially concerned with the situation transpiring. It is a monitoring mechanism, 
which should lead to ‘constant surveillance’ so that a ‘clear risk’ does not evolve into an actual 
breach.48 The hope is that the concentrated pressure of various national governments in the 
 
40 Namely, the risk must ‘have actually materialised’ (Commission Communication (n 31) 8). 
41 Meaning that both the ‘purpose’ and ‘result’ of the measures by the Member State must have the 
aim of violating the EU’s values (ibid and see Bonelli (n 13) 184). 
42 Article 237 TFEU. See also European Parliament (Parliament), ‘Resolution of 10 June 2021 on the 
rule of law situation in the European Union and the application of the Conditionality Regulation (EU, 
Euratom) 2020/2092 (2021/2711(RSP))’, P9_TA(2021)0287, para 5.  
43 See Bonelli (n 13) 181. Kochenov (n 4) 138-139. 
44 Commission, ‘Rule of Law: European Commission acts to defend judicial independence in Poland’ 
(EC Press Corner, 20 December 2017) 
<https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_17_5367> accessed 24 August 2021  
45 Article 7(1) TEU. 
46 Bonelli (n 12) 182-183. 




Council and various EU institutions will be sufficient to convince the Member State concerned 
to resolve the problem before further action needs to be taken. The mechanism is therefore 
purely preventative and dialogic – it does not lead to or foresee the introduction of any 
sanctions. 
2.1.2 Sanctioning arm 
Articles 7(2) and 7(3) TEU are separate steps, and the conclusion of the former does not 
automatically lead to the latter – this separation being possible due to the fact that the 
determinations are made by two different bodies49 – but taken together they represent the 
sanctioning arm of Article 7. This mechanism is reserved for instances where a Member State 
has seriously and persistently violated the EU’s values.50  
Article 7(2) TEU may be initiated by the Commission or one third of Member States.51 
Subsequently, the Member State concerned may ‘submit its observations’ to the European 
Council, after which – given Parliament’s consent52 – the European Council would vote on the 
existence of a ‘serious and persistent breach’ of the EU’s values by unanimity.53 If unanimity 
is attained, this would constitute a denouncement, signalling that a Member State has been 
violating the EU’s values. By itself, this amounts to no more than condemnation. However, 
this condemnation is an essential precondition for the imposition of sanctions under Article 
7(3) TEU. 
Under Article 7(3) TEU, the Council may impose sanctions on a Member State against which 
the Article 7(2) TEU denouncement had been made, voting by a qualified majority.54 These 
sanctions may include the suspension of a Member States’ voting rights,55 but they could also 
 
49 See Bonelli (n 12) 185. 
50 Kochenov (n 4) 141. See also Armin von Bogdandy and Michael Ioannidis, ‘Systemic Deficiency in 
the Rule of Law: what it is, what has been done, what can be done’ (2014) 51(1) CML Rev 59. 
51 The European Parliament is unable to do so; it may only encourage the eligible institutions to do so. 
Parliament, ‘Rules of Procedure’ (8th parliamentary term, January 2017) (hereinafter “Rules of 
Procedure”), Rule 83. See Besselink (n 31) 132; Bonelli (n 12) 184; Kochenov (n 4) 140-141. 
52 Rules of Procedure (n 51) and Article 354 TFEU. See also Kochenov (n 4) 144; Bonelli (n 12) 184.  
53 Namely, it is to be determined that the breach ‘lasts some time’ (persistence), taking into account 
its ‘purpose’ and ‘result’ (seriousness). See Commission (n 30) 8; Bonelli (n 12) 184. 
54 The voting requirements in Article 7 exclude the Member State against which the vote is taken 
(Article 354 TFEU). See Besselink (n 31) 132; Kochenov (n 4) 143.  
55 Article 7(3) TEU; Patrick Lavelle, 'Europe's Rule of Law Crisis: An Assessment of the EU's Capacity to 
Address Systemic Breaches of Its Foundational Values in Member States' (2019) 22 TCLR 35, 41. 
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concern any ‘right deriving from the application of the Treaties’.56 This is because Article 7(3)’s 
language is not exhaustive, and refers to the suspension of ‘certain of the rights deriving from 
the application of the Treaties’.57 It is therefore possible to argue that the sanctions which 
may be imposed are broad, and ‘[l]ess intrusive measures are certainly foreseeable… [such 
as] the use of financial sanctions or the suspension of EU structural funding. The provision 
leaves a broad discretion to the Council in this sense.’58 
The procedural thresholds of the sanctioning arm of the mechanism are therefore far more 
demanding than the preventative arm, as it requires unanimity in the European Council 
without which sanctions may not be adopted (even if, for the imposition of sanctions, only a 
qualified majority is required). 
Finally, as stipulated in Article 7(4) TEU, these sanctions may be altered or revoked, also by 
qualified majority in the Council if the situation in the Member State improves.59 
In sum, the sanctioning arm of Article 7 constitutes an escalation in the EU’s rule-of-law-
response-toolkit, even if it is a mechanism with an extremely high procedural threshold, 
requiring unanimity in the European Council before sanctions may begin to be considered. 
The EU’s Member States must be conscious of the fact that if they violate the EU’s values, 
they may face a series of sanctions. In theory, this acts as a deterrent against such action.  
2.2 Second implication: Article 7 as a ‘nuclear’ tool 
Despite the introduction of a weaker non-sanctioning provision into Article 7, and the fact 
that the sanctions imposed on Austria were not formally EU measures, Article 7’s reputation 
was tarnished.60 The mechanism was later famously termed by Commissioner Barroso as a 
‘nuclear option’.61 A term which stuck; it convinced successive Commissioners to refrain from 
 
56 Gábor Halmai, ‘How the EU Can and Should Cope with Illiberal Member States’ (2018) 38(2) 
Quaderni Constituzionali 313, 334; Besselink (n 31) 129-131. 
57 Article 7(3) TEU (emphasis added). See Besselink (n 31) 129; Kochenov (n 4) 142. 
58 Bonelli (n 12) 185. See also Tomas Dumbrovsky, ‘Beyond Voting Rights Suspension: Tailored 
Sanctions as Democracy Catalyst under Article 7 TEU’ (2018) EUI Working Papers RSCAS 2018/12 
<http://hdl.handle.net/1814/52925> accessed 24 August 2021. cf Bugarič (n 8) 98; Roland Bieber and 
Francesco Maiani, ‘Enhancing Centralized Enforcement of EU Law: Pandora’s Toolbox?’ (2014) 51 CML 
Rev 1057, 1082, 1084-1085.  
59 Article 7(4) TEU. 
60 See Wilms (n 16) 70, Kochenov (n 4) 135-136. 




using it against Hungary, when the crisis there started in 2010.62 Thus, Article 7 became 
associated with the improper use of sanctions; it was perceived as an ‘unusable’ tool.63 The 
belief was that Article 7 could not be used as it was simply too ‘toxic’; and its effects would 
be ‘too devastating to make it practicable.’64  
However, this attitude towards Article 7 (and its connection to the Haider affair) is deeply 
unfounded.65 It completely ignores the introduction of the preventative arm, which by itself 
could not lead to sanctions. Furthermore, each stage of Article 7 is divided and separate – 
even the conclusion of the preventative arm would then require a separate initiation of Article 
7(2) TEU, which would require the unanimity of the European Council even before a separate 
institution would be able to impose sanctions. Those sanctions – contrary to the unfounded 
nuclear myth – need not lead to the nuclear suspension of voting rights, with the Council 
possessing complete discretion over which sanctions to introduce.66 Another convincing 
argument states that refusing to initiate Article 7 against Hungary (and later Poland), based 
on the Austrian experience, is unfounded considering that these States ‘have a sustained track 
record… [with] ample evidence of actual, repeated and systemic rule of law violations’, and 
the situation therefore is completely different from Austria where no actual violations had 
occurred.67  
Nonetheless, while the idea of Article 7 as ‘nuclear’ is now increasingly acknowledged as 
unfounded, the point remains – the ‘nuclear’ perception of Article 7 meant that the tool 
would not be used, thereby depriving the EU from being able to address the crisis developing 
in Hungary in a timely manner. 
 
62 See Bugarič (n 8) 94-95.  
63 Müller (n 58) 17. See Commission Communication (n 30) 12; Besselink (n 31) 134-135; Kochenov 
and Pech 2016 (n 1) 1067; Frans Timmermans, 'The European Union and the Rule of Law’ (Conference 
on the Rule of Law, Tilburg University, 31 August 2015).  
64 Kochenov (n 4) 132, 136. 
65 Kochenov and Pech 2016 (n 1) 1067; Kochenov (n 4) 136. 
66 Bonelli (n 12) 185. 
67 Dimitry Kochenov, Laurent Pech and Kim Lane Scheppele, ‘The European Commission’s Activation 
of Article 7: Better Late than Never?’ (Verfassungsblog, 23 December 2017) 
<https://verfassungsblog.de/the-european-commissions-activation-of-article-7-better-late-than-
never/>  accessed 24 August 2021; Kochenov and Pech 2016 (n 1) 1067-1068. 
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Before progressing, we may also point to a few other reasons as to why Article 7 was 
perceived as unusable, which have possibly stemmed from its perception as a nuclear tool.68 
First, the mechanism was viewed as impossible to use, because it possesses high procedural 
thresholds such as the four-fifths supermajority required to conclude the preventative arm or 
the unanimity requirement under Article 7(2) TEU.69 The Commission may have therefore 
been reluctant to initiate either of the mechanisms owing to the fact that if insufficient 
support from the States in either council was present, the tool would fail thus reinforcing the 
perception of Article 7 as ineffective, and potentially validating the behaviour of violating 
Member States.70 It was also problematic that the operative decision-making under Article 7 
rests in the hands of intergovernmental institutions, which cannot be compelled to vote on 
the existence of a ‘clear risk of a serious breach’, a ‘serious and persistent breach’ or as to the 
imposition of sanctions – there was therefore no guarantee that even if the procedure was 
initiated, that it would reach a conclusion.71 
Therefore, while the introduction of Article 7 marked a positive development in the EU’s 
enforcement toolkit, theoretically equipping it with a tool for the enforcement of its values, 
the Haider affair and the subsequent concerns stemming from it had seemingly closed the 
door to the possibility of utilising the tool when arguably it was necessary. 
3. Thinking up alternatives: the failure of the infringement’s procedure 
With Article 7 seen as unusable, the EU still had the infringement’s procedure it could rely on 
against Hungary.72 This too, however, proved inadequate, mostly owing to its scope which 
was ‘too narrow to address the structural problem which persistently noncompliant Member 
States pose’.73 Indeed, ‘the Commission has construed its powers as confined strictly to the 
areas where concrete, specific provisions of the EU's acquis have been breached.’74 Since the 
 
68 Sadurski, 2019 (n 10) 223-224; Wilms (n 16) 74. 
69 Dimitry Kochenov and Laurent Pech, 'Monitoring and Enforcement of the Rule of Law in the EU: 
Rhetoric and Reality' (2015) 11 EuConst 512, 517. 
70 Wilms (n 15) 68-69.  
71 Kochenov and Pech 2015 (n 69). See Case T-337/03 Bertelli Galvez v Commission EU:T:2004:106, 
[2004] ECRII-1041, para 15.  
72 Kochenov and Pech 2015 (n 69) 517. 
73 Halmai (n 56) 316; Bugarič (n 8) 96-97; Kochenov and Pech 2016 (n 1) 1065; cf Christophe Hillion, 
‘Overseeing the Rule of Law in the EU: Legal Mandate and Means’ in Closa and Kochenov (n 8) 66.  
74 Kochenov and Pech 2016 (n 1) 1065. See also Lavelle (n 55) 46.  
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EU lacks a competence over the structuring of national justice systems, the Commission 
initially felt unable to bring infringement actions for ‘governmental attacks on courts’75 
Accordingly, in its early jurisprudence regarding Hungary, where the age of retirement for 
judges was lowered, thereby ‘remov[ing] from office the most senior ten percent of the 
judiciary, including a lot of court presidents, and members of the [SC]’, the action for 
infringement brought by the Commission was based on age discrimination.76 The problem of 
such approaches, even where a violation of EU law is found, is that they do not capture the 
essence of the problem, which is the undermining of checks and balances, and are therefore 
unable to ‘impose effective remedies’.77  
Fortunately, the approach of the CJEU has constantly been improving in the context of the 
rule of law crisis. Indeed, while the competence over the structuring of a national justice 
system remains with Member States, meaning that the EU lacks a legal basis to act in this 
sphere,78 the CJEU has since extended its jurisdiction. It has inter alia highlighted that Member 
States – even when exercising their sole competences – must comply with their obligations in 
EU law, which include the provision stipulated in Article 19(1) TEU that ‘Member States shall 
provide remedies sufficient to ensure effective legal protection in the fields covered by Union 
law’.79 Such ‘effective legal protection’ is impossible to ensure if the judiciary is not 
independent or impartial.80 Accordingly, the CJEU has held that Member States must ensure 
the independence of their judiciaries for the proper functioning of EU law. In other words, the 
Court has interpreted teleologically a somewhat procedural provision found in Article 19(1) 
 
75 Pech and Scheppele (n 35) 13. 
76 Halmai (n 56) 316.  
77 Kochenov and Pech 2015 (n 69) 520; Kochenov and Pech 2016 (n 1) 1068-1069; and Bugarič (n 8) 
85, 95-96; Lavelle (n 55) 47; Pech and Scheppele (n 35) 13. 
78 See Article 5(1)-(2) TEU.  
79 See Case C-791/19 Commission v Poland (disciplinary regime for judges) EU:C:2021:596, paras 50-
53, 56, 95, 136. See also Kim Lane Scheppele, Dimitry Kochenov and Barbara Grabowska-Moroz, ‘EU 
Values are Law, after All: Enforcing EU Values through Systemic Infringement Actions by the European 
Commission and the Member States of the European Union’ (2020) 39 YB Eur L 3, 12, 17, 19. 
80 Case C-791/19 (n 79) para 57. See also Case C-64/16 Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses v 
Tribunal de Contas EU:C:2018:117, paras 32-37. 
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TEU to create an obligation under EU law requiring Member States to ensure independence 
of their judiciaries, thereby protecting the rule of law.81 
Despite the recent progression in the CJEU’s jurisprudence however, the point remains that 
initially this tool was too narrow to effectively capture the cumulative effects of various 
legislative measures aimed at dismantling domestic checks and balances. The mechanism 
could not address the problem at hand directly, and therefore appropriate remedies could 
not be issued. The infringements procedure was therefore perceived as incapable of 
adequately addressing the rule of law crisis.82  
Thus, as the rule of law crisis in the EU unfolded, it became apparent that neither tool was 
able to adequately address rule of law backsliding. The backsliding in Hungary started in 2010 
with the election of Victor Orban’s Fidesz party, but neither Article 7 TEU nor infringements 
proceedings were able to sufficiently address the dismantling of checks and balances and the 
assault on the rule of law there. The EU therefore resorted to the creation of the RLF.83 
4. The Rule of Law Framework introduced 
Due to the inability of the EU’s mechanisms to address the emerging rule of law crises, calls 
arose for ‘a new and more effective mechanism to safeguard values in Member States’.84 The 
mechanism created in turn – the RLF85 – was aimed at bridging the gap between these two 
mechanisms, with the hope that it would succeed where the previous ones failed.86 Indeed, 
the tools had some positive aspects which the RLF would attempt to replicate. Infringement 
proceedings could not be blocked by Member States, and could be initiated relatively easily, 
 
81 Aleksandra Kustra-Rogatka, ‘The Rule of Law Crisis as the Watershed Moment for the European 
Constitutionalism’ (Verfassungsblog, 14 November 2019) <https://verfassungsblog.de/the-rule-of-
law-crisis-as-the-watershed-moment-for-the-european-constitutionalism/> accessed 24 August 
2021. See also, Kochenov (n 4) 146-148; Lavelle (n 55) 46; Gábor Halmai, ‘The Possibility 
and Desirability of Rule of Law Conditionality’ (2019) 11 HJRL 171, 179. 
82 Halmai 2019 (ibid) 176; Scheppele, Kochenov and Grabowska-Moroz (n 79). 
83 Bonelli (n 12) 189-190. 
84 Letter of the Foreign Ministers of Denmark, Finland, Germany and the Netherlands to the President 
of the European Commission and to the Presidency of the Council, 6 March 2013; Bonelli (n 12) 190. 
See also Robert Grzeszczak and Stephen Terrett, 'The EU's Role in Policing the Rule of Law: Reflections 
on Recent Polish Experience' (2018) 69 NILQ 347, 357. 
85 Commission, ‘A new EU Framework to strengthen the Rule of Law’ (Communication) 
COM/2014/0158 final. 
86 Bonelli (n 12) 190; Kochenov and Pech 2015 (n 69) 531.  
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with the Commission bringing the case to the CJEU but were unable to capture and address 
the cumulative effect of the backsliding measures, as they focused specifically on violations 
of the EU’s acquis. Article 7, on the other hand, possessed a sufficiently broad scope but was 
too cumbersome and politically costly to utilise. The RLF therefore bridged the gap between 
the broad scope but difficult to utilise Article 7, and the narrow scope but comparatively easy 
to initiate infringement’s procedure. The RLF would be completely controlled by the 
Commission, thereby removing the issues associated with Article 7’s procedural thresholds, 
and it would address ‘systemic threats’ to the rule of law, before they turned into a ‘clear risk 
of a serious breach’ as required by Article 7(1) TEU, thereby ensuring the tool was not 
confined to the EU’s acquis.87 The new mechanism was created unilaterally by the 
Commission through a communication, a non-legally binding instrument which amounted to 
the creation of a purely dialogic monitoring tool. Accordingly, it did not amount to an illegal 
extension of the Commission’s powers, which would have otherwise required a Treaty 
amendment, as the need to carry out a degree of monitoring is inherent in the preventative 
arm of Article 7(1) TEU, which requires the initiating body to produce a ‘reasoned proposal’.88  
Before we proceed to an explanation of how the tool was to function, the two goals of the 
mechanism will be clarified.89 The mechanism’s main function was to ‘to prevent perceived 
systemic threats to the rule of law from escalating.’90 This was to be done through a process 
of ‘structured dialogue’ between EU institutions and a Member State who appears to be 
threatening the rule of law, thereby serving as an ‘early warning tool’.91 This structured 
dialogue is reflected in the RLF’s three stages. It was hoped that this dialogue would be 
sufficient to encourage the Member State to resolve the violations itself – before any further 
supranational intervention was necessary. 
 
87 Commission Communication 2014 (n 85) 6. 
88 Kochenov and Pech 2015 (n 69) 525 (emphasis added). cf Council, ‘Commission’s Communication 
on a new EU Framework to Strengthen the Rule of Law’ (Opinion of the Legal Service) Brussels, 27 May 
2014, Doc 10296/14. See also Grzeszczak and Terrett (n 84) 35, Armin von Bogdandy, Carlino 
Antpöhler, and Michael Ioannidis, ‘Protecting EU Values: Reverse Solange and the Rule of Law 
Framework’ in András Jakab and Dimitry Kochenov (n 4). 
89 See Wilms (n 16) 76; Sadurski, 2019 (n 10) 214. 
90 Kochenov and Pech 2016 (n 1) 1066. 
91 Kochenov and Pech 2015 (n 69) 521-522; Halmai (n 56) 316-317. See also Commission, ‘Further 
strengthening the Rule of Law within the Union: State of play and possible next steps’ 
(Communication) COM/2019/163 final. 
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The second and subsidiary goal of the RLF was to precede and facilitate the activation of 
Article 7.92 Indeed, the Commission’s ability to assess the situation in a Member State aimed 
to ‘resolve future threats to the rule of law in Member States before the conditions for 
activating the mechanisms foreseen in Article 7 TEU would be met.’93 But it was to be without 
prejudice to the activation of other tools. It was therefore to compliment the activation of 
infringements or Article 7; it is for this reason that the RLF also became known as a ‘pre-Article 
7’ procedure, or a ‘pre-preventative procedure’.94 The Commission’s findings under the RLF 
were to strengthen the possibility of activating Article 7(1) TEU. 
With this in mind we may consider the three stages of the RLF which aimed to prevent a 
deterioration through ‘structured dialogue’. It should be noted that each stage of the RLF is 
‘purely discretionary’ for the Commission.95 The Commission decides when and if to initiate 
the mechanism, and how exactly it should escalate its response with each subsequent step. 
4.1 Stage 1: Assessment: Informal Dialogue and Opinion 
In the first stage, the Commission engages in a ‘preliminary assessment’ of the situation in 
the Member State, to see if a ‘systemic threat to the rule of law’ exists.96 The Commission will 
look for violations which are not sporadic or one off violations,97 but situations where   inter 
alia ‘the authorities of a Member State are taking measures or are tolerating situations which 
are likely to systematically and adversely affect the integrity, stability or the proper 
functioning of the institutions and the safeguard mechanisms established at national level to 
secure the rule of law.’98 Accordingly, the Commission will collect information and engage in 
‘confidential and informal’ dialogue with the Member State over the perceived violation.99  
 
92 Kochenov and Pech 2015 (n 69) 521-522.  
93 Commission Communication 2014 (n 85) 4.  
94 Hillion (73) 78-79. 
95 Bonelli (n 12) 192. 
96 Commission Communication 2014 (n 85) 7-8. 
97 ibid 6. 
98 ibid 6-7. For a critique of the substantive criteria of the RLF see, e.g., Bonelli (n 12) 191, Kochenov 
and Pech 2015 (n 69) 523-524, Sadurski, 2019 (n 10) 217-218. 
99 The RLF officially states that dialogue begins with the issuing of an Opinion. However, as Bonelli 
highlights, the Commission’s informal dialogue may begin even before the issuing of the Opinion 
(Commission Communication 2014 (n 85) 7-8 cf. Bonelli (n 12) 192). 
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If upon this assessment the Commission believes a threat to the rule of law exists, it will 
elaborate its concerns by issuing a ‘rule of law opinion’.100 The content of the Opinion as well 
as that of the informal dialogue remains confidential to ‘facilitate quickly reaching a 
solution’.101 
4.2 Stage 2: Recommendation 
If the Member State does not adhere to the Opinion issued by the Commission, it will in turn 
issue a recommendation.102 Under this second stage, the Commission clarifies how the 
Member State is posing a threat to the rule of law, provides specific guidelines on how to 
resolve the problem, giving the Member State a deadline in which it must respond. This text 
is ‘made public by the Commission’.103 
4.3 Stage 3: Follow-up 
Lastly, if the recommendation is ignored (or there is continued insufficient response by the 
Member State concerned) a follow-up process is engaged in by the Commission, whereby it 
will ‘monitor’ the response of the Member State concerned with the previously issued 
recommendation.104  
The Communication introducing the RLF stipulated that: 
This monitoring can be based on further exchanges with the Member State concerned 
and could, for example, focus on whether certain practices which raise concerns 
continue to occur, or on how the Member State implements the commitments it has 
made in the meantime to resolve the situation.105  
If this dialogue failed, and there is ‘no satisfactory follow-up to the recommendation by the 
Member State concerned within the time limit set, the Commission will assess the possibility 
of activating one of the mechanisms set out in Article 7 TEU’.106 
At this stage we may make three comments on the enforcement capacity of the tool.  
 
100 Commission Communication 2014 (n 85) 7. 
101 ibid 8.   
102 ibid.  
103 ibid.  
104 ibid.  
105 ibid. (emphasis added). 
106 ibid.  
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First, the mechanism indicates that dialogue may be continued with the Member State as a 
form of follow-up, but as we will see in the following chapter, Poland’s refusal to adhere to 
the Commission’s original recommendation was followed-up by three other 
recommendations. The Commission has consequently been criticised for issuing ‘ad hoc 
recommendations’ which were not explicitly foreseen in the original mechanism, thereby 
delaying meaningful escalation of the EU’s response.107 
Secondly, unlike the infringement’s procedure or the sanctioning arm of Article 7, this is a soft 
law tool.108 It does not possess a legally binding element, viz., it lacks an enforcement 
mechanism for non-compliance with the Commission’s recommendations.109 The Member 
State in question may not, for example, be brought before the CJEU for its failure to adhere 
to the Commission’s recommendations. Moreover, the RLF does not foresee the imposition 
of sanctions as it is a purely dialogic and diplomatic mechanism. 
Thirdly, there was no obligation on the Commission to initiate Article 7(1) TEU. This omission 
was perhaps aimed at ensuring that this mechanism would be as non-confrontational as 
possible. But as will be discussed in the context of the mechanism’s failure, this lack of an 
automatic connection to Article 7 may be perceived as problematic, as it allowed the 
Commission to delay the activation of Article 7.110  
5. Conclusion 
The introduction of Article 7 marked a crucial stage for the EU, as it possessed for the first 
time a tool aimed specifically at the protection of its values. It possesses the broadest scope 
of any EU tool, able to address any violation to the EU’s values. It allows for constant 
monitoring and surveillance; it allows the Council (under Article 7(1) TEU) and the European 
Council (through its denouncement under Article 7(2) TEU) to induce political pressure upon 
a State to halt its violations of the EU’s values; and it may ultimately lead to the imposition of 
 
107 Kochenov (n 4) 140. 
108 See Chapter 3, section 2. See also Artur Nowak-Far, The Rule of Law Framework in the European 
Union: Its Rationale, Origins, Role and International Ramifications’ in Von Bogdandy (n 4) 320.  
109 Soft law in this thesis will be distinguished from hard law based on the differences in their 
enforcement capacity (Chapter 3 Section 2.1). See also Matej Avbelj and others, ‘EU Soft Law in the 
EU Legal Order: A Literature Review’ (SoLAR Working Paper Forthcoming) 7 
<https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3346629>  accessed 24 August 2021. 
110 See Chapter 3 Section 3.2. See also Kochenov and Pech 2016 (n 1) 1067. 
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sanctions as the ultimate deterrent. It is therefore prima facie a powerful tool, capable of 
defending the EU’s values. It can theoretically dissuade violations through political pressure 
and/or the threat (and actual imposition) of sanctions. It also allows the EU to preserve itself 
by isolating a Member State (by suspending its voting and membership rights) so that its 
violations may not harm the EU’s functioning.111 However, following the Haider Affair and the 
rise of scepticism surrounding the tool’s use, at a time when rule of law backsliding first 
started with Hungary, the EU seemed incapable of addressing the threat as it refused to use 
the tool tailored for this exact situation. Indeed, despite the introduction of the weaker, 
preventative arm, the mechanism was still perceived as unusable and was not activated 
against Hungary when the situation there begun to develop in 2010. 
Instead, the EU resorted to infringement proceedings which proved incapable of addressing 
backsliding due to their narrow scope. In response, in the belief that the EU’s other tools were 
incapable of resolving the threat posed by rule of law backsliding, the Commission created 
the RLF. But despite the introduction of this new tool in 2014 it still was not used against 
Hungary, this is so despite clear signs of the rule of law being undermined.112 Instead, when 
the EU had been faced with another backsliding State in the form of Poland, the Commission 
decided to act only then – not against the original violator, but against this new offender. 
Therefore, in early 2016 the RLF was used against Poland (and only against Poland), and not 
against Hungary, the Member State for which the mechanism was devised. In practice, as the 
following chapter will illustrate, both the RLF and the subsequently activated Article 7 proved 
ineffective at resolving backsliding in Poland.  
Thus, while the EU’s apparent search for enforcement tools capable of protecting its values 
reflects an acknowledgment of the threat posed by their violations, it would appear that once 
activated, the tools created are powerless against openly defiant States. It appears that the 
EU was willing to enforce its values, but that it was simply unable to do so.  
Consequently, knowing the context of these tools, and how they were to function, we may 
proceed to an assessment of how they were used against Poland and begin to consider why 
exactly they were unable to address the problems they were designed for.  
 
111 Müller (n 36) 114. 
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Chapter 2: The Tools in Practice  
 
1. Introduction 
The EU first responded to the backsliding in Poland through the RLF soon after the electoral 
victories of the PiS government and their almost immediate attack on the judiciary. The 
mechanism was initiated by the Commission in January 2016 and the dialogue under the 
mechanism lasted until December 2017 when the Commission ultimately conceded that 
despite its four recommendations and attempts at dialogue, Poland was uncooperative and 
the threat to the rule of law was constantly increasing.1 With the failure of the RLF, the 
Commission (rightly) felt compelled to activate Article 7(1) TEU. However, despite the 
initiation of the mechanism, nothing was achieved. The rule of law in Poland continued to be 
violated as if nothing happened,2 and Minister Czaputowicz even described the tool as 
‘dead’.3 There is some truth to his derogatory comment as the Council has failed to make use 
of the tools available to it under Article 7’s preventative arm: the hearings held have been 
infrequent and have illustrated the insignificant support from the Member States for the 
procedure, no recommendations have been issued and the mechanism has not been 
concluded, viz., there has not been a vote over the existence of a ‘clear risk of a serious 
breach’ in Poland. This being so despite a constant deterioration in Poland which has seen its 
internal rule of law violations produce very real and external problems for the EU, and which 
 
1 Commission, ‘Proposal for a Council Decision on the determination of a clear risk of a serious breach 
by the Republic of Poland of the rule of law (Reasoned Proposal)’ COM/2017/835 final, paras 171, 173-
175.  
2 See Section 3.2 in this chapter. For more recent signs of deterioration in Poland, see also: 
Commission, ‘2020 Rule of Law Report: Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Poland’ 
SWD/2020/320 final (hereinafter “Commission 2020”); Commission, ‘2021 Rule of Law Report: 
Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Poland’ SWD/2021/722 final (hereinafter “Commission 
2021”).  
3 Polsat News, ‘”Artykuł 7 jest martwy; Komisja Europejska przegrała” [Article 7 is dead; the European 
Commission lost]’ (PolsatNews (author tr), 11 December 2018) 
<www.polsatnews.pl/wiadomosc/2018-12-11/czaputowicz-kosiniak-kamysz-goscmi-wydarzen-i-
opinii-transmisja/>  accessed 20 August 2021. 
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arguably puts it firmly into the ‘serious and persistent breach’ category.4 It would thus seem 
that at a time when the EU is facing one of its most serious challenges, Article 7 TEU – the 
EU’s prime tool for the protection of its values – appears redundant. 
In order to illustrate how these tools have turned out in practice, this chapter’s assessment 
will be provided in two parts.  
First, the EU’s initial response to the crisis in Poland through the RLF, between January 2016 
and December 2017 will be considered. The section will consider the circumstances 
surrounding each of the four recommendations issued by the Commission, in order to 
highlight how the Commission’s pressure and attempts at dialogue were ignored by Poland. 
Thus, while the Commission attempted to prevent further deterioration through dialogue, 
Poland continued to subordinate the judiciary and entrench itself in power.  
Secondly, given that only the preventative arm of Article 7 has been initiated, the tool’s 
operation in practice will be considered from December 2017 onwards. In order to illustrate 
the mechanism’s failure, it will first be highlighted how the implementation of the mechanism 
in 2018 (its early stages) resulted in the organisation of three hearings – the format of which 
was deficient and – which failed to produce any change or exert any substantial pressure on 
Poland. Secondly, it will be highlighted how the Council had seemingly lost interest with the 
proceedings, as no hearing was held from December 2018 until June 2021, this being so 
despite Poland’s continuous deterioration. Accordingly, it will be argued that the Council has 
failed to utilise Article 7(1) TEU appropriately: it failed to illustrate adequate concern with the 
crisis in 2019 and 2020 by failing to hold hearings, and to this day it has failed to exert any 
meaningful pressure on Poland through its recommendations or its official warning.  
With the RLF seemingly incapable of halting violations and with Article 7(1) TEU utilised 
ineffectively, the situation in Poland has worsened. The EU has prima facie been incapable of 
resolving the threat it is increasingly facing via rule of law backsliding.  
 
 
4 Dimitry Kochenov, ‘Article 7: A Commentary on a Much Talked-About “Dead” Provision’ in Armin von 
Bogdandy and others (eds), Defending Checks and Balances in EU Member States: Taking Stock of 
Europe’s Actions (Springer 2021) 114. 
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2. The Rule of Law Framework: January 2016 – December 2017 
After securing the post of the President in August 2015, and the Parliament in October 2015, 
PiS controlled the executive and legislative branches. The regime subsequently engaged in a 
crusade to subordinate the judiciary, and in their first two years in power this was largely 
achieved.5 This assault came in two phases.6 In the first phase, PiS disabled effective judicial 
review and turned the CT into a supporter of the regime. In the second phase, no longer 
concerned with scrutiny by the CT, the PiS government began to pass substantive legislation 
affecting the composition and functioning of ordinary courts and the SC. As the situation in 
Poland was deteriorating, the Commission attempted to engage in dialogue through the RLF. 
However, while the original Communication stated that the dialogue would be ‘structured’, 
in practice the Commission appeared to change the way it enforced its creation.7 The 
Communication establishing the RLF assumed that non-compliance with informal dialogue 
would lead to the issuing of an Opinion, followed by a recommendation, and finally to the 
follow-up stage and a possible activation of Article 7. Instead of following this process, the 
Commission issued three additional ‘ad hoc’ recommendations after the first one was not 
complied with. Thus, instead of escalation to Article 7 following non-compliance with the first 
recommendation, we instead saw protracted and ineffective dialogue. Indeed, after each 
substantive rule of law breach by Poland, the Commission issued a recommendation, which 
Poland proceeded to denounce, criticise, and ignore.  
In order to illustrate the ineffectiveness of the RLF in constraining Poland’s backsliding, this 
section will consider the circumstances surrounding each of the four recommendations.  
2.1 Dialogue initiated: informal dialogue, Opinion and the first recommendation 
The newly elected government’s first major assault on the rule of law came in the form of 
undermining the operation of the CT, whose role is to ‘adjudicat[e]… on the Constitutionality 
 
5 Laurent Pech and Kim Lane Scheppele, 'Illiberalism Within: Rule of Law Backsliding in the EU' (2017) 
19 CYELS 3, 14-21. 
6 Matteo Bonelli, ‘A Union of Values: Safeguarding Democracy, the Rule of Law and Human Rights in 
the EU Member States’ (PhD thesis, Maastricht University 2019) 277; Marcin Matczak, ‘Poland: From 
Paradigm to Pariah? Polish Constitutional crisis – facts and interpretations’ (University of Oxford, 8 
March 2018) <https://www.fljs.org/poland-paradigm-pariah> accessed 24 August 2021. 
7 Dimitry Kochenov and Laurent Pech, 'Better Late than Never: On the European Commission's Rule of 
Law Framework and Its First Activation' (2016) 54 J Common Mkt Stud 1062, 1066-1067, 1070; 
Kochenov (n 4) 139. 
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of legislation.’8 The regime had to dispose of any meaningful ‘procedural and institutional 
avenue to enforce constitutional rules’ as otherwise any plans to entrench themselves in 
power would be short-lived.9 The regime first incapacitated the CT with legislation aimed at 
affecting its functioning, and it began to unconstitutionally staff the CT with its supporters 
with the aim of changing its composition.10  
The CT’s functioning was affected by a series of laws aiming to preoccupy the Court and create 
a backlog in cases, so that it would not engage in scrutinizing other, substantive, PiS legislation 
for compatibility with the Constitution.11 For instance, one such law stipulated that the CT 
would have to handle cases in chronological order, thereby shielding newer laws from 
scrutiny.12 While the CT ultimately decided these laws to be unconstitutional,13 they did – as 
planned – slow down the work of the Court, and in any case they were not enforced by the 
PiS government which found them improperly passed, citing as an excuse the fact that the CT 
had not adhered to the new rules on its functioning.14 
PiS also began its subordination of the CT via unlawful appointments.15 In order to understand 
how this took place, it should be noted that the Sejm (lower house of Parliament) is 
responsible for selecting candidates to the CT, which then must be approved by the President. 
The President’s role, in this context, is not voluntary but obligatory. The President must swear 
in the judges legitimately appointed by the legislature.16 Bearing this in mind, one should also 
be aware that Andrzej Duda – aligned with PiS – won the Presidential elections in August 
2015, prior to the PiS government’s parliamentary election victory in late October 2015. The 
 
8 Commission 2020 (n 2) 2; Polish Constitution, Article 188; Wojciech Sadurski, Poland’s Constitutional 
Breakdown (OUP 2019) 61. 
9 Tomasz Tadeusz Koncewicz, ‘Farewell to the Separation of Powers – On the Judicial Purge and the 
Capture in the Heart of Europe’ (Verfassungsblog, 19 July 2017) <https://verfassungsblog.de/farewell-
to-the-separation-of-powers-on-the-judicial-purge-and-the-capture-in-the-heart-of-europe/>  
accessed 23 March 2020. See also Sadurski (n 8) 2-3, 50-52, 58; Robert Grzeszczak and Stephen Terrett, 
'The EU's Role in Policing the Rule of Law: Reflections on Recent Polish Experience' (2018) 69 NILQ 
347, 348. 
10 Sadurski (n 8) 58-95. 
11 ibid 70-75. 
12 Commission, ‘Commission Recommendation (EU) 2016/1374 of 27 July 2016 regarding the rule of 
law in Poland’ [2016] OJ L 217, para 26 (hereinafter “Recommendation 1 2016”). See Sadurski (n 8) 
72. 
13 See Constitutional Tribunal, Judgment of 9 March 2016, K 47/15. See also Sadurski (n 8) 71ff. 
14 Recommendation 1 2016 (n 12) paras 18-24; Sadurski (n 8) 74.  
15 Recommendation 1 2016 (n 12) paras 3-17; Sadurski (n 8) 61-70. 
16 See Constitutional Tribunal, Judgment of 3 December 2015, K 34/15. 
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previous government, in anticipation of a potential electoral loss, appointed earlier in October 
five judges to the CT. However, only three out of the five appointments were lawful as the 
appointments to the other two judicial posts were made pre-emptively, before the terms of 
the two judges to-be-replaced had expired. It is here that the problem arises: the new 
President refused to swear in all the five judges appointed by the previous government, and 
when the PiS government came into power it passed a resolution finding all the appointments 
illegitimate and proceeded to appoint and swear in overnight their own five appointees.17 
Thus, simply put, three out of the five newly appointed judges (the so-called ‘quasi-judges’) 
were appointed unlawfully as they were appointed to judicial posts which had already – 
lawfully – been filled.  
Simply put, in the early stages the regime slowed down the functioning of the CT to shield 
itself from scrutiny, it refused to enforce crucial decisions of the CT which challenged their 
assault on it, and it began to amend its composition.18  
The Commission responded swiftly.19 It communicated its concerns over the unlawful 
appointments as soon as they were made in December 2015, and it requested that PiS refrain 
from passing legislation undermining the CT’s functioning.20 With PiS continuing to amend the 
functioning of the CT, and ignoring the rulings of the CT, the RLF was officially initiated on the 
13th of January 2016, following which the Commission attempted to engage in informal 
dialogue with Poland via inter alia country visits.21 However, there was no progress and so 
 
17 The then-still-independent CT ruled in a series of cases that three out of the five appointments were 
made lawfully and that the President was under an obligation to swear in judges lawfully appointed 
by the legislature, (K 34/15 (n 16)) and that the new government had no legal basis in appointing CT 
judges to posts which were already lawfully filled. (Constitutional Tribunal, Judgment of 9 December 
2015, K 35/15) These judgments were not complied with by the government. See Sadurski (n 8) 63. 
18 Recommendation 1 2016 (n 12) para 2. 
19 For an assessment, see Laurent Pech, ‘Systemic Threat to the Rule of Law in Poland: What should 
the Commission do next?’ <https://verfassungsblog.de/systemic-threat-to-the-rule-of-law-in-poland-
what-should-the-commission-do-next/> (Verfassungsblog, 31 October 2016) accessed 12 November 
2020. 
20 Letter of the Commission to the Polish Government, 23 December 2015, quoted in 
Recommendation 1 2016 (n 12); Bonelli (n 6) 281. 
21 Frans Timmermans, ‘Readout by First Vice-President Timmermans of the College Meeting of 13 
January 2016’, Brussels, 13 January 2016, Doc SPEECH/16/71; Laurent Pech and Patryk Wachowiec, 
‘1095 Days Later: From Bad to Worse Regarding the Rule of Law in Poland (Part I)’ 
<https://verfassungsblog.de/1095-days-later-from-bad-to-worse-regarding-the-rule-of-law-in-
poland-part-i/> accessed 25 August 2021; Sadurski (n 8) 218; Bonelli (n 6) 282.  
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the Commission decided to ultimately issue an Opinion on the 1st June 2016.22 The Opinion 
inter alia highlighted the threat to the rule of law posed by the undermining of judicial review 
– something which the regime’s measures had clearly attempted to achieve.23 The Opinion 
therefore requested Poland to amend legislation on the CT’s functioning, to enforce and 
respect the decisions of the CT, and to replace the quasi-judges with the judges appointed 
lawfully by the previous government.24 However, both the informal dialogue and the Opinion 
which followed ‘led to nothing.’25 
The Commission therefore proceeded to issue a recommendation on the 27th July 2016.26 In 
it, the Commission largely reiterated its concerns and requests from the Rule of Law 
Opinion,27 concluding that the circumstances and events in Poland represented a ‘systemic 
threat to the rule of law’.28 Poland was given three months to respond.   
On the 27th October 2016, the Polish government responded, in a way which would 
‘prefigur[e] the responses to all subsequent recommendations: it was heavy-handed, full of 
self-righteous outrage, and made no concessions whatsoever to any specific criticisms.’29 
Witold Waszczykowski, the Minister of Foreign Affairs inter alia denounced the Commission’s 
‘interferences into Poland’s internal affairs’, arguing them to be in violation of ‘objectivism… 
respect for sovereignty, subsidiarity and national identity’.30 He described the 
recommendation as ‘an expression of incomplete knowledge about how the legal system and 
the [CT] operate in Poland’. Due to this alleged ignorance, he concluded that the 
recommendation was ‘groundless’, and that the Commission’s assessment of the CT could 
not ‘form the basis for claiming that there is a systemic threat to the rule of law in Poland.’ 
 
22 Commission, ‘Rule of Law Opinion regarding the Rule of Law in Poland’, Brussels, 1 June 2016 (not 
published). Text available curtesy of Laurent Pech, ‘Commission Opinion of 1 June 2016 regarding the 
Rule of Law in Poland’ (EU Law Analysis, 19 August 2016) 
<https://eulawanalysis.blogspot.com/2016/08/commission-opinion-of-1-june-2016.html> accessed 
24 August 2021. (hereinafter ‘Rule of Law Opinion’); Bonelli (n 6) 282.  
23 Rule of Law Opinion (ibid) paras 79, 85; Bonelli (n 6) 283.  
24 See Rule of Law Opinion (ibid) para 52. 
25 Sadurski (n 8) 219; Bonelli (n 6) 284. 
26 Recommendation 1 2016 (n 12). 
27 Bonelli (n 6) 284.  
28 Recommendation 1 2016 (n 12) para 72. 
29 Sadurski (n 8) 219-220.  
30 ibid; Minister of Foreign Affairs (Poland), ‘A statement on the Polish government’s response to 
Commission Recommendation’ (Warsaw, 27 October 2016). 
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While Poland expressed its readiness to engage in dialogue with the Commission – as it did in 
all of its responses to the Commission – the tone of its response to the EU’s attempts at 
dialogue was not subtle. Poland would not cooperate.31 
One would therefore be excused for thinking that, due to this open hostility to the 
Commission’s recommendation, the Commission should have escalated its approach and 
proceeded to initiate Article 7(1) TEU32 – Poland was blatantly not willing to cooperate, and 
the events in Poland, in the words of the Commission, did indicate ‘a systemic threat to the 
rule of law’. Instead, however, the Commission decided to proceed with more dialogue. Three 
more recommendations would follow, and the hostile and uncooperative response from 
Poland would not subside.  
2.2 Dialogue continued: the second recommendation  
The regime continued its subordination of the CT and by the end of 2016 managed to turn it 
into an active aide of the government. The Commission’s recommendation had amounted to 
nothing.33 We may note in particular that PiS further amended the CT’s functioning in 
November and December 2016. The new legislation inter alia established the post of an acting 
First President of the CT – a post unforeseen in the Constitution – appointed by the President 
of the Republic, who would fulfil the functions of the First President of the CT until a new 
appointment had been made. The acting First President would also ‘lead the new selection 
process’.34 The law also required the participation of the quasi-judges in the election process 
of the First President of the CT, thereby arguably rendering it ‘unconstitutional’.35 It was 
according to this constitutionally-questionable procedure that Julia Przyłębska was first 
appointed as the acting First President, and subsequently, on the 21st of December 2016, as 
the First President of the CT.36 
 
31 Konrad Niklewicz, ‘Safeguarding the Rule of Law within the EU: Lessons from the Polish Experience’ 
(2017) 16 EurView 281, 284. 
32 Pech (n 19).  
33 See Bonelli (n 6) 286-287. 
34 Commission, ‘Commission Recommendation (EU) 2017/146 of 21 December 2016 regarding the rule 
of law in Poland complementary to Recommendation (EU) 2016/1374’ [2016] OJ L 2/2/65, paras 55-
56 (hereinafter “Recommendation 2 2016”).  
35 Recommendation 2 2016 (ibid) para 46.  
36 Namely, she admitted the three quasi-judges into the Tribunal, following which she convened a 




PiS therefore secured the post of the First President of the CT, who is responsible for inter 
alia, attributing cases to judges of the CT. As other judges of the CT retired, the regime 
secured a majority on the CT.37 Thus, the process that started with the passing of legislation 
inhibiting the effective functioning of the CT, coupled with unconstitutional judicial 
appointments, and an unconstitutional appointment of the first President of the CT, created 
a situation where PiS controlled the majority of the judges on the CT including the judges 
presiding over it. In turn, Przyłębska was able to manipulate the composition of the bench for 
‘politically sensitive’ cases – the CT was able to invalidate previous legislation perceived ‘as 
an obstacle to unconstitutional actions by the ruling elite’ and validate or ignore legislation 
aimed at inter alia further undermining institutional checks and balances.38 After the capture 
of the CT, the government repealed the legislation aimed at slowing down the CT so as to 
ensure they would possess an unencumbered judicial ally.  
Thus, despite the Commission recommendation condemning the events in Poland, PiS 
managed to continue with its judicial reforms, and disable the CT’s ability to exercise judicial 
review when it posed a threat to their rule. Once it acquired a majority of judges, it turned 
the CT into an ‘active aide of the government and the parliamentary majority.’39  
In response to the deteriorating situation in Poland and passing of the legislation on the 
functioning of the CT (which led to the appointment of Przyłębska as the First President of the 
CT), the Commission issued a second recommendation on the 21st of December 2016.40 The 
recommendation reiterated the Commission’s previous concerns and requests, but 
additionally targeted the legislation introducing the dubious appointments procedure for the 
new First President of the CT. The procedure was deemed as ‘fundamentally flawed as regards 
the rule of law’, as it further undermined the possibility of exercising effective judicial 
review.41 The recommendation therefore inter alia repeated the Commission’s previous 
requests, that Poland should publish and enforce decisions of the CT, restore the proper 
 
three of whom were unconstitutionally appointed themselves. See Recommendation 2 2016 (n 34); 
Sadurski (n 8) 65. 
37 Sadurski (n 8) 79. 
38 ibid 69-70 79, 84. See also Commission 2020 (n 2) 3-4. 
39 Sadurski (n 9) 79-80, 84. See also Laurent Pech, Patryk Wachowiec, and Dariusz Mazur, ‘Poland’s 
Rule of Law Breakdown: A Five-Year Assessment of EU’s (In)Action’ (2021) 13 HJRL 1, 7. 
40 Recommendation 2 2016 (n 34). 
41 ibid para 59-60. 
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functioning of the CT by replacing the quasi-judges with validly appointed ones, and ensure 
that any laws on the CT’s functioning are compliant with the CT’s judgments over them.42 
Moreover, the recommendation required that a new First President of the CT is not appointed 
in the meantime, at least until the legislation could be reviewed by the CT and until the validly 
appointed judges are admitted to the CT.43 The Commission maintained that a ‘systemic 
threat to the rule of law’ existed.44 
Unsurprisingly the regime maintained that it was not committing any breaches of the rule of 
law and therefore refused to comply with the Commission’s requests.45 
2.3 Yet more dialogue: the third recommendation 
With judicial review disposed of, the regime proceeded to its next phase of subordinating the 
remainder of the judiciary. This legislative package introduced by the government in 2017 
sought inter alia to ensure that judges in ordinary courts and the SC would also become 
ideologically synchronised and cooperative towards the regime.46 It has been described as the 
‘elimination of the existing system of checks and balances designed to secure the 
independence of the judiciary from the executive branch’.47  
The legislative package included inter alia a Law on the Organization of Ordinary Courts, a 
Law on the SC, and a Law on the National Council of the Judiciary (NCJ).48 They were all put 
forward in the first months of 2017, and while the former was adopted in July 2017, the latter 
two were vetoed by the President, perhaps due to the ongoing mass protests in Poland.49 As 
will be highlighted in the following section, this veto turned out superficial – the two laws 
were adopted in December 2017 and only reflected ‘cosmetic’ changes, which did not limit 
 
42 ibid para 65. 
43 ibid para 66(f). 
44 ibid para 61. 
45 Minister of Foreign Affairs (Poland), ‘A statement on Poland’s response to European Commission’s 
complementary Recommendation of 21 December 2016’ (Warsaw, 20 February 2017); Sadurski (n 8) 
221. 
46 See Bonelli (n 6) 287. 
47 Anna Śledzińska-Simon, ‘The Rise and Fall of Judicial Self-Government in Poland: On Judicial Reform 
Reversing Democratic Transition’ (2018) 19(7) German Law Journal 1839, 1840; Bonelli (n 6) 288; 
Sadurski (n 8) 97-98.  
48 Law of 12 July 2017 amending the law on the Ordinary Courts Organisation, JL 2017 Pos 1452; Law 
of 8 December 2017 on the Supreme Court, JL 2019 Pos 825; Law of 8 December 2017 amending the 
Law on the National Council of the Judiciary, JL 2018 Pos 3. 
49 Sadurski (n 8) 99; Bonelli (n 6) 288. 
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the executive’s influence over the judiciary in any substantial way.50 Before we consider the 
circumstances surrounding the fourth recommendation, we must first highlight some of the 
Commission’s concerns presented in its third recommendation issued on the 26th of July 
2017.51  
Regarding the Law on the NCJ, the Commission illustrated concern over changes to its 
composition. The NCJ is responsible for appointing judges to all the courts in Poland.52 
Traditionally, fifteen of the twenty-five members of the NCJ were judges appointed by other 
judges.53 However, in order to control future judicial appointments, the regime amended the 
procedure so that the lower house of Parliament would appoint the judge-members of the 
NCJ.54 The law also allowed for dismissal of current judge-members of the NCJ ‘despite their 
constitutionally guaranteed term of office’.55 In turn, this would give ‘the ruling party a 
decisive say in the composition of the [NCJ], and indirectly, in the nominations of judges.’56  
As to the Law on the SC, the Commission illustrated its concern over the regime’s increased 
control over the composition of the SC. In its initial form the law foresaw forced retirements 
of all SC judges,57 and created a discretionary power which allowed for the extension of 
judicial terms of SC judges but only to those pre-selected by the Minister of Justice.58 Given 
the amendments to the composition of the NCJ, this law would allow the regime to 
immediately subordinate the SC.59 The law also foresaw the introduction of a DC into the 
structure of the SC which would be staffed completely by the politicised NCJ.60 This chamber 
would pose a serious threat to judicial independence due to, in particular, the fact that 
disciplinary proceedings could be initiated by the Minister of Justice, and the case would be 
 
50 See Reasoned Proposal (n 1) 3. 
51 Commission, ‘Commission Recommendation (EU) 2017/1520 of 26 July 2017 regarding the rule of 
law in Poland complementary to Recommendations (EU) 2016/1374 and (EU) 2017/146’ [2017] OJ L 
228/19 (hereinafter “Recommendation 3 2017”). 
52 Miroslaw Granat and Katarzyna Granat, The Constitution of Poland (Hart Publishing 2019) 124; Polish 
Constitution Articles 179, 186.  
53 Sadurski (n 8) 100. 
54 Recommendation 3 2017 (n 51). See also Commission 2020 (n 2) 4. 
55 Sadurski (n 8) 102 (emphasis added); Polish Constitution, Article 187(3); Recommendation 3 2017 
(n 51) para 27.  
56 See Sadurski (n 8) 101. See also Recommendation 3 2017 (n 51) paras 24-30. 
57 Recommendation 3 2017 (n 51) para 35. 
58 ibid para 36. 
59 ibid para 37. 
60 ibid para 39. 
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decided by a chamber appointed by a politicised NCJ.61 Accordingly, ‘the mere threat of’ such 
proceedings ‘would directly affect the independence of judges of the [SC].’62 In other words, 
the Chamber would be tasked with controlling the content of judicial rulings.63  
Regarding the law on the Ordinary Courts Organisation, the Commission illustrated its 
concern over the regime’s plans to directly increase their influence over the implementation 
of justice nationwide. The law lowered the age of retirement from 67 to 65 for male judges 
and 60 for female judges and gave the Minister of Justice a discretionary power to extend 
judicial mandates until the age of 70.64  The law also extended the powers of the Minister of 
Justice to appoint and dismiss presidents of courts.65 This ability to control and discipline court 
presidents is crucial when one considers the broad powers that they possess: they can decide 
on compositions of judicial panels and demote judges, and they too have cases to 
adjudicate.66 Accordingly, judges not adjudicating in line with the regime’s demands could be 
demoted or have their case load reallocated by politicised court presidents who, if they do 
not follow the recommendations of the Minister of Justice, could themselves be demoted, 
dismissed or receive a salary reduction. The law therefore allowed the ruling elites to replace 
judges in ordinary courts,67 and more indirectly to start controlling the implementation of 
justice by all courts across the country. 
The Commission therefore unsurprisingly highlighted in its third recommendation ‘that the 
situation of a systemic threat to the rule of law in Poland… has seriously deteriorated.’68 
Besides reiterating its concerns over the insufficient improvements regarding the CT, the 
Commission also argued that if the legislative package was to be introduced this would 
 
61 ibid paras 40-41. 
62 ibid para 42. 
63 For further reforms to the law, and the damage posed to the rule of law, see Commission 2020 (n 
2) 5-6. See also Case C-791/19 Commission v Poland (disciplinary regime for judges) EU:C:2021:596, 
para 157; Laurent Pech, ‘Protecting Polish Judges from Political Control’ (Verfassungsblog, 20 July 
2021) <https://verfassungsblog.de/protecting-polish-judges-from-political-control/> accessed 24 
August 2021.  
64 Recommendation 3 2017 (n 51) paras 31-34. 
65 ibid paras 19-23; Sadurski (n 8) 220. 
66 Sadurski (n 8) 116-118. 
67 See Koalicja Obywatelska, Czarna Księga: 5 lat rządów PiS [The Black Book: 5 years of PiS 
governance], (author tr) October 2020, 37-38 
<https://platforma.org/upload/document/czarnaksiega/Czarna%20Ksi%C4%99ga_5%20lat%20rz%C
4%85d%C3%B3w%20PiS.pdf>  accessed 24 August 2021. 
68 Recommendation 3 2017 (n 51) para 45. 
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‘structurally undermine the independence of the judiciary in Poland and would have an 
immediate and concrete impact on the independent functioning of the judiciary as a whole’.69 
The recommendation thus required inter alia that these laws ‘do not enter into force’.70 The 
Commission also emphasised its readiness to initiate Article 7 in the event of further 
deterioration,71 but it is surprising that Article 7 was still not initiated especially given Poland’s 
failure to adhere to the Commission’s previous two recommendations (which the Commission 
itself also acknowledged).72  
Poland’s response of the 28th August 2017 went as one could have expected. It maintained a 
hostile approach indicating it would not ‘make any concessions regarding its legislative 
package on the judiciary.’73 The government deplored the Commission’s ‘language of 
ultimatums’, its failure to grasp the ‘substantive aspects of the reform’, and its continued 
‘interference with the ongoing legislative process in Poland’.74 Furthermore, they falsely 
claimed that the legislative package complied with EU judicial independence standards, and 
that in any case it was not the EU’s concern since deciding on the functioning and structure 
of the national legal system was a Member State competence.75  
2.4 The fourth recommendation and the end of the Rule of Law Framework  
In the months following the third recommendation the situation deteriorated further. The 
Commission inter alia noted that the Minister of Justice ‘started exercising the powers to 
dismiss court presidents’,76 and despite negative assessments over the new and updated 
versions of the two laws previously vetoed by the President,77 they came into force on the 8th 
 
69 ibid para 45(2). 
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71 ibid para 57. 
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73 Sadurski (n 8) 221; Niklewicz (n 31) 284.  
74 Minister of Foreign Affairs (Poland), ‘A statement following the European Commission’s 
Recommendation of 26 July 2017 regarding the rule of law in Poland’ (Warsaw, 28th August 2017). 
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75 Minister of Foreign Affairs, 28 August 2017 (ibid); Sadurski (n 8) 221. 
76 Commission, ‘Commission Recommendation (EU) 2018/103 regarding the rule of law in Poland 
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of December 2017.78 Faced with constant deterioration and a lack of cooperation from 
Poland,79 the Commission issued its fourth and final recommendation on the 20th of 
December 2017, alongside a separate ‘reasoned proposal’ initiating Article 7(1) TEU. The 
recommendation supplemented the findings and the initiation of Article 7(1),80 but before we 
consider it, we must first consider how the RLF was concluded.  
Given Poland’s failure to adhere to the Commission’s previous recommendations, the fourth 
recommendation echoed the previous ones.81 It inter alia requested Poland to restore 
effective judicial review by restoring the CT’s independence; to enforce the decisions of the 
CT from when it was still independent; to remedy the Commission’s concerns regarding the 
laws introduced at the time of the third recommendation.82 Importantly, it also highlighted 
the threat to the rule of law presented by the passing of the two initially vetoed laws. It is 
here where we see that the changes introduced were merely ‘cosmetic’ and did not attempt 
to limit the regime’s control over the judiciary.83 
The law on the NCJ would still forcibly retire its current judge-members,84 but Parliament 
would have to approve the new NCJ appointments by a three-fifths majority and not a simple 
majority as the previous law dictated.85 The amendment was insignificant as it still left the 
power to control the composition of this important body to the legislature thereby weakening 
its independence.86  
The Law on the SC slightly differed to its previous iteration but again did not weaken the 
regime’s plans to subordinate the judiciary. Instead of forcibly retiring all judges, the law 
would retire judges who reached the newly set retirement age of 65, or would do so within 3 
months of the law’s entry into force.87 This still meant that 31 out of 83 SC judges would be 
forcibly retired and given the new composition of the NCJ this would allow the regime to 
 
78 ibid recitals 40-41. 
79 ibid paras 36-37. 
80 Sadurski (n 8) 220  
81 ibid.  
82 Recommendation 4 2017 (n 76) para 47. 
83 Reasoned Proposal (n 1) 3; Sadurski (n 8) 222. 
84 Recommendation 4 2017 (n 76) para 30. 
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expeditiously amend the composition of the SC.88 Furthermore, instead of giving the Minister 
of Justice the power to select the SC judges the terms of whom could be extended, the law 
instead created a discretionary power for the President of the Republic to extend these terms 
twice, by three years each time, upon the judge’s request. This would not be subject to judicial 
review.89 The amendment therefore did not weaken the executive’s control over which 
judges would continue in their posts, the power was merely shifted from one member of the 
executive to another. The law also created two new completely autonomous Chambers within 
the [SC], which would be appointed solely by the new and politicised NCJ.90 The Chamber of 
Extraordinary Control and Public Affairs would inter alia preside over ‘extraordinary appeals’, 
a procedure which would allow this newly politicised Chamber to overturn any judicial 
decision, thereby violating legal certainty and the non-retroactivity of law.91 As to the DC, the 
other autonomous Chamber, the law removed the explicit competence of the Minister of 
Justice to initiate disciplinary proceedings.92 Instead, it created the post of an ‘extraordinary 
disciplinary officer appointed on a case-by-case basis by the President of the Republic’, and 
by the Minister of Justice in certain specific circumstances.93 Accordingly, the amendment did 
not limit the executive’s influence over judges, it merely set up the post of a designated 
disciplinary proceeding instigator who would initiate the proceedings against any SC judge on 
behalf of the executive.94  
 
88 ibid para 6. The forced retirements were ultimately reversed after increased pressure from the EU. 
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On top of reiterating its previous concerns and recommendations the Commission therefore 
also required Poland to amend these two new laws in order to ensure compliance with 
principles of separation of powers, judicial independence, and the rule of law. It inter alia 
required that the retirement age should not be lowered for SC judges, that the President’s 
discretionary power to extend judicial terms be removed, that the extraordinary appeal 
procedure be removed;95 it also prohibited the termination of the current judge-members in 
the NCJ and that the appointments be made by judges, not Parliament.96 
The tone of Poland’s response slightly differed this time, with a more ‘conciliatory note’ being 
struck, perhaps owing to the initiation of Article 7(1) TEU alongside the fourth 
recommendation.97 The government, for instance, tried to argue that the reforms were 
necessary and that they owed it to their voters, but also that it made concessions to its 
previous legislation so as to avoid further contention with the Commission. As illustrated 
above, and as recognised by the Commission itself, these changes were merely ‘cosmetic’ and 
constituted a façade of compliance, as the amendments did not limit the regime’s influence 
over the judiciary in any substantial way. Accordingly, the threat to the rule of law persisted 
and there was no reversal of the government’s plans. 
In sum the RLF allowed the Commission to gather evidence on Poland and to illustrate the 
damaging nature of the reforms introduced by the PiS government,98 which ultimately led to 
the activation of Article 7 TEU. However, despite the open hostility and defiance of the Polish 
government, the Commission decided to continue dialogue and repeatedly issue 
recommendations to no effect. This dialogue, and four recommendations, lasted from 
January 2016 to December 2017. Therefore, for almost two years the Polish government was 
able to continue with its plans of subordinating the judiciary, with the RLF merely criticising 
the developments, unable to enforce change in any substantial way.99 In that time, Poland 
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managed to take over the CT thereby disposing of effective judicial review and introduce 
major reforms affecting judicial independence and separation of powers. 
However, as the following section will illustrate, the escalation of the EU’s response via the 
activation of Article 7(1) TEU has also proven ineffective. Poland’s rule of law violations have 
not been stopped.100 
3. Article 7 TEU: December 2017 onwards 
At the time of the fourth recommendation, on the 20th of December 2017, the Commission 
also issued its ‘reasoned proposal’ for the activation of Article 7(1) TEU,101 which was later 
formally presented to the Council in February 2018.102 In it the Commission reiterated its 
findings from the RLF, thereby highlighting Poland’s constant deterioration which negatively 
affected ‘the entire structure of the justice system in Poland’.103 Furthermore, the 
Commission acknowledged Poland’s failure to cooperate and adhere to its 
recommendations.104 Consequently, it was forced, after two years of dialogue, the effect of 
which was questionable, to escalate the EU’s response and activate Article 7.105 The initiative 
therefore signalled that the EU was escalating its approach and acknowledging the severity 
of the problem in Poland.106 This escalation, meant the involvement of other EU institutions 
in the process. Importantly, it shifted the responsibility to act to the Council and the Member 
States therein – the effectiveness of the procedure would now rest in their hands.107 Sadly, as 
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this section will illustrate, while symbolically the initiation of Article 7 may have constituted 
an acknowledgment of the crisis in Poland, in practice shifting the responsibility to the Council 
has allowed the crisis to be trivialised, thereby highlighting the mechanism’s unsuitability in 
resolving backsliding.  
In order to illustrate Article 7’s hitherto failure to resolve rule of law backsliding, this section 
will first consider the immediate impact of the Commission’s initiation of Article 7(1) 
proceedings against Poland. Namely, it led to the formation of three hearings in the Council, 
between December 2017 and December 2018. It will be illustrated that despite the 
Commission accumulating increasingly damning evidence, highlighting Poland’s violation of 
the rule of law, the Council failed to make use of the toolkit available to it under Article 7’s 
preventative arm – it failed to issue any recommendations or issue a warning to Poland of its 
situation representing a ‘clear risk of a serious breach’ to the EU’s values. Subsequently, the 
section will illustrate the deficient format of the hearings which certainly did not help in 
preventing further deterioration in Poland. 
Secondly, it will be highlighted how the Council seemingly delegated the task of protecting 
the EU’s values to the Commission and the CJEU, thereby failing to illustrate adequate 
concern with the threat to the EU posed by rule of law backsliding. The section will first 
illustrate Poland’s continuous deterioration and the threat the events from 2019 onwards 
have posed to the operation and functioning of the EU’s legal system, and accordingly, the 
EU’s rule of law. Subsequently, the Council’s failure to utilise Article 7 during this time will be 
highlighted (the single hearing held in June 2021 notwithstanding).  
Therefore, simply put, the national governments in the Council, tasked with (and responsible 
for) the employment and effectiveness of Article 7(1) TEU have failed to illustrate adequate 
concern with the threat to the EU posed by rule of law backsliding. 
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3.1 Article 7(1) TEU in action: three hearings in 2018 
Following the presentation of the reasoned proposal to the Council in February 2018, the 
European Parliament adopted a resolution calling for ‘swift action’ by the Council.108 This call 
for action, however, remained unanswered. Indeed, while the situation in Poland was 
sufficiently concerning so as to lead to the organisation of three separate hearings – on the 
26th June, 18th September, and 11th December 2018109 – these did not lead to any change on 
the ground.  
Prior to the hearings the Commission and the Polish delegation provided official stances 
through written statements, and during the hearings other Member States were able to ask 
questions. However, these hearings did not lead to the issuing of any recommendations by 
the Council, nor the issuing of the official warning that there was a ‘clear risk of a serious 
breach’ of Article 2 TEU values in Poland. One may find this puzzling as the situation in Poland 
had been continuously deteriorating throughout this time. To illustrate this deterioration, 
recall that the Law on the SC introduced a disciplinary regime for judges whereby the 
President of the Republic, and indirectly the Minister of Justice, could appoint individuals to 
investigate judges and initiate a disciplinary proceeding, and these would be adjudicated 
upon by the DC, a new autonomous chamber of the SC staffed solely by the politicised NCJ.110 
Therefore, the body deciding in disciplinary cases, as well as the prosecutors initiating these 
cases, are strongly connected to the PiS government, and such a disciplinary regime ‘creates 
concerns as regards the principle of separation of powers and may affect judicial 
independence’.111 The Commission presented these concerns to the Council during the first 
hearing.112 
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By the second hearing the disciplinary regime had evolved further. An amendment to the law 
introduced in July 2018 allowed for ‘the disciplinary officer (appointed by the Minister of 
Justice) to appoint deputies of his choice’, thereby increasing the Minister’s influence over 
individuals dealing with disciplinary proceedings.113  
By the third hearing the Commission highlighted an increase in disciplinary proceedings 
initiated by the regime against judges criticising the judicial reforms and against judges issuing 
preliminary references to the CJEU.114 Furthermore: 
disciplinary officers appointed by the Minister of Justice exercised their power to take 
over investigations carried out by disciplinary officers appointed at the request of the 
judiciary, including in cases where the judges concerned were found by the latter not 
to have committed a disciplinary offence.115 
Thus, even by the third hearing, the Commission highlighted that its ‘concerns… fully 
remain’,116 and understandably so. The regime has tried to shield itself from scrutiny by 
threatening judges willing to criticise their reforms with arbitrary disciplinary proceedings, 
thereby increasing the influence of the legislative and executive branches over the 
judiciary.117   
The Commission therefore ‘produced increasingly damning evidence’ proving that the 
developments in Poland were harmful to the rule of law and therefore certainly posed a clear 
risk of a serious breach of the EU’s values.118 Commentators point out that Poland was into 
the ‘serious and persistent’ breach territory of the sanctioning arm of Article 7 since the 
violations were increasingly obvious and systemic.119 However, this appears to have been 
insufficient in convincing the Council that the events in Poland were sufficiently dire – namely, 
 
113 Council, ‘Rule of Law in Poland / Article 7 (1) TEU reasoned proposal (European Commission 
contribution for the hearing of Poland on 18 September 2018)’, Brussels, 11 September 2018, Doc 
12034/18, pages 14-15 (hereinafter “September Contribution”).  
114 Council, ‘Rule of Law in Poland / Article 7 (1) TEU reasoned proposal (European Commission 
contribution for the hearing of Poland on 11 December 2018)’, Brussels, 5 December 2018, Doc 
15197/18, page 13 (hereinafter “December Contribution”). 
115 ibid. 
116 ibid.  
117 ibid. 
118 Sadurski (n 8) 226. 
119 See Pech and Scheppele 2018 (n 52) and Kochenov (n 4) 141. 
56 
 
that the threat to the EU’s values was sufficiently clear – to require the issuing of any 
recommendations or its official warning.  
With the Council failing to exert any substantial pressure on Poland, Article 7(1) TEU hearings 
have achieved very little. They have allowed the Commission to produce reports on the 
violations in Poland, and they gave the opportunity for Member States truly concerned with 
such violations to scrutinise the events in Poland. But lacking any official condemnation or 
even the issuing of recommendations in the Council, Poland has not been deterred. Indeed, 
the provision was even referred to as ‘dead’ by the (then) Minister of Foreign Affairs, Jacek 
Czaputowicz.120 While the proceedings have not ceased, and the Council could schedule a 
hearing at any time, there is some truth to this declaration as after the December 2018 
hearing, no other hearing was held until June 2021.121 As will be illustrated later, even at this 
hearing, the Council has failed to exert additional pressure on Poland. In order to illustrate 
why these hearings have thus far achieved very little, we may consider their deficient format.  
3.1.1 Format of the hearings 
A series of Freedom of Information requests by Laurent Pech have allowed him to bring to 
light some of the issues with the format of the hearings held under Article 7(1) TEU.122 The 
fact that little progress has been made under this procedure may, as will become apparent, 
be attributed to the heavily ‘deficient format’ of these hearings,123 which do not adequately 
reflect the scrutiny expected from a procedure aimed at protecting the EU’s values.  
As a starting point we may take the fact that  the Council’s decision to construe the hearings 
in a ‘peer-review’ format, which aims to ‘enable ministers to have a more in-depth exchange… 
on the key concerns identified’ by the Commission.124 Pech criticises this ‘attempt to 
“dedramatise” Article 7(1) proceedings’ as ‘difficult to reconcile with the purpose and content 
of this Treaty provision.’125 Indeed, bearing in mind that the procedure was introduced to 
enforce and safeguard the values of the EU, and the fact that the hearings are the main means 
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of illustrating to the Council that a particular Member State is posing ‘a clear risk of a serious 
breach’ to the EU’s values, it is questionable that the format of the hearings is not aimed at 
scrutiny of the potentially harmful developments in a Member State, but at yet more dialogue 
and some form of constructive feedback.  
This issue becomes evident when considering that the format of the hearings allows the State 
questioned to make ‘false [and] misleading’ statements.126 This is so, because the national 
delegations questioning the Member States concerned are given a ‘maximum of two minutes 
for a maximum of two questions… while the representatives of the government subject to 
Article 7 can spend up to 10 minutes answering each question’.127 This, combined with the 
fact that the Council does not conduct any form of fact checking ‘either before, during or after 
the hearings’, means that any incorrect statements made by the government being 
questioned can hardly be picked up as and when they are made, unless a national delegation 
possesses sufficient ‘expertise… to quickly spot false or misleading statements’.128 Thus, the 
procedure has been designed in a way which favours the Member State being questioned – 
even if the other national delegations possess the knowledge allowing them to scrutinise the 
events in Poland, the modalities of the hearing prevent these delegations from exerting 
adequate pressure and conducting sufficient scrutiny given that they are confined to a 
maximum of two interventions each. It leads to an illogical or absurd situation where, for a 
State questioned under Article 7(1) to be meaningfully scrutinised, a concerted effort from all 
of the other delegations is required so that where the questioning capacity of one delegation 
is depleted, another can come in and respond to the misleading claims made in response to 
the questions asked by the previous delegation. In other words, a mechanism designed with 
the aim of scrutiny has been qualified in such a way as to make such scrutiny near impossible 
to carry out. The process therefore hardly reflects a framework suitable for assessing 
violations to the EU’s values.  
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This lack of follow-up and sufficient scrutiny on the misleading claims of the Polish 
government can easily be spotted in any of the hearings. Indeed, as an example of this, in the 
third hearing held in December 2018, the Belgian delegation ‘asked why the [CT] had been 
requested to verify the compatibility of the Treaty provision on the preliminary question 
mechanism with the Polish Constitution.’ The Polish delegation responded that ‘this is a 
question of interpretation of the Treaty and that the Polish courts have been asked questions 
on issues remaining national competence.’129 This prima facie appears a genuine argument – 
preliminary reference questions issued by national courts should focus on the interpretation 
or validity of a provision of EU law. However, this point ignores the fact that preliminary 
reference questions have mostly focused on whether the reforms of the government had 
undermined judicial independence. As highlighted by the CJEU, such questions do fall within 
the scope of EU law and can be asked as questions of interpretation by domestic courts even 
if the competence to act in this field is reserved for the Member State, due to the fact that 
domestic courts are tasked with enforcing EU law and thus their independence is also crucial 
for the proper implementation of EU law.130 Therefore, Poland’s basis for attempting to limit 
domestic courts from referring questions to the CJEU was legally incorrect, but there appears 
to be no evidence in the hearing report of this being questioned. The Council has therefore 
opted for a model which allows it to accept statements made by Poland at face value, without 
verifying their accuracy or sincerity.   
A separate albeit equally concerning development may also be spotted in the participation of 
Member States in the hearings. As Pech and Grogan illustrate, in the three hearings 
concerning Poland, and the one hearing concerning Hungary, 12 Member States did not ask 
a single question.131 That is, 12 out of 27 Member States have not shown interest in the 
questionable events transpiring in Poland and Hungary. It would appear that in refusing to 
hold their peers to account, these uninterested States seem to be ignoring the fact that the 
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protection and enforcement of the EU’s values is a responsibility of all the EU’s institutions 
and Member States.132 
Therefore, given the deficient format of the hearings it is hardly surprising that no 
recommendations have been issued, or determination of a ‘clear risk’ made. These require 
the attainment of a four-fifths majority, meaning that 22 Member States on the Council must 
support the motion. If, however, 12 Member States are unwilling to even ask a question on 
the developments in Poland – which clearly violate the rule of law and therefore Article 2 TEU 
– it is at least doubtful that they would be willing to declare a ‘clear risk of a serious breach’ 
of the rule of law if the Council Presidency did schedule a vote on the matter.  
3.2 Events post December 2018: a challenge to the EU’s functioning  
After December 2018 PiS’ subordination of the judiciary began to produce very real problems 
for the EU. In order to illustrate this problem, we may start with the fact that in 2018 and 
2019 the regime began to utilise more frequently its means of suspending and dismissing 
uncooperative judges.133 As a result, independent remnants of the SC issued a preliminary 
reference to the CJEU, asking whether judges not appointed through an impartial process 
could still be considered judges (and thus render binding decisions) under EU law. The Court 
responded in November 2019 in its AK ruling,134 highlighting that for its effective 
implementation EU law requires national courts to be independent and impartial.135 It 
therefore requested national courts – in line with obligations rooted in the principle of 
supremacy – to disapply the legislation which allowed for such an improper judicial body to 
operate.136 In response, three chambers of the SC (still relatively independent and impartial) 
issued a resolution in January 2020, and in line with the criteria for assessing impartiality 
provided by the CJEU in AK, found that any judicial body staffed with judges appointed by the 
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NCJ could lack independence and as such its decisions could be challenged for lack of 
impartiality in the appointments process.137 The resolution therefore amounted to a finding 
that the DC is not a court and therefore cannot issue binding decisions.138 
In order to protect its judicial appointments from being undermined, the PiS government used 
its politicised CT to undermine the SC resolution and declare it invalid.139 It also passed what 
has come to be known as the muzzle law in December 2019.140 The law is deeply problematic 
and strengthens the regime’s control over the judiciary, but for our purposes we only need to 
consider one of its provisions.141 The law made it a disciplinary offence for judges to question 
the legitimacy of judicial appointments, and retroactively discontinued any cases attempting 
to do so.142 The law stipulated that the only body able to assess validity of judicial 
appointments would be the Extraordinary Chamber of Public Affairs – recall that this body 
was also staffed completely by the politicised NCJ, precisely the appointments of which were 
being assessed.143 The law therefore attached disciplinary consequences on any judge or 
judicial body attempting to enforce the AK judgment and assess the legality of judicial 
appointments,144 or to issue further preliminary reference questions to the CJEU on the 
matter.145 The law has been in force from March 2020, and ‘has been hampering the actual 
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application of the AK ruling which set out the method and criteria for assessing judicial 
independence.’146 
With Poland actively undermining the ability of domestic courts to assess the independence 
and operation of the improperly appointed DC, the CJEU issued in April 2020 an interim relief 
order which held that legislative provisions allowing the DC to initiate disciplinary proceedings 
against judges had to be suspended.147 Thus, in an ‘unprecedented’ manner the Court 
‘demanded the immediate suspension… of the processing of all disciplinary cases regarding 
judges’.148 This infringement proceeding was initiated by the Commission April 2019,149  
before the passing of the Muzzle Law, and therefore concerned the operation of the 
disciplinary regime prior to its amendments. Thus, the initial infringement proceedings 
initiated in April 2019 (and thus the interim relief order of April 2020) did not explicitly capture 
the alternative ways in which the regime could punish recalcitrant judges and as such, 
following the April 2020 interim relief order, ‘instead of continuing to persecute independent 
judges on the back of formal disciplinary proceedings, Polish authorities started suspending 
judges… by initiating unfounded criminal charges against them and getting them suspended 
by the DC via the lifting of their judicial immunity.’150 Despite criticism – as the revocation of 
immunities was not substantially different to the previously held disciplinary proceedings – 
the Commission did not request penalty payments for non-compliance with the injunction, 
seeing that the Court’s order referred to disciplinary proceedings and not revocation of 
judicial immunities.151 Poland was therefore allowed to completely disregard the order of the 
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CJEU, by allowing the DC to continue operating in a different manner, still allowing the regime 
to punish recalcitrant judges and members of the legal profession.152 
Following further pressure from the CJEU,153 and at the request of the DC (the very same 
Chamber whose operation was to be suspended),154 the CT held on the 14th of July 2021 that 
interim relief orders, relating to the structure and functioning of the judiciary, were contrary 
to the Polish Constitution and were therefore to be deprived of supremacy.155  This was a 
crucial moment in Poland’s rule of law backsliding and its attitude towards the EU. In what 
can only be seen as a culmination of PiS’ efforts to control the justice system in Poland, the 
government, after outlawing preliminary references and explicitly rendering the AK ruling 
inapplicable, after using its politicised CT to render null and void attempts at enforcing the AK 
ruling (as explicitly required by EU law), after explicitly ignoring an interim relief order’s object 
and purpose (indeed the DC continued to operate by other, equally harmful, means), the 
regime has now blatantly undermined a key concept of EU law – the CT confined the scope of 
EU law in the Polish legal order, in violation of supremacy (which requires EU judicial decisions 
and legislative provisions to precede national judicial decisions and legislative  provisions) and 
autonomy (as only the CJEU may determine the scope of EU law) of EU law. Pech has therefore 
rightly described the process as one of ‘EU-legal-disintegration’.156 The EU can hardly possess 
a legal order if the decisions of its Court are not respected or if the rules upon which it is based 
are not adhered to. Functional legal systems require inter alia authority, consistency, and the 
ability to fix dysfunctions – an EU incapable of doing this can hardly possess its own legal 
system.157 
 
152 Pech, Wachowiec and Mazur 2021b (n 139). 
153 See e.g. Case C-824/18 AB and Others v Krajowa Rada Sądownictwa and Others EU:C:2021:153;  
Bucki, Dębska and Gajdus (n 136). 
154 Jakub Jaraczewski, ‘Polexit or judicial dialogue?’ (Verfassungsblog, 19 July 2021) 
<https://verfassungsblog.de/polexit-or-judicial-dialogue/> accessed 24 August 2021. 
155 Constitutional Tribunal, Judgment of 14 July 2021, P 7/20. 
156 Pech 2021 (n 63). 
157 See Roland Bieber and Francesco Maiani, ‘Enhancing Centralized Enforcement of EU Law: Pandora’s 
Toolbox?’ (2014) 51 CML Rev 1057, 1057-1058. Also note that another, possibly more damaging case 
is constantly being delayed by the CT. The CT has been asked to assesses whether Article 2 TEU, Article 
19(1) TEU and Article 4(3) TEU are compliant with the Polish Constitution. These are the exact 
provisions used by the CJEU to review the rule of law violations in Poland. The government therefore 
seeks to undermine supremacy and applicability of EU law (and the protection of EU values) more 
generally. See, Constitutional Tribunal, case pending, K 3/21; Jaraczewski (n 154). 
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We may briefly note that this ruling coincided with two other decisions of the CJEU concerning 
Poland’s disciplinary regime – an interim relief order issued on the 14th July 2021 in the 
context of infringement proceedings brought against the Muzzle Law,158 and a decision in the 
infringement proceedings concerning the disciplinary regime prior to the introduction of the 
Muzzle Law issued on the 15th July 2021159 – both of which found Poland’s disciplinary regime 
as existing in violation of EU law due to inter alia the fact that it undermines judicial 
independence, viz., the disciplinary regime is likely to influence through ‘pressure and [its] 
deterrent effect’ judicial decision-making and therefore affect how judges implement law, 
including EU law.160 The government’s initial response was hostile and indicated a refusal to 
comply,161 but the tone changed with the Commission making it clear it would resort to 
financial penalties under Article 260 TFEU if Poland failed to explain how it would adhere to 
the decisions by the 16th August 2021. The Commission was clear that ‘EU law has primacy 
over national law’ and it appears ready to enforce this.162 Consequently, Poland’s de facto 
leader Jarosław Kaczyński stated he would ensure that the DC will be eliminated “in its current 
form” so as to remove the reason for contention with the EU.163 It is unlikely that this is a 
sincere statement, and the government may only be creating yet another façade of 
compliance as the President had done through his vetoes to the two 2017 laws, thereby 
buying themselves more time to further entrench themselves in power. Regardless, the point 
being made here is that the situation in Poland is creating problems for the functioning and 
integrity of the EU’s legal order, and that it is being acknowledged and addressed by the 
Commission and the Court. Given the threat posed to the EU by rule of law backsliding, one 
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would therefore be forgiven for expecting all of the EU’s institutions to try to resolve this 
problem – especially those tasked with the operation and enforcement of the EU’s strongest 
enforcement tool. However, as the following section will illustrate, the Council has failed to 
adequately respond to the crisis. 
3.2.1 The Council’s response (or lack thereof)  
Article 7(1) hearings, while deficient in format, still provided an opportunity for Member 
States truly committed to the rule of law to scrutinise the events in Poland.164 Their 
inexistence is therefore problematic and arguably indicative of the Council’s refusal to 
acknowledge the threat posed by the events in the EU’s backsliding States.165 Indeed, 
between December 2018 and June 2021 the Council failed to schedule a single hearing 
concerning Poland despite the clear and constant deterioration therein. It held a few 
confidential state of play meetings where it ‘took note’ of the events in Poland and has issued 
a series of ‘(non-binding) conclusions’ illustrating its “concerns” about the situation in 
Poland,166 but these cannot be comparable to the hearings under Article 7(1) TEU which 
arguably should aim to facilitate a process of prevention and resolution of threats posed to 
the EU’s values. Thus, simply put, the Council has failed to devote sufficient time or attention 
to the rule of law backsliding in Poland, especially given the aforementioned threat to the 
functioning of EU law. With no hearings held, it appeared that the Council had completely 
deferred the duty to protect the EU’s values to the Court and Commission.167   
However, after years of inactivity, the Council then organised a hearing on the 22nd of June 
2021.168 It had the opportunity to discuss the continued operation of the DC; Poland’s refusal 
to adhere to the interim relief order of April 2020; the Muzzle Law and its implications for 
judges issuing preliminary references to the CJEU. As illustrated previously, these 
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developments undermine the integrity of the EU’s legal order and strike at the EU’s 
foundations rooted in mutual trust and judicial interdependence.  However, after two years 
of Council inactivity, we were faced with yet another anti-climactic episode. This hearing 
turned out lacklustre for inter alia two reasons.  
First, PiS’ continued violation of EU values went without sufficient scrutiny. The regime 
highlighted its readiness to implement judgments of the CJEU and argued that it was 
compliant with the interim relief order of April 2020 as the DC’s disciplinary activities were 
suspended, with the Chamber continuing ‘to adjudicate only in cases concerning the 
immunity of judges in criminal proceedings.’169 As mentioned previously, this constituted 
disciplinary proceedings by other means, and therefore amounted to superficially complying 
with the April 2020 interim relief order. Nonetheless, despite PiS’ misleading claims and its 
continued violation of the EU’s values, the regime was not held to account before the Council. 
The report on the hearing does not illustrate any meaningful scrutiny of such claims by the 
other national delegations and after the hearing there was no indication of a 
recommendation, or a warning being issued by the Council.  
Secondly – and this could be a reason for the lacklustre scrutiny during, and outcome of, the 
hearing and of the entire Article 7(1) TEU procedure in general – the concern of national 
delegations in the rule of law crisis in Poland appears to have drastically deteriorated. While 
there were approximately 12 Member States failing to ask questions at the previous three 
hearings in 2018, at this hearing only 11 national delegations did illustrate their concern by 
questioning Poland.170 That is, 16 out of 27 Member States failed to discuss the constantly 
deteriorating situation in Poland. With approximately three-fifths of Member States in the 
Council uninterested in the events in Poland, it is unlikely that a four-fifths majority required 
under Article 7(1) can be attained.  
Accordingly, the Council has failed to make use of a tool which was designed with that specific 
body in mind – it has continuously abrogated its responsibility to protect the EU’s values.  
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170 The document states that 10 delegations asked questions, but the German delegation asked a 
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The process of rule of law backsliding in Poland has allowed the PiS government to 
subordinate a large part of the Polish judiciary to its will. The CT is being used for political 
purposes, with the regime most recently using it to limit the supremacy of EU law in the 
sphere of the structure and functioning of domestic justice systems in order to limit the EU’s 
interference and shield themselves further from scrutiny. Presumably, the regime is trying to 
do the same with ordinary courts and the SC, so as to ensure that all law enforcement is in 
line with the government’s agenda. Through a campaign of judicial appointments, dismissals, 
and disciplinary proceedings the regime is trying to shape the way judges apply the law. 
Fortunately, while it may be too late for the EU to reverse the appointments already made, 
the Commission and the CJEU have drawn a line – a line which the Polish government does 
not wish to cross given its potentially extensive financial burden. The Court and Commission 
understand the threat posed to the EU by a judiciary devoid of independence and impartiality. 
Such a judiciary is less likely to enforce EU law as interpreted by the CJEU, and more likely to 
construe it based on the needs and desires of the ruling party. If this continues, as it has been, 
one may only fear what the state of the EU’s legal order will be in the next five or ten years. 
Arguably the situation in Poland has deteriorated to such an extent due to the ineffectiveness 
of the EU’s response. Thus, one could argue that supranational interference is not capable of 
resolving backsliding.171 However, even if the EU cannot cure the cause, it certainly can 
remedy the symptoms. The EU’s ability to halt or slow down backsliding is evident with the 
regime – even now as its backsliding is very much underway – considering the reversal of one 
of its flagship policies only to appease the EU and avoid financial sanctions. Therefore, in order 
for the EU to understand what works, and to avoid making mistakes which render its response 
ineffective, it is important to consider why the tools created with the sole purpose of 
protecting the EU’s values (or the rule of law in particular) have turned out ineffective.  
In order to engage in such an assessment, we may recap how the RLF and Article 7 turned out 
in practice. Vis-à-vis the RLF, we may note how in the face of an openly hostile and 
uncooperative Member State, the Commission engaged in supervision and issued four 
separate recommendations, spanning across two years. Such protracted discussions, which 
 
171 See Uitz (n 144). cf Chapter 3, Section 2.3 in this thesis. 
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were unforeseen in the Communication establishing the mechanism, led to no change on the 
ground, but allowed the Commission to gather evidence which was arguably useful in 
activating Article 7.  
As to Article 7, a tool which was supposed to represent an escalation in the EU’s response, we 
may note that the Council’s handling of the tool has led to less scrutiny of the events in Poland 
than that under the RLF.172 Under Article 7(1) TEU the Council has continued dialogue with 
Poland (despite such dialogue being ineffective under the RLF), but has failed to issue 
recommendations or a warning in the three years during which the mechanism has been 
employed. The Council has therefore exerted minimal pressure against Poland, while the 
latter has continued its plans of subordinating the judiciary. The frequency and the format of 
the hearings is also lamentable; it would appear that as the Commission and CJEU have shown 
increasing concern with the events in Poland, the Council has lost interest. It is therefore 
possible to argue that the Council is – questionably – delegating the task of values 
enforcement to other institutions. Therefore, despite the activation of the EU’s prime values 
enforcement tool in December 2017, PiS has continued to consolidate power and subordinate 
the judiciary. The tool was supposed to prevent further deterioration, but it is difficult to 
gauge its ability to address backsliding if it is not being used. The Council’s negligence – 
described by some as a ‘lack of leadership’173 – has therefore allowed the situation to decline. 
Indeed, the fact that the Muzzle Law was passed after the initiation of Article 7(1) TEU proves 
that the Polish government does not see the mechanism as a real obstacle or threat, which 
gives some credibility to the claim by Minister Czaputowicz that Article 7 is ‘dead’. After all, 
the preventative arm appears ineffective, and the sanctioning arm of the mechanism has not 
been initiated.  
In sum, both the RLF and Article 7(1) TEU have failed to resolve rule of law backsliding in 
Poland. The former was incapable of enforcing change, and the latter has not been used 
effectively. The following chapters will reflect on why this was so.  
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The dialogue under the RLF proved incapable of preventing further deterioration in Poland. 
Regardless, the Commission continued to issue recommendations for almost two years, 
during which PiS continuously entrenched itself in power. Bearing this in mind and 
considering the RLF’s two goals – to prevent a deterioration and facilitate the activation of 
Article 7 – we may start to consider the reasons for the tool’s inefficacy, and the lessons to be 
drawn from the experience.  
First, this chapter will consider whether the soft law nature of the RLF was the reason for its 
failure to prevent a deterioration. In order to illustrate that this criticism has merit – in the 
context of rule of law backsliding states – the section will proceed to lay out an enforcement 
spectrum, following which the RLF will be classified as a tool of soft enforcement. 
Subsequently, it will be argued that given their effectiveness resting on a presumption of 
compliance, tools of soft enforcement are unsuitable when dealing with backsliding states. 
Lastly, it will be argued that while the alternative of hard enforcement cannot be a panacea, 
it is nonetheless a preferable means of enforcement given its greater coercive and deterrent 
capacity.  
The second reason for the ineffectiveness of the RLF relates to the duration of the dialogue 
under it. The Commission’s decision to repeatedly issue recommendations in the face of an 
openly defiant and uncooperative state has ultimately allowed for further deterioration to 
occur. Given the clear signal that Poland would not cooperate, the Commission can therefore 
partly be blamed for the deterioration in Poland as it continued its dialogue irrespective of 
Poland’s recalcitrance. However, that is not to say that the use of the RLF was completely 
unfounded. Indeed, given the challenges of utilising Article 7, and the RLF’s aim as 
supplementing its activation, one could go as far as to say that the RLF was crucial for the 
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escalation of the EU’s response. Accordingly, the section will first illustrate the utility in the 
use of the RLF for the legitimate activation of Article 7 TEU. However, the decision to engage 
in protracted discussions allowed PiS to further entrench itself in power, and therefore 
weakened the EU’s ability to enforce its values. Therefore, secondly, the problem with delays 
will be considered. Lastly, the problems with the RLF’s construction will be considered, 
highlighting how its discretionary nature and lack of strict time frames for the escalation of 
the tool permitted the Commission to refrain from escalating the EU’s response. 
2. The Framework’s first goal: preventing a deterioration  
The RLF’s first goal to prevent deterioration of a systemic threat to the rule of law was not 
achieved. It is argued that this inefficacy is attributable to the tool’s soft law nature.  
In an attempt to prove this is so, this section will first provide a theoretical framework of 
enforcement, distinguishing between soft and hard enforcement. Subsequently, it will be 
illustrated that the RLF falls into the soft enforcement category. 
Secondly, it will be argued that soft enforcement faces a near insurmountable obstacle if it 
tries to enforce norms against rule of law backsliding states, given their recalcitrant nature.  
Thirdly, it will be argued that hard enforcement is more suitable at enforcing norms in the 
aforementioned context as it is capable of exerting sufficient pressure so as to deter or halt a 
violation. While this assessment is not definitive, especially given the narrow scope of this 
thesis, it is argued that given the failure of the RLF (and Article 7(1)TEU), the EU ought to stop 
placing its faith in dialogic tools and be more responsive to the uncooperative nature of 
backsliding states.  
2.1 Enforcement Spectrum 
Soft law refers to ‘rules of conduct which, in principle, have no legally binding force but which 
nevertheless may have practical effects’, and in some cases may possess ‘legal effects.’1 In 
the context of EU law, soft law comprises ‘instruments deprived of legally binding force in 
accordance with Article 288 TFEU’. This includes recommendations which can be issued under 
the preventative arm of Article 7 by the Council, or those issued by the Commission under the 
 
1 Oana Ştefan, ‘Soft Law and the Enforcement of EU Law’ in András Jakab and Dimitry Kochenov (eds), 
The Enforcement of EU Law and Values: Ensuring Member States’ Compliance (OUP 2017) 200. 
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RLF. Communications – such as the one issued by the Commission to create the RLF – are also 
soft law.2 In contrast, ‘[h]ard law is endowed with binding legal force, produces general and 
external effects, is adopted by the Union institutions according to specific procedures, and 
has a legal basis in the Treaty.’3 Generally speaking, for its enforcement, the former relies on 
‘persuasion and guidance’ whereas the latter allows for ‘enforcement by a coercive 
authority’.4 
International relations literature has devised various typologies which help to distinguish 
between these two sources of law, with Ştefan arguing that ‘the main differentiating features 
between hard and soft law lie in the capacity of the norm to prescribe legally binding 
commitments, the clarity and precision of its terms, and its enforceability.’5 However, given 
that the focus of the criticism concerning the RLF’s inability to lead to change (given Poland’s 
reluctance to cooperate), targets its enforcement capacity, it is only on this aspect that we 
will focus.  
The softer side of the enforcement spectrum is defined in literature as a ‘compliance’ or 
‘management’ strategy.6  Ştefan highlights that ‘enforcement through compliance focuses on 
cooperation, persuasion, and advice. Compliance is achieved because states undertake 
commitments in the interests of efficiency and norms, and occurs through clear and 
transparent norms, economic and political capacity building, and rules interpretation.’7 A 
similar account of enforcement is presented by Conant, under the heading of the 
‘management approach’. The assumption being that States will generally respect their 
international commitments, and if they do not, such non-compliance is likely a result of 
‘capacity limitations and ambiguities of interpretation rather than deliberate defiance.’8 Soft 
law is therefore preferred due to its clarificatory benefits, and coercive means of enforcement 
 
2 ibid. See Article 288 TFEU; Artur Nowak-Far, ‘The Rule of Law Framework in the European Union: Its 
Rationale, Origins, Role and International Ramifications’ in Armin von Bogdandy and others (eds), 
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6 See respectively, Ştefan (n 1), Lisa Conant, ‘Compliance and What EU Member States Make of It’ in 
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are not perceived as necessary. Accordingly, on the softer side of the enforcement spectrum 
dialogic and clarificatory tools are preferred, with the assumption being that States are 
committed to upholding their obligations. These approaches assume that adherence to norms 
and values can be ensured gradually, ‘by the intervention of certain devices other than the 
legal force of an act, such as those related to knowledge and meaning making’, thereby 
instilling a commitment to such values.9 In order to avoid confusion with alternating 
terminologies, this type of enforcement will simply be referred to as soft enforcement.  
The alternative means of enforcement in the literature have been described as ‘deterrence’ 
or ‘enforcement’ strategies.10 On this account the expectation is that States will prioritise 
their interests above their international commitments. In the words of Conant: 
Enforcement theorists expect that free-riding is a paramount concern for compliance 
with international regulation because each state gains most if others comply while it 
reneges on commitments. The assumption is that states choose to cheat whenever 
the benefits of shirking outweigh its costs.11 
This approach is therefore based on the opposite assumption to soft enforcement approaches 
and expects States to breach their international commitments if such defiance would be of 
greater benefit to them. To resolve this problem, institutions are set up in order to: 
increase the probability of detection and the costs of cheating. Investing in monitoring 
and sanctioning helps to expose and punish cheaters, increasing the costs of non-
compliance and thereby reducing its incidence.12 
Therefore, on the opposite end of the enforcement spectrum there is an understanding that 
States are selfish, and they must be deterred from deviating from their commitments through 
 
9 See also Matej Avbelj and others, ‘EU Soft Law in the EU Legal Order: A Literature Review’ (SoLAR 
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coercive and confrontational means, so as to outweigh the costs of defiance.13 Instead of 
relying on dialogic and soft means of enforcement, these tools are likely to take the form of 
sanctions – be they financial, diplomatic or otherwise. Once more, for simplicity’s sake, this 
type of enforcement will be encapsulated under the broader term of hard enforcement. 
While the soft-hard enforcement dichotomy will be used to assess the RLF’s enforcement 
capacity, it is important to acknowledge that increasingly tools of enforcement are not either 
soft or hard.14 A ‘hybrid’ theory explains that various factors affect how states act, which 
makes it difficult to categorise them as simply defiant or compliant, thereby distorting the 
picture presented by either of the two enforcement types illustrated above.15 Accordingly, 
enforcement tools often draw from both soft and hard strategies, so as to increase the 
compliance through norm clarification, which may ultimately lead to harsher sanctions and 
deter violations.16 Such hybrid models attempt to acknowledge the nuance of international 
governance and attempt to maximise effectiveness of enforcement by maintaining a flexible 
approach. Article 7 would appear to slide perfectly into this category. It is a hard law tool, 
with its basis in the Treaty, and enforceable by the EU’s institutions. However, its preventative 
arm appears to reflect a ‘soft enforcement’ approach, with the mechanism only able to issue 
a warning and recommendations which are capable of exerting political pressure and may 
lead to other indirect repercussion on the Member State concerned,17 but there is nothing 
under Article 7(1) TEU that could lead to sanctions. As per Article 288 TFEU, recommendations 
issued by the Council are non-binding acts, and the warning issued by the Council at the 
conclusion of Article 7(1) also constitutes no more than a denouncement. The tool’s 
sanctioning arm, on the other hand, after the determination under Article 7(2) TEU (which 
may also be categorised as a softer kind of enforcement since it is merely a denouncement),18 
may lead to an actual imposition of sanctions and it is this part of the mechanism that 
 
13 Ştefan (n 1) 204. 
14 ibid 212-213. 
15 Conant (n 6) 13-14. 
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<https://verfassungsblog.de/the-european-commissions-activation-of-article-7-better-late-than-
never/>  accessed 24 August 2021; Matteo Bonelli, ‘A Union of Values: Safeguarding Democracy, the 
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possesses a hard enforcement element. Thus, while Article 7 is a legal mechanism, 
representing hard law, its enforcement capacity is a blend of both soft and hard enforcement. 
For our purposes, however, while it is acknowledged that some overlap is inevitable, we will 
focus on the two opposite accounts of enforcement. The following section therefore classify 
the RLF as a tool of soft enforcement.  
2.1.1 The Rule of Law Framework as a soft enforcement tool  
The RLF is a monitoring, supervisory and dialogic tool. The Commission’s dialogue aimed to 
illustrate to the Member State concerned the threat posed to the rule of law, with the hope 
that this would be sufficient in encouraging the State to resolve its violations before any 
escalation would be necessary. Furthermore, the Commission’s recommendations are ‘not 
binding legal acts, [and] the Commission will not be able to bring an action against the 
Member States concerned (under Article 258 TFEU [the infringements procedure]) for not 
fulfilling them.’19 Thus in order to be effective – and implement its first goal of preventing a 
deterioration on the ground – the RLF can only encourage change through dialogue. A 
Member State is encouraged (but not obligated) to engage in this dialogue with the 
Commission, and it may not in any case be obligated to enforce the Commission’s 
recommendations.20  
In order to narrow the focus to an assessment relevant and specific to the RLF, a number of 
observations regarding its enforcement capacity must be made. 
First, the RLF – unlike certain soft law mechanisms ordinarily found under international law – 
is not made under a treaty between contracting states.21 It was unilaterally created by the 
Commission through a ‘communication’ – an instrument lacking legally binding force, allowing 
the Commission to inter alia clarify how provisions of EU law and policy ought to be 
interpreted and applied.22 The main consequence of non-compliance with the Commission’s 
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recommendations under the RLF is a possible initiation of Article 7(1) TEU. The tool has 
therefore aptly been described by Hillion as a ‘pre-preventative’ procedure;23 the non-
compliance with the RLF leads to another dialogic mechanism which, although more capable 
of exerting pressure, still does not encompass any sanctioning capacity.24 One could therefore 
argue that it is a tool capable of exerting only limited political pressure on the Member State.25 
Secondly, the recommendations made under the RLF were not enforced by the CJEU. This 
may have stemmed from a belief ‘that use of soft law instruments in court is undesirable’, 
given their often vague and aspiratory provisions which could undermine legal certainty if 
enforced judicially.26 In response to such claims, one could argue that the Commission’s 
recommendations were sufficiently specific as to what was expected from Member States, in 
contrast to soft law treaties in international law which may contain somewhat aspiratory and 
imprecise language.27 However, while the specificity of the instructions in the 
recommendations may not have been an issue, the judicial enforcement of non-binding 
instruments could nonetheless be problematic,28 as it could amount to ‘fostering illegitimate 
decision making’ which could exacerbate the criticisms over the EU’s democratic deficit.29 
Therefore, simply put, judicial enforcement of provisions lacking legally binding force 
becomes problematic.30 Some exceptions to this rule exist in the context of EU law, such as 
where the soft tool is ‘considered binding at the discretion of the enacting institution’ or 
where soft law was ‘negotiated’ between states thereby making it possible to argue that the 
tool possesses a binding aspect.31 These arguments, however, do not apply in the context of 
 
23 Christophe Hillion, ‘Overseeing the Rule of Law in the EU: Legal Mandate and Means’ in Carlos Closa 
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the RLF as it was not deemed binding by the Commission, nor was it agreed upon by States. 
The RLF may therefore be described as incapable of judicial enforcement. 
Given this assessment we may relatively uncontroversially categorise the RLF as a soft 
enforcement tool – it lacked a legally binding aspect, was not judicially enforceable, and 
therefore rested almost exclusively on the belief that recommendations and dialogue would 
be sufficient at persuading States to correct their behaviour.  
We may now consider whether the RLF’s failure to induce change in a defiant State lies in its 
soft enforcement capacity. 
2.2 Soft enforcement as a response to the rule of law crisis 
The key criticism regarding the RLF’s enforcement capacity can be summarised as follows.32   
The RLF’s soft enforcement capacity rests on an assumption of compliance. The tool lacks a 
deterrent aspect, instead placing its faith completely in dialogic and discursive means of 
enforcement, the belief being that pressure exerted through such dialogue will in itself be 
sufficient to steer a Member State in the right direction. This is not completely unfounded 
given State compliance with EU law is ultimately voluntary.33 Therefore, since the EU cannot 
amend domestic constitutions or domestic legislation, one may argue that the most effective 
form of supra-national interference comes in the form of dialogue, political pressure, or other 
such approaches which aim to strengthen the capacity of domestic institutions to resolve the 
problem at its very core.34 The practical implications of this assumption are however 
problematic. In the words of Niklewicz: 
Apparently, the Commission believed that any rule-of-law crises to be addressed by 
the [RLF] could only result from unintentional mistakes, poor interpretations and so 
on, on the part of the government in question. At the same time, the Commission 
seemed to believe that governments would act in good faith and that they would be 
willing, in the end, to adhere to… basic tenants of liberal democracy. It is highly 
probable that no one in Brussels expected a situation where a member-state 
 
32 See Laurent Pech and Kim Lane Scheppele, 'Illiberalism within: Rule of Law Backsliding in the EU' 
(2017) 19 CYELS 3, 6-7, 27. 
33 See Bieber and Maiani (n 25) 1060-61. 
34 See Günter Wilms, ‘Protecting fundamental values in the European Union through the rule of law: 
Articles 2 and 7 TEU from a legal, historical and comparative angle’ (EUI 2017) 73. 
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government’s deeply nested and fully embraced intention was to act against the 
essence of liberal democracy.35 
Arguably, the RLF was therefore based on the presumption that States could never 
purposefully aim to undermine the EU’s values, thereby operating under the presumption 
that dialogue under the RLF will work as it would highlight the issues to States who would 
then cooperate with the monitoring institution (the European Commission). In other words, 
the RLF was based on an assumption of compliance – a belief that Member States would 
cooperate. 
One may therefore notice that problems arise if a Member State is unwilling to engage in this 
dialogue, as the tool is incapable of enforcing compliance.36 Soft law therefore is likely to have 
a negligible impact – at least in the short term when arguably it is most important to take 
action before regimes entrench themselves in power37 – if it is faced with uncooperative 
States. Problematically, the tool was used against Poland, a State whose regime is wilfully and 
persistently set on dismantling checks on its power. It was therefore committed to its 
backsliding, ‘regardless of the political cost’; it also helped that it was convinced that the RLF 
and Article 7 were mere ‘paper tigers’.38 Nowak-Far is therefore correct when he states that 
recommendations issued by the Commission could be ‘disregard[ed]’ by the ‘Member States 
concerned, if only [they were] determined enough’, as Poland has shown.39  
Accordingly, reliance on soft enforcement is argued to be of questionable use in the context 
of the rule of law crisis. The assumption of compliance upon which these tools are based 
appears to be incompatible with the reality of persistently recalcitrant backsliding states. Such 
tools are therefore unequipped to enforce norms when faced with persistently defiant 
states.40 In short – soft enforcement does not work if both sides are not equally committed 
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to finding a solution through dialogue and cooperation. The tool was therefore correctly 
criticised for ‘its likely ineffectiveness’ from the outset.41  
This argument certainly appears to be supported by how the tool was implemented – Poland 
ignored the Commission’s recommendations, denounced the Commission’s interferences, 
and continued its rule of law deterioration despite the activation of the mechanism, unafraid 
of the consequences associated with non-compliance.  
That is not to say that soft enforcement is redundant and should not be used if one expects it 
to fail. Wilms highlights that ‘the European Union is a community based on trust in the 
compliance of Member States.’42 The EU’s basis in mutual trust rests on the assumption that 
all Member States are going to comply with EU law, and the suspension of this principle is 
only permitted in ‘exceptional circumstances.’43 Wilms therefore argues that even if one 
expected Poland to ignore the Commission’s recommendations under the RLF, the high 
thresholds for disapplying the principle of mutual trust is reason enough for the Commission 
to nonetheless use it. A refusal to do so, he argues, would amount to suspension of this 
fundamental principle, and would be ‘badly advised’, amounting ‘to repeating the mistakes 
made in the [Haider affair]’.44 It is possible to question whether this argument truly applies to 
the RLF, given that the initiation of Article 7 would likely have started with its preventative 
arm, where the State has a right to be heard, and which in any case does not lead to any 
sanctioning as was the case in the Haider affair. Nonetheless, the argument does highlight the 
importance of dialogic tools given the EU’s foundation in the concept of mutual trust. The EU 
is based on the assumption of compliance, and therefore it is possible to argue that to ensure 
its actions are legitimate, the EU ought to resort to tools of soft enforcement first.  
This point, however, does not undermine the aforementioned analysis regarding tools of soft 
enforcement. If anything, it strengthens the criticism levelled against the RLF: since the EU is 
based on an assumption of compliance, it appears to be in an inherently disadvantageous 
position, as it is reluctant to acknowledge the lack of cooperation from backsliding states. In 
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turn, the EU is limiting its capacity to address backsliding by having to resort to tools which 
reflect the presumption of compliance (or mutual trust).   
2.3 Hard enforcement as a response to the rule of law crisis   
Unlike soft enforcement, hard enforcement theories presuppose that States will act in a way 
which benefits them – therefore regardless of the value or importance of a norm enforced, a 
state will implement or ignore it depending on the benefit gained.45 In practice, such a 
perspective may be an oversimplification, as not all states can be cast through such a prism,46 
but it is argued that this approach is more appropriate in the context of the rule of law crisis 
where states are committed to their illiberal goals and it would appear that little can be done 
from dissuading them from carrying them out – after all, a government able and willing to 
undermine the independence of its entire judiciary in a meticulous and time-consuming 
process is unlikely to respond to arguments rationalising the importance of the rule of law.   
Hard enforcement theories are therefore based on the assumption that the cost of non-
compliance with a norm must outweigh the cost of compliance.47 In the context of the rule of 
law crisis, this would translate to an enforcement mechanism containing sufficiently robust 
coercive and deterrent means so as to force a state to halt its backsliding and restore the 
functioning of the rule of law.  
The crux of the matter can therefore be formulated as follows: is a sanctioned norm more 
likely to be enforced than a non-sanctioned norm?  
To begin answering this question we could argue that ‘[t]he key distinction between hard and 
soft law is that the former imposes greater costs on the violating state than does the latter. 
This gives hard law greater "compliance pull" than soft law.’48 A norm is therefore complied 
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with when the cost of non-compliance is too high.49 Oftentimes this takes the form of 
sanctions.50  
While not conclusive, one may consider the fact that on the few occasions where Poland did 
halt its unlawful activity (even if only temporarily), this was often accompanied by increased 
pressure. In 2017 Poland was ordered to halt its illegal logging activity in the Białowieża Forest 
by the CJEU. Poland did not cooperate. In response, the CJEU construed its powers under 
Article 279 TFEU in a way which made the imposition of financial sanctions a possibility. The 
Court argued it was necessary for it to be able to adopt ‘any measure intended to ensure that 
the interim order is complied with by that party. Such a measure may entail, inter alia, 
provision for a periodic penalty payment to be imposed should that order not be respected 
by the relevant party.’51 This interpretation of Article 279 TFUE was necessary to ‘guarantee 
the effective application of EU law, such application being an essential component of the rule 
of law… on which the European Union is founded.’52 In turn, Poland conceded.  
The threat of periodic penalty payments of at least EUR 100,000 per day convinced 
the Polish government to comply with the interim measure, not only in the Białowieza 
Forest case in November 2017, but almost a year later in a [SC] case [concerning forced 
retirements].53  
Furthermore, Poland’s recent willingness to rework the DC after the Commission threatened 
financial penalties under Article 260 TFEU following Poland’s initially hostile response to the 
July 2021 decisions of the CJEU supports this argument further. These episodes illustrate how 
an increase in pressure via hard enforcement may be capable of deterring further violations. 
They highlight that a sufficient amount of deterrence and pressure may produce positive 
results. We could attribute this policy reversal to the importance of financial considerations 
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to Poland – it is one of the main net beneficiaries of EU funds, and as such financial sanctions 
can serve as a real deterrent due to the very real consequences felt by the Member State.54 
Financial sanctions may therefore amount to increasing the cost of non-compliance to such 
an extent so as to force Poland into compliance.55   
This argument is reaffirmed when considering Poland’s failure to comply with the April 2020 
interim relief order. Given that controlling judicial decision-making via the threat of facing 
disciplinary proceedings was a crucial tool for the regime’s subordination of the judiciary, and 
given that no financial penalties were threatened after Poland’s failure to comply with that 
interim relief order,56 we could argue that the cost of defiance (abolishing a flagship 
backsliding piece of legislation) outweighed the benefits in compliance (avoiding criticism, 
political pressure and denouncements from the EU). In other words, the regime does not have 
a problem with being denounced and criticised, and that is a cost it is willing to pay for 
continuing its backsliding. The lack of financial sanctions has therefore meant that the cost of 
compliance could not match the cost of defiance.  
While this is merely a hypothesis, and the evidence may therefore be inconclusive, the fact 
that Poland’s withdrawal regarding the Białowieża forest, SC forced retirements, and now the 
DC – as examples of the few instances where they actually did comply with EU pressure – 
coincided with a threat of imposition of financial sanctions, it may be possible to argue that 
hard means of enforcement are more effective at ensuring compliance than softer means of 
enforcement. Indeed, none of the Commission’s recommendations under the RLF (or 
hearings under Article 7(1)) had a similar impact. The argument that a form of deterrence is 
required when faced with a defiant and uncooperative State is not outlandish and has a 
degree of empirical evidence to support it, compared to the ineffectiveness of the RLF. 
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However, the literature surrounding compliance with sanctioned norms is not unequivocal, 
and as the following section will illustrate, its success need not be guaranteed.  
2.3.1 The difficulties of hard enforcement  
While soft enforcement is likely to be ineffective against uncooperative states, the argument 
that it is bound to produce weaker results than hard enforcement is open to debate.57 Despite 
speaking in a domestic context, McHarg points out that while hard law enforcement may 
prima facie appear more effective,58 upon further consideration ‘the strength of legal 
sanctions is highly variable, depending on the nature of the penalty in question, the likelihood 
of enforcement, the ease or difficulty of proof [et al]’.59 Thus, in practice, the initially 
threatening hard law sanctions may become ineffective if they are incapable of enforcement. 
It is not difficult to see this argument translate to the EU’s enforcement tools, as Article 7, 
despite its potential of imposing extensive sanctions, may have been neutered due to its 
perception as a tool too damaging to use and too uncertain to enforce. As the following 
chapter will illustrate, given the apathy of Member States towards Poland’s violations as seen 
in the context of Article 7(1) hearings, the unanimity threshold of Article 7(2) TEU is very 
unlikely to be met (Hungary’s veto possibility notwithstanding), and as such Poland has been 
openly defying EU law in the knowledge that its actions are likely to go unpunished. Thus, 
while in theory Article 7’s sanctioning arm is capable of greater effect than the RLF or Article 
7(1) TEU, this is negated if the tool is incapable of enforcement itself. Soft law tools which rely 
on ‘moral and political pressure’,60 might therefore possibly produce greater effects if the 
choice is between inactivity (of hard enforcement) and some pressure (via soft 
enforcement).61  
However, in response to this one could argue that the problem is not with hard enforcement 
per se, but with hard enforcement which is unreasonably qualified. Indeed, threats of actual 
financial penalties imposed by the CJEU and the Commission have shown to produce results. 
Effective sanctioning tools must therefore not only be capable of imposing sanctions in 
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theory, but they must also be capable of imposing them in practice.62 If deterrence tools lie 
dormant and are not used, it should not be surprising when they fail to convince a defiant 
state to comply with a norm. 
But here we face a new problem, as highlighted by Hofer, who argued that:  
even if sanctions have successfully inflicted the desired costs, this does not mean that 
the targeted actor will cave and act according to the wishes of the sanctioning state. 
If behavioral change is the primary objective for international lawyers, in political 
science there is a general consensus that coercive sanctions are generally a "failure" 
in terms of their ability to change behavior (and this in spite of the diversity of 
sanctions studies).63 
Indeed, States may consider various reasons for compliance with a sanctioned norm.64 While 
speaking in the context of international law and inter-state sanctions, Hofer points out a series 
of reasons as to why states may refuse to comply with sanctions. For instance, if sanctions are 
perceived as posing ‘a threat to its identity; [the state] might perceive that it is not being 
sanctioned for what it has done but for who it is. Under these circumstances the political cost 
of compliance is likely to be too high.’65 Similarly, the State must view the sanctions and the 
sanctioning body as legitimate. If the sanctioned state perceives the measures imposed on it 
as ‘unfair’ it may ‘resist compliance with the sanctioning state's demands.’ Therefore, a 
‘States' sense of identity and the norms they wish to uphold in their international relations 
have led sanctioned actors to declare that such measures are illegitimate. [In such 
circumstances] [n]oncompliance becomes a form of resistance against an illegitimate act.’66 
Applying this to the rule of law crisis, one may see how even the imposition of sanctions as a 
way to ensure compliance becomes problematic. Indeed, Poland has been described by 
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Scheppele as ideologically committed to its backsliding.67 If the governing officials therefore 
truly believe in a different conception of the rule of law,68 attempts at its enforcement may 
be ineffective. Furthermore, Poland has repeatedly declared the EU’s denouncements and 
criticisms as unfounded, illegitimate, and ideological.69 Therefore, in the context of the rule 
of law crisis, where states are committed to their backsliding, it may be possible that even 
harder forms of enforcement will be ineffective.  
What is worse, if the sanctioned state finds these sanctions as unfounded, it may ‘reject the 
norms being enforced and seek solidarity among other deviant actors.’70 In that sense, the 
sanctioning of a state so as to discourage further deviation, may have the opposite effect to 
that intended, and lead to further violations and deterioration. Indeed, one may see the EU’s 
constant denouncements of Poland – albeit not in a sanctioning capacity – leading to the 
alienation of the Polish government, pushing it into ‘Russia’s sphere of influence’ as predicted 
by Bugarič.71 Indeed, Poland has expressed interest in the formation of a new political 
grouping in the European Parliament with inter alia Hungary’s Orbán and Italy’s Salvini, both 
of whom have positive and relatively strong relations with Russia.72 Even if this does not 
reflect a true pro-Russian alliance in the EU, the possible formation of such a political grouping 
could reflect a more united and profound opposition to the EU’s commitment to Article 2 TEU 
values. Therefore, an argument could be made that if the EU had done more than just criticise 
the events in Poland, this could lead to even further alienation from the EU and the values it 
aims to uphold. 
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However, given the failure of the EU’s hitherto soft enforcement approach, it is argued that 
by failing to resort to harder means of enforcement the EU would consciously be rendering 
itself powerless. Thus, the appeal in favour of stronger means of enforcement – even if the 
risks associated with it are true – may be formulated as follows.  
The RLF was unable to persuade Poland to reverse or even halt its backsliding, and it is 
therefore possible to conclude that the RLF’s first goal of preventing a deterioration was going 
to be unattainable given the uncooperative nature of backsliding regimes. It would appear 
that these states cannot be sufficiently compelled to comply with norms enforced via soft 
means. We may also note that the situation in Poland continued to deteriorate after the 
initiation of Article 7’s preventative arm which also lacks a sanctioning component.  
Furthermore, the literature on enforcement mechanisms highlights how soft law can often 
turn into hard law, thereby increasing its enforceability in the process. This transition appears 
to support the claims of supporters of harder means of enforcement, which favour them due 
to their greater ‘compliance pull’. Indeed, the acknowledgment and praise attributed to soft 
law’s capacity to turn into hard law,73 it is argued, could be construed as an acknowledgment 
that soft enforcement may not always be effective, and in such circumstances, more 
deterrent means of enforcement are required. 
It is true that hard enforcement may not be a panacea:74 sanctions may risk alienating States 
and could produce feelings of resentment or retaliation and in any case their success is not 
guaranteed. Despite these concerns, however, a degree of empirical evidence – at least in the 
Polish context – appears to strengthen the case in favour of hard enforcement. Indeed, the 
EU has in the past succeeded at dissuading Poland’s violation of EU law and values via threats 
of financial penalties. Crucially, if the regime does rework or abolish the DC following the EU’s 
threats of financial penalties under Article 260 TFEU in July 2021, after having ignored the 
April 2020 interim relief order which lacked financial penalties, this will arguably support the 
case in favour of hard enforcement when dealing with defiant States. It will illustrate that if 
the EU can muster the strength to sanction conduct which goes against its very values and 
functioning, it can succeed at slowing down the backsliding. Sanctions under infringement 
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proceedings may not, however, resolve the threats completely. They focus on particular 
violations and therefore do not address cumulative violations, or provide comprehensive 
remedies, to backsliding.75 However, infringement proceedings where financial sanctions 
have been threatened highlight the crucial role which the EU can play through hard 
enforcement. The EU can slow down the deterioration through the mere threat of imposing 
financial penalties under Article 260 TFEU. It has not yet resorted to the imposition of 
sanctions through Article 7(3) TEU, Article 279 TFEU or Article 260 TFEU. One may assume 
that if the EU is able and willing to use its sanctioning tools, it may raise the stakes of defiance 
to the stage where further violations will not appear worthwhile to the regimes.  
Therefore, given the gravity of the threat faced by the EU, and given the failure of the hitherto 
soft enforcement approach, it is argued that hard enforcement is worth exploring, and soft 
enforcement ought to be refrained from. Poland is committing serious violations of EU law 
and dialogic tools are preventative – once a serious violation occurs (and persists), there is 
little that they may achieve on the ground, especially if the actors are uncooperative. Simply 
put, if both types of enforcement are going to fail, then at least they should both be tried out 
first. The EU has tried the soft enforcement route. Perhaps the other option – if the EU is truly 
committed to protecting the rule of law – is to meaningfully escalate its response. 
3. The Framework’s second goal: supplementing Article 7 
After two years of dialogue under the RLF the Commission finally activated Article 7(1) TEU. 
Whether or not Article 7(1) could have been initiated against Poland without the 
Commission’s four recommendations is unclear. After all, the European Parliament did initiate 
the preventative arm of Article 7 against Hungary a year after the Commission’s initiation 
against Poland, without Hungary ever being subjected to the RLF. However, given the nuclear 
perception of Article 7 and the associated reluctance to use it, there is room to argue that the 
RLF ‘resulted in the accumulation of overwhelming, damning evidence’76 crucial to the 
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activation of Article 7. Thus, while the RLF operates outside of Article 7’s legal framework,77 
the Commission’s assessments arguably helped to achieve the RLF’s subsidiary goal of 
strengthening its activation.78  
Nonetheless, while the RLF may have strengthened the possibility of activating Article 7, the 
duration of the dialogue was excessive, and it gave PiS additional time to entrench itself in 
power. Thus, the failure of the Commission to escalate the EU’s response in a timely manner 
– so that the situation in Poland could be addressed with more appropriate mechanisms – is 
argued to be the second major challenge to the effectiveness of the RLF. This is because it 
weakened the EU’s ability to resolve backsliding, and therefore inadvertently contributed to 
further deterioration.  
In order to illustrate the second major challenge to the effectiveness of the RLF, this section 
will first illustrate why assessments under the RLF were arguably important for the escalation 
of the EU’s response. However, while dialogue may have been useful and relevant for a 
legitimate escalation of the EU’s response, this does not justify protracted dialogue. Thus, 
secondly, it will be highlighted how protracted discussions and the Commission’s failure to 
escalate its response weakened the EU’s ability to resolve backsliding. More concretely, the 
problem will be argued to lie with the tool’s discretionary nature which did not guarantee the 
activation of Article 7 or impose strict time frames between each of its stages. 
3.1 The utility in dialogue 
Wilms highlighted why – from an efficacy perspective – it may have been prudent to engage 
in dialogue. In discussing the difficulties of activating Article 7’s mechanisms, he highlighted 
that both over and under-enforcement of Article 7 carries with it ‘considerable risks.’79 If the 
Commission initiated Article 7(1) TEU against a Member State, but the Council voted against 
the claim that the Member State had committed a ‘clear risk of a serious breach’, perhaps 
because the Commission could not produce sufficient evidence in support of its claim or 
because States in the Council were simply unwilling to criticise and sanction each other, this 
could lead to serious ‘political damage’.80 It could reinforce the idea that Article 7 is ineffective 
 
77 Hillion (n 23) 78. 
78 Bieber and Maiani (n 25) 1089. See also Commission, ‘Further strengthening the Rule of Law within 
the Union: State of play and possible next steps’ (Communication) COM/2019/163 final, 9.  
79 Wilms (n 34) 68.  
80 This argument also applies to Article 7(2) TEU. See Wilms (ibid) 68. See also Chapter 4, Section 3.2. 
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and unusable, creating a similar attitude to that which surrounded Article 7 after the Haider 
affair, and ‘[w]hat is probably still worse is that a negative decision would give additional 
legitimacy to the respective Member State, who would thence be confirmed in its “illiberal” 
course.’81 Conversely, under-enforcement, viz., a purposeful decision refraining from 
activating Article 7 due to fear that not enough information can be gathered to prove that the 
thresholds of Article 7 had been met – when in fact the ‘formal and substantial requirements’ 
are likely to be met – may cause equally serious damage. It may encourage other States to 
violate the EU’s values, seeing that the original State had not faced punishment for its actions, 
or it could be ‘understood as equivalent to an endorsement of the situation in the Member 
State concerned’.82 A monitoring and supervisory tool, permitting the accumulation of 
evidence was therefore crucial.83 Had the Commission failed to provide sufficient evidence of 
the violations in Poland, if it then lost in the Council, the tool would have been rendered 
unusable and the EU’s enforcement capacity via its strongest enforcement tool would have 
been neutered.  
At this stage, one may argue that Article 7’s preventative arm was to fix this very problem. It 
could thus appear that the RLF constitutes an unnecessary ‘duplication’,84 inducing further 
delay before Article 7 could be initiated, as its critics had highlighted.85 
However, while it is true that the RLF is a duplication of Article 7’s preventative arm, it crucially 
is not an identical copy as it is controlled not by Member States, but by the Commission, which 
in turn improves it as a monitoring tool. The RLF is a mechanism allowing for dialogue 
between the Commission and the Member State, with the possibility to issue non-binding 
recommendations, which may escalate and lead to the activation of Article 7(1) TEU. This 
subsequent mechanism, much like the RLF, is aimed at fostering dialogue, but this time with 
the involvement of the other Member States in the Council. The main difference being that 
 
81 Wilms (ibid) 68. 
82 ibid 69. 
83 ibid 69. 
84 See Gábor Halmai, ‘How the EU Can and Should Cope with Illiberal Member States’ (2018) 38(2) 
Quaderni Constituzionali 313, 335. 
85 Patrick Lavelle, 'Europe's Rule of Law Crisis: An Assessment of the EU's Capacity to Address Systemic 
Breaches of Its Foundational Values in Member States' (2019) 22 Trinity CL Rev 35, 43-44; Dimitry 
Kochenov, ‘Busting the Myths Nuclear: A Commentary on Article 7 TEU’ (2017) EUI Working Paper No 
LAW 2017/10, 8-9 <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2965087> accessed 24 
August 2021. cf Wilms (n 34) 79.  
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the key decision-making is done by the EU’s intergovernmental institutions. The Member 
State may be assessed and questioned, or interrogated, in the General Affairs Council only 
after the Council Presidency schedules a hearing.86 Moreover, a recommendation or a final 
determination of a ‘clear risk of a serious breach’ may only be issued after a supermajority is 
attained in the Council. While the political consensus of over 22 Member States may increase 
the force and legitimacy of a determination condemning the activity in a particular State, its 
effectiveness hinges upon the very existence of such a political consensus. Thus, unless a 
“coalition of the willing” is found, neither a recommendation can be issued nor a 
determination under Article 7(1) found. 
While similar, the RLF may therefore be distinguished by the fact that it allows for constant 
monitoring without the risk of losing a vote, as it is completely controlled by the Commission. 
This independence from interests of States is crucial,87 and strengthens the RLF’s utility as a 
monitoring tool, perhaps more effective at an early stage than the preventative arm of Article 
7 itself as it does not face the same over and under-enforcement challenges. Thus, the 
additional dialogue and monitoring before the initiation of either of Article 7’s arms is 
arguably ‘not a “loss of time” but rather a necessary procedural stage before formalising any 
steps under Article 7 TEU.’88  
Therefore, the RLF could be argued to represent a crucial supervisory and monitoring tool 
which ameliorated the shortcomings of Article 7 and helped with its activation. However, the 
statement that dialogue may be useful at an early stage, is not the same as saying that only 
dialogue should be resorted to; this is where the problem with the RLF’s implementation 
materialises. The Commission’s decision to engage in dialogue for almost two years 
contributed to the delay in the EU’s escalation and activation of Article 7 thereby arguably 
 
86 Article 237 TFEU. 
87 The need for the EU to possess a tool that is ‘independent from political influence’ was recognised 
by the European Parliament back in 2013, perhaps indicating an acknowledgment of the deficiencies 
in the preventative arm of Article 7. See Parliament, ‘Resolution of 3 July 2013 on the situation of 
fundamental rights: standards and practices in Hungary (pursuant to the European Parliament 
resolution of 16 February 2012) (2012/2130(INI))’, P7_TA(2013)0315, para 81; Bieber and Maiani (n 
25) 1085. For an assessment of the issues with Article 7’s intergovernmentalism see Chapter 4, Section 
3.3. 
88 Wilms (n 34) 79-80. 
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weakening the EU’s capacity to enforce its values. It is to this problem, and the corresponding 
time-sensitivity of rule of law crises that we turn to next.  
3.2 Time-sensitivity and the problem with in(sufficient)action 
Rule of law crises are ‘time-sensitive’.89 The more time is given to the illiberal governments 
and the more the EU’s institutions delay with addressing the crisis, the more time the 
recalcitrant States have to consolidate power and dismantle checks and balances, the more 
difficult it will be to prevent further damage or reverse the ‘slide into autocracy’.90 Pech and 
Scheppele describe this well:  
Once a government has created facts on the ground - packed courts, fired officials, 
purged institutions - the Commission's tools fail to work. The Commission can virtually 
never force a change in an existing situation but only lay out ground rules for the 
future. Poland's ruling party must have understood that it would not be possible for 
the Commission in Poland - as it was not possible for the Commission in Hungary - to 
reinstate fired judges (or dismiss unlawfully appointed ones), insist on new members 
of no-longer independent boards, restore civil society organisations closed by funding 
cuts or amplify the robustness of the opposition after state-sponsored bullying had 
scared people into leaving the country.91 
In other words, if the EU is unable to exert sufficient pressure so as to stop backsliding before 
the regime consolidates its power, its enforcement capacity will be severely weakened. The 
decision by the Commission to engage in dialogue for two years, during which PiS pretended 
to engage in dialogue but continued to entrench itself in power, has therefore limited the 
effectiveness of the preventative arm of Article 7 before it was even used.92  
Indeed, the ineffectiveness of Article 7’s preventative arm is clear – the situation in Poland 
has continued to deteriorate irrespective of the mechanism’s initiation. Of course, there are 
problems with how Article 7(1) TEU has been handled by the Council, with it failing to 
schedule regular hearings or issue recommendations or a warning, and we know that its 
 
89 Commission Communication (n 78) 9; Robert Grzeszczak and Stephen Terrett, 'The EU's Role in 
Policing the Rule of Law: Reflections on Recent Polish Experience' (2018) 69 NILQ 347, 355. 
90 Bugarič, 2018 (n 49) 83. 
91 Pech and Scheppele (n 32) 27-28. 
92 Grzeszczak and Terrett (n 89) 356. 
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enforcement capacity is also soft as it may only lead to ‘mere criticism, not a move toward 
deadlines, ultimatums or sanctions.’93  However, the tool still represented an escalation from 
the RLF and it is possible that had the mechanism been used effectively by the Council at an 
earlier stage, Poland could have been deterred from proceeding with its backsliding. The fact 
that Article 7’s initiation was delayed, with the Polish government able to continuously and 
increasingly entrench itself in power, certainly did not help. PiS was convinced that the EU 
would not escalate to Article 7, and it therefore engaged in dialogue with the Commission 
while simultaneously ignoring its recommendations. By continuing dialogue, PiS made the 
most of the provision ‘to delay the possible recourse to the parts of Article 7 TEU that bite.’94  
Accordingly, it is argued that the problem is not with the initiation of the mechanism which 
was useful in itself as it supplemented the activation of Article 7 – the problem lies with the 
continued dialogue once it was clear that the RLF was not leading to any change (thereby 
failing its first objective) and after it become clear that Poland was openly violating the rule 
of law.95 Kochenov, Pech and Scheppele were therefore right to argue that Article 7 should 
have been initiated in ‘November 2016 before the all too predictable unconstitutional capture 
of the Polish [CT] which happened at the end of December 2016’.96 The Commission itself 
acknowledged in its recommendations that by undermining judicial review the regime was 
preventing the legislation passed from being scrutinised and tested against the provisions of 
the Constitution – an important check on the government’s power had been dismantled, 
which allowed for the introduction of further damaging legislation, and yet the Commission 
failed to escalate the EU’s response. The Commission’s decision to continue dialogue 
therefore possibly allowed ‘the Polish ruling party… to undermine if not annihilate virtually all 
checks and balances one year before the Commission moved to act [under Article 7].’97 
Knowing that delays in action (or inaction) undermine the EU’s enforcement capacity by 
allowing further deterioration, we may consider how the EU could learn from this. In order to 
 
93 Pech and Scheppele (n 32) 30-31. 
94 Kochenov and Pech 2015 (n 20) 539. 
95 See Niklewicz (n 35) 287-288. 
96 Kochenov, Pech and Scheppele (n 17); Laurent Pech, ‘Systemic Threat to the Rule of Law in Poland: 
What should the Commission do next?’ <https://verfassungsblog.de/systemic-threat-to-the-rule-of-
law-in-poland-what-should-the-commission-do-next/> (Verfassungsblog, 31 October 2016) accessed 
12 November 2020.  
97  Kochenov, Pech and Scheppele (n 17).  
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do this, we need to reflect upon the structure of the RLF. The Commission gave itself 
discretion over the escalation of the tool which, in turn led to the introduction of political 
considerations into the process.  
3.2.1 Commission discretion as a challenge to efficacy  
Before we proceed to outline the flaws with the construction of the RLF, we should also 
acknowledge that it did attempt to address the time-sensitive nature of rule of law crises. 
Indeed, as a soft law mechanism it was introduced relatively easily. The mechanism did not 
require time consuming Treaty amendments, the success of which could not be guaranteed.98 
The other option would be to create a mechanism via legislative means, but this likely would 
have required a majority in the European Parliament and a qualified majority in the Council. 
This too would have likely faced delay at a time when the EU’s Member States were 
descending into authoritarianism and a prompt response was necessary.99 Therefore, the 
ability to introduce a new mechanism relatively quickly is undoubtedly a strength of the 
RLF,100 especially given the initial reluctance to activate Article 7 and the inability of the 
infringements procedure to resolve the crisis (which, it could be argued, rendered the EU 
powerless at the time).  
Furthermore, as highlighted by Wilms, the RLF is time efficient in both a procedural and a 
substantive sense. Procedurally, the RLF’s structured dialogue leads to the ‘setting… [of] clear 
deadlines for replying to its [the Commission’s] questions’.101 Substantially, the RLF aims to 
find ‘rapid solutions to the threats to the Rule of Law’ by highlighting threats at an early stage. 
This may in turn allow ‘the Member State concerned… [to] adapt or correct its contentious 
behaviour at an early stage’.102 Indeed, the RLF was initiated against Poland almost as soon 
 
98 Kochenov and Pech 2015 (n 20) 528-529, 532. 
99 Indeed, the Council Legal Service did not approve of the RLF, and the Council instead created its 
Rule of Law Dialogue, a heavily deficient mechanism which relies on self-reporting by States. (Pech 
and Scheppele (n 32) 29; Council, ‘Commission’s Communication on a new EU Framework to 
Strengthen the Rule of Law’ (Opinion of the Legal Service) Brussels, 27 May 2014, Doc 10296/14; 
Council, ‘Press Release, 3362nd Council meeting, General Affairs’, Brussels, 16 December 2014, Doc 
16936/14) It is thus possible a similar reluctance could have been shown regarding the creation of a 
mechanism in the EU’s legislature, thereby leading to more delay.  
100 Indeed, the Framework came into force approximately a year after the calls for a new mechanism 
became more widespread across the Union. See Bonelli (n 17) 189-190. 
101 Wilms (n 34) 79; Commission, ‘A new EU Framework to strengthen the Rule of Law’ 
(Communication) COM/2014/0158 final, 8. 
102 Wilms (ibid) 79. 
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as the CT became assaulted. Therefore, not only was the RLF able to be introduced with 
relative ease, but once in force, it was to address threats at an early stage, and without 
unnecessary delay. The RLF thus prima facie embodies an acknowledgment by the EU of the 
time-sensitive nature of rule of law crises. 
However, despite some of its positive aspects, the mechanism’s ability to respond to the time-
sensitivity of rule of law crises is limited in inter alia two ways. First, it does not possess clear 
timeframes for the escalation between its different stages.103 Namely, there was no 
automatic connection between the issuing of the recommendations (stage 2) and the follow-
up (stage 3), as a result of which the Commission was able to issue repeated ‘ad hoc’ 
recommendations, unforeseen in the original Commission Communication.104 Secondly, the 
activation of Article 7 was not a guarantee under the RLF, with the Commission 
Communication indicating that such escalation was merely a possibility. In turn, the RLF left a 
great deal of discretion over the implementation of the tool to the Commission. The point 
relevant for our purposes, is that this discretion – the lack of strict time-frames and the 
Commission’s ability to decide how it would engage in follow-up to the non-implementation 
of its recommendations – allowed the Commission to continue its protracted discussions with 
Poland despite their ineffectiveness.105 It introduced more political considerations into the 
process, with the Commission apparently believing it had to seek the approval of the Council 
before it resorted to the activation of Article 7(1). Such approaches, as rightly pointed out by 
Pech and Scheppele add ‘a political element which may be considered ill-advised for an 
institution that is supposed to act independently and whose insulation from politics was 
institutionally organised to enable it to take “difficult” decisions in ensuring the uniform 
application of Union law.’106 
Therefore, while some of the RLF’s aspects represented an acknowledgment of the time-
sensitive nature of rule of law backsliding, the lack of an automatic connection between the 
RLF and Article 7, instead leaving the decision over escalation to the Commission’s discretion, 
allowed for the dialogue to last longer than was necessary. The Commission therefore 
 
103 Kochenov and Pech 2016 (n 24) 1070.  
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continued operating under a tool of soft enforcement. Such tools, however, are to address 
threats at an early stage and once the breaches are obvious, there is little point in engaging 
in further preventative dialogue – once the damage is done, it can no longer be prevented 
from occurring. 
4. Conclusion 
The RLF represented an important contribution to the EU’s anti-backsliding toolkit at a time 
when the activation of Article 7 appeared unfathomable.107 The perception of Article 7 as 
nuclear and unusable was unfounded, but that does not change the fact that the EU’s 
institutions did not see it as a viable tool. The RLF’s ability to gather evidence and monitor the 
situation was therefore crucial in addressing concerns of over and under-enforcement 
associated with the activation of Article 7.108 In that sense, the RLF appears to have achieved 
its secondary goal of escalating the EU’s response to that of Article 7. 
However, despite its positive contributions, the RLF was ineffective at resolving (halting or 
preventing) further deterioration – its first and primary objective. On the contrary, one could 
argue it further facilitated this deterioration through the Commission’s protracted dialogue. 
Therefore, it is argued that the EU’s experience with the RLF ought to have taught the EU (at 
least) two lessons.  
First, if the EU wants to dissuade a state from acting in a particular way (or to enforce a 
particular value), it cannot rely on tools of soft enforcement if it is faced with recalcitrant 
states. These tools are effective when States are cooperative and willing to engage in a 
meaningful dialogue. However, when faced with ‘bad faith’ actors,109 more deterrent tools 
are needed in order to increase the cost of non-compliance for those states. While these tools 
also have risks and issues associated with them, it would appear that a deterrence-based 
approach is more suitable as it does not rest on an unfounded (in the context of rule of law 
backsliding) presumption of compliance.  
 
107 On a positive, or hopeful assessment, prior to the tool’s apparent ineffectiveness see von 
Bogdandy, Antpöhler, and Ioannidis (n 9) 228.  
108 Wilms (n 34) 82. 
109 Laurent Pech, Patryk Wachowiec, and Dariusz Mazur, ‘Poland’s Rule of Law Breakdown: A Five-Year 
Assessment of EU’s (In)Action’ (2021) 13 HJRL 1, 21.  
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Secondly, the EU’s institutions must be pragmatic and respond appropriately when they see 
that their tools are ineffective. The EU will not be able to resolve the threat posed by rule of 
law backsliding if its approach is stagnant. The situation is constantly deteriorating, with the 
PiS government continuously consolidating and entrenching itself in power. By refusing to 
acknowledge such deterioration, and by failing to adequately respond, the EU’s approach 
could be described as negligent at best, and permissive (and therefore facilitatory) at worst.110 
The longer the EU delays, the more challenging the reversal of these measures will become, 
and the more difficult it will be for the EU’s tools in any form – soft or hard – to halt the decay.  
 
110 Kochenov 2017 (n 85) 1.  
Chapter 4: Article 7’s Ineffectiveness 
 
1. Introduction  
Despite the activation of Article 7’s preventative arm, the situation in Poland has continued 
to deteriorate. It is therefore possible to argue, in line with the derogatory statement of 
Minister Czaputowicz, that the provision is ‘dead’:1 hearings have been infrequent and 
deficient; no recommendations have been issued; and no conclusion to the procedure (which 
would culminate with an official warning of the EU) is in sight.  Even the issuing of this warning 
is arguably too late now, given that the regime has already largely entrenched itself in power 
and the preventative arm does not possess adequate means to compel Poland to reverse its 
backsliding. Given the lack of resolve of the Member States in the Council to act under the 
preventative arm, it should therefore also be unsurprising that the main deterrent aspect of 
Article 7 – its sanctioning arm – has not been initiated and this is likely to remain so given its 
high procedural thresholds. Kochenov is therefore correct when he describes Article 7 as not 
only ‘dead’, but also ‘misused’.2 
In order to illustrate some lessons the EU could draw from this experience, this chapter will 
attribute Article 7’s ineffectiveness to three aspects pertaining to its implementation and 
structure.  
First, in considering the tool’s implementation, the EU’s failure to activate Article 7 will be 
considered. In order to illustrate that the EU’s caution, inaction and delays weakened its 
enforcement capacity – and given the fact that the previous chapter has already explained 
the negative impact on the EU’s preventative tools – the effect of delaying Article 7’s initiation 
 
1 See Robert Grzeszczak and Stephen Terrett, 'The EU's Role in Policing the Rule of Law: Reflections on 
Recent Polish Experience' (2018) 69 NILQ 347, 354. See also Laurent Pech, Patryk Wachowiec, and 
Dariusz Mazur, ‘Poland’s Rule of Law Breakdown: A Five-Year Assessment of EU’s (In)Action’ (2021) 13 
HJRL 1, 18-21.  
2 The point made by Kochenov is that the mechanism has not been used effectively, as has been 
illustrated throughout this thesis. See Dimitry Kochenov, ‘Article 7: A Commentary on a Much Talked-
About “Dead” Provision’ in Armin von Bogdandy and others (eds), Defending Checks and Balances in 
EU Member States: Taking Stock of Europe’s Actions (Springer 2021) 140. 
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on its sanctioning arm will be considered. It will be argued that by delaying the activation of 
Article 7 the EU has neutered its strongest enforcement tool: with Poland joining Hungary in 
its backsliding the two States are likely to invoke their veto in the European Council if Article 
7(2) is initiated.3 
Secondly, the problematic design of Article 7 and its impact on the tool’s efficacy will be 
considered. First, the section will illustrate why it may have been necessary for Article 7 to be 
qualified given that, if left unqualified, it would allow the EU to sanction a Member State for 
events occurring in a purely domestic capacity. It will then be argued that while some 
qualifications to a tool like Article 7 may have been called for, in practice two particular 
qualifications – one relating to the tool’s high procedural thresholds and the other relating to 
its intergovernmental nature – have ultimately limited its effectiveness. Thus, secondly, it will 
be highlighted in the context of Article 7’s high procedural thresholds that setting standards 
too difficult to satisfy renders the tool unusable. And thirdly, it will be argued that this 
problem is exacerbated by Article 7’s intergovernmental decision-making under which even 
the preventative arm’s lower threshold has thus far not been satisfied. It is therefore claimed 
that the larger issue relates to leaving the decision-making of a tool for the enforcement of 
the EU’s values solely to the consideration of a body least likely to use it.  
Article 7’s ineffectiveness may therefore be attributed to three reasons: delays which 
weakened the tool’s capacity to resolve backsliding before it was even initiated; high 
thresholds which have limited the tool’s sanctioning capacity; and its intergovernmentalism 
which has made any decision taken under the mechanism a political one, thereby making it 
possible for considerations of diplomatic expediency to outweigh the need to respect the EU’s 
founding values.  
2. The failure to initiate the tool: a neutered deterrent  
While the violations in Hungary began in 2010, and those in Poland in 2015, Article 7’s 
initiating bodies were uninterested in using the EU’s prime enforcement tool. Article 7 was 
 
3 In this thesis the issue associated with Article 7(2)’s unanimity requirement is treated as a separate 
issue pertaining to the tool’s design. (See section 3.2) In discussing the delays associated with Article 
7’s implementation, however, the thesis aims to highlight the EU’s inadequate treatment of rule of 
law backsliding in Poland. 
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only activated against Poland after the failure of the RLF, in December 2017, and it was 
activated against Hungary a year later in September 2018. Each initiating institution found an 
excuse not to use the mechanism. As highlighted by Kochenov:  
The Commission, instead of initiating Article 7 TEU, which it could do in the case of 
both Article 7(1) and 7(2) procedures designed and deployed… the [RLF]… the Council, 
instead of working with the other institutions on Article 7, promoted [an] annual rule 
of law dialogue, based on the idea of peer review and unanimously deemed by 
scholars as unworkable; the European Parliament, which could initiate Article 7(1) TEU 
prepared, instead, a detailed proposal on how to revamp the existing structure of 
guaranteeing the adherence to values. Select Member States, instead of initiating 
Article 7 TEU, as it takes 1/3 to launch Article 7(1) or 7(2), were busy writing letters to 
the Commission to ask it to do something: the requests, which ultimately resulted in 
the [RLF], instead of initiating Article 7 TEU.4 
The reasons for refraining from initiating Article 7 are widely documented in the literature.5 
One such reason was Article 7’s perception as a nuclear and unusable mechanism following 
the Haider Affair. Furthermore, there was no guarantee that the tool would be effective given 
its high procedural thresholds, the Council’s complete discretion in decision-making which 
created issues of over and under enforcement, and the fact that even the tool’s sanctioning 
arm was not guaranteed to stop backsliding. Pech and Scheppele also point out the issue with 
multiple initiating bodies, which meant that ‘no institution [bore] the primary responsibility 
for starting the process’.6 
 
4 Dimitry Kochenov, ‘Busting the Myths Nuclear: A Commentary on Article 7 TEU’ (2017) EUI Working 
Paper No LAW 2017/10 <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2965087> accessed 
24 August 2021, 11-12. (footnotes omitted) 
5 See, e.g., Gábor Halmai, ‘How the EU Can and Should Cope with Illiberal Member States’ (2018) 38(2) 
Quaderni Constituzionali 313, 327-328; Dimitry Kochenov and Laurent Pech, 'Better Late than Never: 
On the European Commission's Rule of Law Framework and Its First Activation' (2016) 54 J Common 
Mkt Stud 1062, 1070-1071; Bojan Bugarič, ‘Protecting Democracy inside the EU: On Article 7 TEU and 
the Hungarian Turn to Authoritarianism’ in Carlos Closa and Dimitry Kochenov (eds), Reinforcing Rule 
of Law Oversight in the European Union (CUP 2016) 90. See also Chapter 1, Section 2.2. 
6 Laurent Pech and Kim Lane Scheppele, 'Illiberalism within: Rule of Law Backsliding in the EU' (2017) 
19 CYELS 3, 26. 
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Whatever the reason, the decision not to initiate Article 7 had significant consequences in 
weakening the EU’s enforcement capacity.  
First, as already discussed in the previous chapter, the decision to refrain from escalating the 
EU’s response meant that it could not sufficiently challenge the deterioration in Poland, 
thereby rendering itself powerless.7 With the PiS government able to further entrench itself 
in power, the EU’s ability to resolve backsliding was continuously weakening.  
Secondly, and more directly, such delays arguably neutered Article 7’s sanctioning arm of its 
deterrent potential. Indeed, after the RLF’s failure to prevent further backsliding in Poland, 
followed by the activation of Article 7(1) TEU by the Commission, Victor Orbán made a clear 
declaration that Hungary would veto any determination under Article 7(2) TEU against 
Poland.8 Since, in order for sanctions to be imposed under Article 7(3) TEU, unanimity must 
first be attained and a denouncement issued by the European Council, the provision’s 
applicability has been neutered. One can expect the Polish government to reciprocate, if 
Article 7(2) was to be initiated against Hungary.9 Had the tool been initiated against Hungary 
between 2010 and 2015, with Hungary’s voting rights being suspended under Article 7(3) TEU, 
the failure of the sanctioning arm would therefore not be guaranteed. Therefore, even if 
Article 7’s sanctioning capacity was only to serve as a deterrent – never to be used – the fact 
that it has been rendered unusable deprives it of even this character.10 
This claim suggests that Article 7 has lost its ability to dissuade deterioration and as a result 
has lost much of its enforcement capacity. It rests on the assumption that Article 7’s 
sanctioning arm would be more capable of resolving rule of law crises than softer and more 
dialogic means of enforcement such as those found in the RLF or even the preventative arm 
 
7 Günter Wilms, ‘Protecting fundamental values in the European Union through the rule of law: Articles 
2 and 7 TEU from a legal, historical and comparative angle’ (EUI 2017), 71. 
8 Reuters Staff, ‘Hungary PM flags veto of any EU sanctions against Poland’ (Reuters, 8 January 2016) 
<https://www.reuters.com/article/us-poland-hungary-sanctions-idUSKBN0UM0L220160108> 
accessed 24 August 2021; Kim Lane Scheppele, ‘Can Poland be Sanctioned by the EU? Not Unless 
Hungary is Sanctioned Too’ (Verfassungsblog, 24 October 2016) <https://verfassungsblog.de/can-
poland-be-sanctioned-by-the-eu-not-unless-hungary-is-sanctioned-too/> accessed 24 August 2021. 
9 James Shotter and Valerie Hopkins, ‘Poland pledges to veto sanctions against Hungary’ (FT, 12 
September 2018) <https://www.ft.com/content/b743c0b2-b6cd-11e8-bbc3-ccd7de085ffe> accessed 
24 August 2021.  
10 See Patrick Lavelle, ‘Europe's Rule of Law Crisis: An Assessment of the EU's Capacity to Address 
Systemic Breaches of Its Foundational Values in Member States' (2019) 22 Trinity CL Rev 35, 43. 
99 
 
of Article 7. This may appear to some as an inappropriate assumption given the fact that even 
sanctioning tools are not guaranteed to induce change.11 Indeed, Article 7’s sanctioning arm 
is incapable of forcing legislative change on the ground. The tool rests on the ‘hope’ that the 
pressure exerted through sanctions will be sufficient to encourage a Member State to cease 
its violations.12 However, it is argued that hope regarding the impact sanctions may have is 
different to the hope that the violating State will resolve its violations through dialogue (and 
little to no pressure). In other words, the hope that hard enforcement will be effective is not 
the same as the assumption of compliance upon which tools of soft enforcement are based, 
as discussed in the previous chapter. While compliance with the EU’s requests is ultimately 
voluntary, what distinguishes tools of hard enforcement from those of soft enforcement is 
the cost associated with non-compliance. Given that backsliding states are uncooperative and 
set on eroding checks on their power, tools which are incapable of substantially raising the 
cost of non-compliance are less likely to be effective. Soft tools simply do not have that 
capacity. As correctly foreseen by Niklewicz, Poland’s non-compliance with the EU’s requests 
(and thus the ineffectiveness of the EU’s approach) stemmed from Poland’s belief that ‘any 
collateral damage would be limited to naming and shaming, something with which it could 
live’.13 
Therefore, by delaying and therefore rendering the sanctioning arm unusable, the EU has 
been left only with the preventative arm in the context of Article 7 which significantly 
weakens its enforcement capacity. 
The lesson to draw from this experience may therefore be similar to that articulated at the 
end of the previous chapter. While bold actions may not always be well-advised,14 the time-
sensitive nature of rule of law crises requires such a response. Poland’s deterioration 
illustrates how the initial dismantlement of checks and balances by replacing judges with 
government supporters may then turn into a direct challenge to EU law and its functioning.15 
A prima facie internal matter is manifesting very real and very external effects which are 
 
11 Kochenov (n 2) 136. See also Chapter 3, Section 2.3.1. 
12 Jan-Werner Müller, 'Should the EU Protect Democracy and the Rule of Law inside Member States' 
(2015) 21 ELJ 141, 144. 
13 Konrad Niklewicz, ‘Safeguarding the rule of law within the EU: lessons from the Polish experience’ 
(2017) 16 EurView 281, 285. 
14 Wilms (n 7) 71. 
15 See Chapter 2, Section 3.2.  
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damaging to the EU. We may not be able to turn back time and convince the EU to have 
initiated Article 7 sooner, but if anything, it ought to have realised by now that further delays 
will allow for further damage. Irrespective of the risks associated with harsh actions, it is 
possible to argue that – at least in the context of rule of law backsliding states – the damage 
caused by inaction outweighs the concerns associated with action.  
3. Article 7’s qualifications 
In theory, Article 7 is a powerful tool. It possesses not only extensive sanctioning powers, 
combined with the ability to exert political pressure by condemning a Member State as a 
violator of the EU’s values, but its assessments are also applicable to purely internal and 
domestic affairs. While neither sanctions nor political pressure are guaranteed to be effective 
in dissuading backsliding, the tool still arguably represents the broadest and most extensive 
deterrence tool in the EU’s enforcement toolkit. Grzeszczak and Terrett are therefore correct 
when they state that ‘Article 7 TEU appears to create a powerful weapon to be wielded 
against any Member State which threatens to depart from the EU's values.’16  
However, this statement must immediately be qualified – the tool has the capacity to be 
powerful, but the limitations imposed on it strictly curtail its efficacy, viz., its capacity to 
enforce the EU’s values.17 The two central limitations for the purposes of this section are 
Article 7’s ‘excessively demanding’ procedural thresholds,18 and its intergovernmental 
nature.19 The former refers to the introduction of procedural qualifications which preclude 
the tool from being used too frequently or easily. The latter qualification refers to a system 
whereby the operative decision-making is carried out by institutions composed solely of 
States, be it heads of state or representatives of the states’ governments. Such tools are also 
oftentimes deprived of judicial review, with decision-making left solely to the discretion of 
political bodies. 
 
16 Grzeszczak and Terrett (n 1) 353. 
17 Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks, ‘Grand theories of European integration in the twenty-first century’ 
(2019) 26(8) JEPP 1113, 1125. 
18 Wojciech Sadurski, Poland’s Constitutional Breakdown (OUP 2019) 224. 
19 Lavelle (n 10) 40. 
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Accordingly, the purpose of this section is to illustrate why the inclusion of these aspects into 
tools tasked with the enforcement of the EU’s values limits their effectiveness.  
First, it will be highlighted why Article 7 TEU had to be qualified. This assessment will illustrate 
that tools capable of limiting State sovereignty through the imposition of broad sanctions on 
purely domestic affairs are very unlikely to be agreed upon by states, and in any case such 
tools may also possibly be incompatible with the EU’s foundations in sincere cooperation. 
Accordingly, in criticising Article 7’s high thresholds and intergovernmentalism it must be 
acknowledged that despite their inclusion having a negative impact on the efficacy of values 
enforcement, the existence of a completely unrestricted broad sanctioning tool is unlikely.  
Secondly, in assessing Article 7’s high thresholds, it will be illustrated that while a desire to 
make a powerful sanctioning tool difficult to apply is somewhat justified, if a wrong balance 
is struck between accessibility (ease of use) and non-accessibility (impossibility of use), the 
tool risks being redundant. 
Thirdly, the intergovernmental issue with Article 7 will be discussed. Since Article 7 vests its 
operative decision-making in the EU’s Member States, over relatively vague criteria, with no 
accountability mechanism over the substantive acts (or lack thereof), the tool’s effectiveness 
becomes dependent on the will of states to act. This is problematic for two reasons. First, 
states engage in considerations of diplomatic expediency which may discourage them from 
criticising other states. Secondly, utilising Article 7 and imposing harsh sanctions could 
undermine the financial interests and the commitment to the internal market of Member 
States. Given these considerations, States are unlikely to sanction or even condemn one 
another. Thus, leaving the enforcement of the EU’s values to, arguably, its least value-
oriented institutions limited the efficacy of the mechanism from the outset. 
3.1 The need to restrict Article 7  
States are reluctant to relinquish their sovereignty. Accordingly, construing any form of 
sanctioning mechanism which can limit sovereignty by imposing sanctions for purely domestic 
matters is very unlikely.20 Closa, after conducting a survey of various international 
 
20 See Carlos Closa, ‘Securing Compliance with Democracy Requirements in Regional Organizations’, 
in András Jakab and Dimitry Kochenov (eds), The Enforcement of EU Law and Values: Ensuring Member 
States' Compliance (OUP 2017) 381. 
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organisations and their sanctioning and suspensory capacity for deviations from democracy, 
concluded that such suspensory clauses are made ‘possible because of the adoption of 
mechanisms which do not relinquish national government control over the implementation 
of these provisions.’21 He noted a pattern in all international organisations which contained 
such clauses. Inter alia, such suspensory clauses were ‘in all cases… political’ and therefore 
lacked any form of substantive judicial review.22 The decision-making was ‘intergovernmental 
in all cases’,23 and ‘[a]lmost all international organizations and regional organizations apply 
either consensus or unanimity’ thereby possessing high procedural thresholds.24  
Given that no other international or regional institution possesses such broad suspensory or 
sanctioning clauses which are not intergovernmental, or which do not possess high 
procedural thresholds, one could plausibly conclude that States are unwilling to agree to less 
demanding and easier to utilise alternatives. It is therefore possible to argue that States, as 
masters of the treaties, would only allow for the creation of a sanctioning or suspensory 
mechanism (relating to broad political concepts such as democracy or the rule of law) if they 
could remain in control of it, so as to protect their sovereignty.25  
Indeed, by ensuring decision-making is vested with them, and not with supranational bodies, 
States limit the capacity of the organisation to dictate how they govern themselves. 
Furthermore, by setting high procedural thresholds, States can ensure that such sanctioning 
tools may not be used for ideological or partisan purposes by other governments. Such 
procedural thresholds therefore also create a form of checks and balances, by ensuring the 
tool is not overused.  
 
21 ibid 400. 
22 ibid 391. 
23 ibid 389-390. 
24 ibid 391.  
25 ibid 400; Hooghe and Marks (n 17) 1125; Carlos Closa and Gisela Hernández, ‘Institutional logics and 
the EU’s limited sanctioning capacity under Article 7 TEU’ (RECONNECT, 25 May 2020) 
<https://reconnect-europe.eu/blog/institutional-logics-and-the-eus-limited-sanctioning-capacity-
under-article-7-teu/> accessed 24 August 2021. We may also look to the negotiations concerning the 
recently introduced conditionality mechanism which, after the Council’s input, not only limited the 
tool’s scope, but also ensured that operative decision-making would remain with the Council by 
ensuring that reverse qualified majority voting was not adopted. See Niels Kirst, ‘Rule of Law 
Conditionality: The Long-awaited Step Towards a Solution of the Rule of Law Crisis in the European 
Union?’ (2021) 6(1) European Papers, Insight 101, 105-106.  
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One could also argue that, from an EU perspective, limiting such tools is not completely 
unfounded. Indeed, the EU is based on an adherence to the duty of sincere cooperation. 
Consequently, the EU expects that its constituent entities – both its institutions and its 
Member States – will strive to help the EU achieve its goals and will not take any actions which 
would hinder them.26 Ensuring the protection of Article 2 TEU values – the core values upon 
which the EU is based – arguably reflects such a goal. Consequently, bestowing decision-
making with States (or intergovernmental institutions) could be seen as justifiable given that 
they themselves have a responsibility to protect the EU’s goals and values.27 There is 
therefore, in theory, no problem in vesting decision-making over a values enforcement tool 
in intergovernmental bodies as they are assumed to protect them. Furthermore, on this 
account high thresholds on such tools could also be warranted: given the belief that the 
European Council, and the Member States within it, are committed to securing the EU’s goals, 
there is no need to worry about not reaching the unanimity threshold (or supermajority, in 
the context of the preventative arm) when the situation is dire. After all, Article 7 was meant 
to be a ‘last-resort provision’.28 Therefore, one could argue that an unrestrained tool for 
enforcing the EU’s goals or values would push the boundaries of what the EU is and therefore 
represent an improper overreach of its competences.29 
Therefore, at least theoretically, Article 7’s qualifications may appear justified. From the 
perspective of States allowing a supranational institution to possess an unqualified 
 
26 Article 4(2) TEU; Roland Bieber and Francesco Maiani, ‘Enhancing Centralized Enforcement of EU 
Law: Pandora’s Toolbox?’ (2014) 51 CML Rev 1057, 1061. (footnotes omitted). See also Leonard 
Besselink, ‘The Bite, the Bark and the Howl Article 7 TEU and the Rule of Law Initiatives’ in Jakab and 
Kochenov (n 20) 144; Panos Koutrakos, ‘Institutional Balance and Sincere Cooperation in treaty-
making under EU law’ (2019) 68(1) ICLQ 1, 6; Peter Van Elsuwege, ‘The Duty of Sincere Cooperation 
and Its Implications for Autonomous Member State Action in the Field of External Relations’ in Marton 
Varju (ed), Between Compliance and Particularism: Member State Interests and European Union Law 
(Springer 2019). 
27 See Commission, ‘Strengthening the rule of law within the Union: A blueprint for action’ 
(Communication) COM/2019/343 final, 3, 16. See also Armin von Bogdandy, ‘Fundamentals on 
Defending European Values’ (Verfassungsblog, 12 November 2019) 
<https://verfassungsblog.de/fundamentals-on-defending-european-values/> accessed 24 August 
2021. 
28 Commission, ‘Respect for and promotion of the values on which the Union is based’ 
(Communication) COM/2003/606 final, 7.  
29 See Armin von Bogdandy, ‘Principles of a systemic deficiencies doctrine: How to protect checks and 




sanctioning tool would not be acceptable given the possible infringement of sovereignty. 
From the EU’s perspective, such a tool would arguably undermine the EU’s commitment and 
foundation in sincere cooperation.  
It is therefore possible to argue that Article 7 had to be restricted with high thresholds and 
intergovernmental decision-making in order to reflect these two concerns. However, this 
becomes problematic when the EU’s actors – supposedly committed to the EU’s goals – do 
not uphold their responsibilities. For instance, when the Member States tasked with enforcing 
the EU’s values – under its main enforcement tool – appear apathetic and uncommitted to 
the protection of these values (or indeed openly violate them). In such a case, the high 
procedural thresholds become a burden preventing the few states committed to the 
protection of those values from enforcing them, and intergovernmental decision-making 
becomes a challenge to the tool’s very efficacy. Therefore, an issue arises between the need 
to qualify a tool such as Article 7 (in order to have it exist in the first place) and the need to 
make it workable (for efficacy reasons). 
3.2 High procedural thresholds 
The first limitation we will discuss is that of high procedural thresholds – the issues associated 
with it are somewhat self-explanatory and therefore for simplicity’s sake we may begin here. 
Given the unanimity requirement stipulated in Article 7(2) TEU, Article 7’s sanctioning arm 
prima facie cannot be utilised – and is rendered ineffective – as Poland and Hungary are 
willing to protect each other with a veto.30 It is perhaps for this reason that the sanctioning 
arm of Article 7 has not been initiated. As illustrated in the previous chapter, the high 
thresholds associated with activating either of Article 7’s mechanisms (indeed the four-fifths 
majority under the preventative arm is also a relatively high threshold to attain) entail a series 
of risks with over and under enforcement. Arguably these risks are far higher in the context 
of the sanction arm, the success of which is even less likely given the Poland-Hungary veto 
pact. Indeed, such a failure would provide an unprecedented boost to the violating regime. 
Recall that Minister Czaputowicz described Article 7 as a ‘dead’ provision given the 
insubstantial pressure exerted on Poland following the initiation of the tool’s preventative 
arm. Extending this logic further, if the sanctioning arm – relating to an actual violation of the 
 
30 Pech and Scheppele (n 6) 12-13. 
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EU’s values, and not its mere risk – failed, the backsliding States could use this as unequivocal 
proof that all of its critics were wrong, that it was not violating the rule of law, and that any 
such criticisms are merely political and ideological.31 The failure of the sanctioning arm would 
likely bolster the regime’s support amongst its supporters by highlighting that they were right, 
and they were merely being discriminated against. It would also likely render Article 7 
unusable again, perhaps ushering in a new ‘nuclear’ perception with a modern-day Haider 
Affair equivalent. The failure of the sanctioning arm could therefore have the opposite effect 
to that desired and end the EU’s ability to address backsliding among its Member States. 
There is therefore merit in arguments which advise caution and encourage the EU not to 
‘pursue one recalcitrant Member State when it is known that there are more than one and 
unanimity is required’.32  
Therefore, with two violators, this exceptionally high threshold may have rendered the tool 
unusable and accordingly limited the EU’s capacity to sanction and deter violations of its 
values.33 In order to obviate this challenge, some have proposed and justified the initiation of 
Article 7(2) TEU against Hungary and Poland, simultaneously.34 Kochenov presents this 
argument very clearly. By looking at the provisions of Article 354 TFEU ‘which lays down the 
rules of the procedural aspects of Art. 7 TEU’, he argued that:   
although Art. 354 TFEU refers to a concrete Member State which is to be excluded 
from voting in such cases, the wording clearly implies that in the cases where several 
Member States are suspected of failing to adhere to EU values all such Member States 
should not be given a chance to derail the application of Art. 7 TEU. Should the 
contrary be the case, all the procedural requirements of Art. 7 TEU, especially those 
requiring unanimity, would end up being deprived of their intended effet utile, given 
that the backsliding Member States would most likely obstruct the application of 
 
31 See Wilms (n 7) 68; Chapter 3 section 3.1. 
32 Dimitry Kochenov, ‘The Commission vs Poland: The Sovereign State Is Winning 1-0’ 
(Verfassungsblog, 25 January 2016) <https://verfassungsblog.de/the-commission-vs-poland-the-
sovereign-state-is-winning-1-0/> accessed 24 August 2021; Wilms (n 7) 80. 
33 Grzeszczak and Terrett (n 1) 353. 
34 Dimitry Kochenov, Laurent Pech and Kim Lane Scheppele, ‘The European Commission’s Activation 
of Article 7: Better Late than Never?’ (Verfassungsblog, 23 December 2017) 
<https://verfassungsblog.de/the-european-commissions-activation-of-article-7-better-late-than-
never/> accessed 24 August 2021; Pech and Scheppele (n 6) 29, 35.  
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sanctions to each other’s cases. Excluding several Member States from voting can thus 
be deemed as implicitly authorised by Art. 354 TFEU in the context of Art. 7, especially 
in the context of the Art. 7(2) TEU procedure. It will be up to the Court, when 
approached by one such Member State under Art. 269 TFEU, to clarify the exact extent 
of such an exclusion.35 
Kochenov therefore highlights how the CJEU could exclude States which are violating the EU’s 
values – perhaps illustrated by the fact that the Article 7(1) procedure has been initiated 
against them – from having a vote in the context of Article 7(2) TEU, such as by having an 
Article 7(2) determination against those states simultaneously.36 This is a convincing 
argument given the Court’s capacity to review procedural aspects of Article 7,37 and the 
progressive and teleological interpretations seen in its recent jurisprudence. In ASJP the Court 
broadly interpreted a somewhat procedural provision in Article 19(1) TEU which requires that 
the CJEU ‘shall ensure that in the interpretation and application of the Treaties the law is 
observed’, turning it into a substantive provision which required that domestic courts tasked 
with implementing EU law must be independent and impartial in order to ensure effective 
application of EU law, thereby attempting to protect the rule of law in the EU.38 In the 
Białowieża case the CJEU broadened its oversight and enforcement powers under Article 279 
TFEU, and the Court has since then issued other decisions targeting the illegality of the 
measures which undermine the rule of law in Poland.39 The Court is therefore prima facie 
willing to interpret the treaties in a teleological manner and that is why – given the threat 
posed to the EU’s very functioning through rule of law backsliding – it would not be surprising 
to see the Court allow for the activation of Article 7(2) TEU against both Hungary and Poland, 
 
35 Kochenov (n 2) 143. 
36 ibid. 
37 See Article 269 TFEU; Matteo Bonelli, ‘A Union of Values: Safeguarding Democracy, the Rule of Law 
and Human Rights in the EU Member States’ (PhD thesis, Maastricht University 2019) 177, 180-181. 
38 Case C-64/16 Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses v Tribunal de Contas EU:C:2018:117, paras 
32-37.  
39 See, e.g., Case C-441/17R Commission v Poland (Białowieża Forest) EU:C:2017:877, paras 99-100; 
Case C-791/19 Commission v Poland (disciplinary regime for judges) EU:C:2021:596, paras 50-52. See 
also, Kim Lane Scheppele, Dimitry Kochenov, and Barbara Grabowska-Moroz, ‘EU Values are Law, after 
All: Enforcing EU Values through Systemic Infringement Actions by the European Commission and the 
Member States of the European Union’ (2020) 39 YB Eur L 3. 
107 
 
rendering the sanctioning arm of the tool usable again. Such an approach would certainly 
strengthen the efficacy of Article 7’s sanctioning arm.  
However, while this argument has merit, it is argued that the sanctioning arm is still highly 
unlikely to be used. Indeed, for the CJEU to be able to engage in such an assessment, the 
Article 7(2) initiating institutions would have to take an incredible risk and actually initiate this 
provision. Given the conservative and restrained approach of the EU, which has until now 
delayed, dialogued and attempted to weigh all of its options before attempting to act, this is 
unlikely.40 This refusal to act would also be somewhat justified given that the EU’s Member 
States are simply not as committed to the protection of its values, as illustrated through the 
Article 7(1) hearings in which an insufficient number of Member States have shown concern 
with the backsliding.41 Given the risks associated with an Article 7(2) determination failing, 
the refusal to initiate the provision may be advised, as even if the CJEU decided to revoke the 
‘fellow-traveller veto’ possibility,42 there still appear to be other States not sufficiently 
committed to enforcing the EU’s values. Finally, there are those who believe the abolition of 
the ‘fellow-traveller veto’ is impossible considering the current phrasing of the Treaties. 
Bonelli, for example, opposes such a teleological interpretation given that ‘the Treaties 
explicitly regulate… in a restrictive manner, instances in which a Member State is barred from 
voting in the (European) Council and the activation of Article 7(1) TEU is not one of them.’43  
Consequently, while the argument is convincing, there are many other hurdles which 
preclude it from rendering the sanctioning arm effective, and therefore even a 25 Member 
State majority (27 Member States minus Poland and Hungary) would appear too high – and 
too dangerous – a threshold to attain. 
The sanctioning arm is therefore ineffective as a deterrent.44 Poland appears convinced as to 
the lack of unanimity in the European Council and the impossibility of using the Article 7(2) 
procedure against itself and Hungary simultaneously, which is why it has not been deterred 
from continuing its backsliding.45 With sanctioning out of the picture, the only option left to 
 
40 See Pech and Scheppele (n 6) 29. 
41 See section 3.3 in this chapter. 
42 This term was used by Scheppele (n 8). 
43 Bonelli (n 37) 185, 392. 
44 Niklewicz (n 13) 285. 
45 ibid.  
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the EU under Article 7 is to continue its preventative arm, ‘which is merely a symbolic gesture 
if the possibility of Article 7(2) and thus sanctions is precluded.’46 
The lesson from this experience could therefore be that the EU ought to ensure its tools are 
accessible, even if they must be qualified. At present the balance between accessibility and 
non-accessibility appears heavily skewed in the other direction. Indeed, given the existence 
of multiple violators the unanimity requirement renders Article 7’s sanctioning arm 
redundant. To resolve this issue, Bonelli argues that Article 7 would be rendered more 
operable if the procedural thresholds in Article 7(1) and 7(2) were aligned. Importantly, such 
a move, would not ‘fundamentally [modify] its rationale’ as the tool would still maintain high 
thresholds (and thus be qualified) and the operative decision-making would remain in the 
hands of the Member States.47 While this appears a more appropriate threshold, given that 
‘many other international organizations… already provide for majorities lower than that of 
the EU in democracy-protecting provisions’,48 it is argued that a lowering of such a threshold 
would also have to be accompanied by sharing the responsibilities and powers between the 
EU’s institutions more equally. Indeed, the four-fifths supermajority required for the 
conclusion of the preventative arm still seems unattainable, as illustrated by the fact that only 
11 Member States illustrated their concern with the developments in Poland in the latest 
Article 7(1) hearing. While the mere decision to not ask questions is not necessarily indicative 
of how those Member States would vote in the context of a potential Article 7(1) decision, it 
arguably casts doubt over their commitment to policing the EU’s values. Therefore, the 
concern over high thresholds is exacerbated when decision-making is left to apathetic 
institutions. As will be apparent in the following section, the EU’s intergovernmental bodies 
appear to be such apathetic actors.  
3.3 The intergovernmental qualification 
Article 7 vests most of its operative decision-making with intergovernmental institutions.49 It 
is the Council that decides under Article 7(1) if hearings should be scheduled, if 
recommendations should be issued, or if the procedure should be concluded and a warning 
 
46 Lavelle (n 10) 44. 
47 Bonelli (n 37) 392. See also Bugarič (n 5) 91. 
48 Bonelli (n 37) 392. 
49 See ibid 187. 
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issued. It is the European Council that decides if a determination under Article 7(2) is made. 
And it is the Council that imposes sanctions under Article 7(3). While other institutions may 
initiate Article’s 7(1) and 7(2), and while the Parliament may refuse to give its consent thereby 
vetoing Article’s 7(1) and 7(2), the tool cannot work if the intergovernmental bodies do not 
satisfy the supermajority, unanimity, or qualified majority votes under Article 7. Furthermore, 
Article 7 possesses no substantive judicial review, meaning that the CJEU’s jurisdiction is 
confined to the ‘procedural stipulations contained in that Article.’50 In turn, there is no 
accountability mechanism which could compel the Council to act. It may not, for instance, be 
brought before the CJEU for its failure to act under Article 265 TFEU.51 In other words, the 
CJEU may not police the failure of any institutions to initiate Article 7 TEU, or to assess the 
legality of any action (or inaction) under it.52 Accordingly, outside of the scrutiny which each 
Member States’ government may face before its respective national parliament, there is no 
way to legally oblige the Council (or its Member States) to enforce the EU’s values under 
Article 7 TEU.53 Therefore, the operative decision-making – over relatively broad substantive 
criteria54 – is left to the complete discretion of the Member States in the two Councils.  
Proponents of such intergovernmental enforcement argue that it increases the legitimacy55 
and efficacy56 of the mechanism.  
From a legitimacy perspective, political pressure arising from Article 7(1) declarations or 
recommendations, the Article 7(2) denouncement or sanctions following Article 7(3), may be 
perceived as more legitimate when they manifest through a consensus of the EU’s Member 
 
50 Article 269 TFEU; Lavelle (n 10) 41; Besselink (n 26) 132-133.   
51 Case T-337/03 Bertelli Galvez v Commission EU:T:2004:106, [2004] ECRII-1041, para 15. See also 
Peter Van Elsuwege and Femke Gremmelprez, ‘Protecting the Rule of Law in the EU Legal Order: A 
Constitutional Role for the Court of Justice’ (2020) 16 EuConst 8, 8-9; Dimitry Kochenov and Laurent 
Pech, 'Monitoring and Enforcement of the Rule of Law in the EU: Rhetoric and Reality' (2015) 11 
EuConst 512, 516-517. cf Kochenov (n 2) 137. 
52 Article 265 TFEU itself requires the institution against which the claim is brought to have ‘first been 
called upon to act’. (See, Case T-350/20 Wagenknecht v Commission EU:T:2020:635, para 32) Given 
the complete discretion over decision-making given to the Council and the European Council under 
Article 7, they arguably do not have a legal obligation to act. It is argued they have a responsibility to 
act given that they are the main decision-makers under the procedure, but this in itself is not the same 
as a legal obligation to act. Accordingly, the inaction of the EU’s intergovernmental bodies cannot be 
assessed under Article 265 TFEU.  
53 Thank you to Dr Irene Wieczorek for her insight in this context.  
54 Bieber and Maiani (n 26) 1083. 
55 Lavelle (n 10) 41-42. 
56 Bugarič (n 5) 97. 
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States,57 as opposed to its more supranational bodies such as the Commission or the CJEU. 
This is so because Article 7 is meant to address the most serious violations which are often a 
result of coordinated legislative change at the domestic level aimed at dismantling domestic 
checks and balances. In turn, these changes will most likely have been achieved by 
democratically elected governments commanding the support of their electorate – it could 
be questionable for the EU (and in particular institutions lacking ‘accountab[ility] before 
directly elected bodies’),58 which some argue itself suffers from a democratic deficit,59 to 
undermine these governments.60 Such crises are therefore termed as ‘political’, and to be 
remedied one may argue that they need to be addressed via political instruments.61   
From an efficacy perspective, some argue that the need to attain a degree of consensus for 
the conclusion of any of Article 7’s mechanisms is a strength of the tool.62 Such an approach 
is less prone to criticism of partisan and political actions63 given that such intergovernmental 
institutions will be composed of governments possessing different ideological backgrounds – 
such a diverse political consensus (while difficult to achieve) could be difficult to ignore,64 
thereby enhancing the effectiveness of the recommendations, declarations, or sanctions 
issued through Article 7’s mechanisms.  
However, while it is possible to argue that Article 7’s efficacy and legitimacy are strengthened 
by placing it in the hands of Member States, this assumption is certainly not irrefutable. For 
instance, the fact that institutions which represent the Member States possess both judicial 
powers to determine the violation, and executive powers to impose sanctions for such a 
violation, with no recourse to judicial review of either decision, could undermine the 
 
57 ibid 91, 98. 
58 Besselink (n 26) 143. 
59 See Joseph HH Weiler, ‘In the Face of Crisis - Input Legitimacy, Output Legitimacy and the Political 
Messianism of European Integration' (2013) 1 Peking U Transnat'l L Rev 292. cf Müller (n 12) 144, 146.  
60 Lavelle (n 10) 42; von Bogdandy (n 29) 738. 
61 See Sadurski (n 18) 201; Müller (n 12) 148. 
62 Bugarič (n 5) 91, 98. Hofer makes a similar point in the context of general imposition of sanctions in 
international law. See Alexandra Hofer, 'The Efficacy of Targeted Sanctions in Enforcing Compliance 
with International Law' (2019) 113 AJIL Unbound 163, 166. 
63 A criticism often cited by Poland and Hungary. See Lavelle (n 10) 42. 
64 Bugarič makes this point in the context of financial sanctions, but this is believed to apply to the 
entirety of Article 7. See Bugarič (n 5) 98.  
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legitimacy of the measures adopted under Article 7.65 More important for our purposes, 
however, is the point relating to efficacy.  
It is argued that – irrespective of any benefits associated with intergovernmental 
enforcement – Article 7’s implementation illustrates that this type of decision-making limits 
the efficacy of the EU’s values enforcement capacity.  This is so for two reasons. First, States 
are reluctant to criticise each other due to the possible political or diplomatic repercussions 
which may follow. Secondly, the inevitable confrontation between states under Article 7 
contradicts the very logic of the internal market which arguably drives the decision-making of 
states. Accordingly, the hitherto failure to adequately use the preventative arm of Article 7 – 
such as by exerting sufficient scrutiny and pressure via hearings or issuing recommendations 
– should be unsurprising given that the tool’s very effectiveness hinges on the will of Member 
States to act.  
Simply put, the ineffectiveness of Article 7 is accentuated when the political institutions 
tasked with its enforcement are unwilling to act. 
3.3.1 Diplomatic expediency as an excuse for inaction 
With the Member States in the two councils possessing complete discretion over when and 
how to act under Article 7, the decision-making under either the preventative or the 
sanctioning arm becomes dependent on political and diplomatic considerations.66 Pech, 
Wachowiec and Mazur present an apt example for our purposes. In criticising the Council’s 
failure to schedule hearings, they highlighted how the otherwise active Finish Presidency in 
the Council failed to schedule a single hearing against Poland in 2019, while managing to 
schedule a hearing against Hungary. The authors attribute this to the Presidency’s overlap 
with Polish Parliamentary elections: scheduling hearings or scrutinising Poland’s rule of law 
violations may have influenced the outcome of the elections and so the constant 
deterioration in Poland was left unaddressed under Article 7.67 Grzeszczak and Terrett present 
an equally applicable example, even if slightly dated.68 In 2018 they acknowledged that any 
trade deal which would be reached between the UK and the EU would require unanimity in 
 
65 Lavelle (n 10) 42; Armin von Bogdandy and Michael Ioannidis, ‘Systemic Deficiency in the Rule of 
Law: what it is, what has been done, what can be done’ (2014) 51(1) CML Rev 59, 60.  
66 See Bieber and Maiani (n 26) 1083; Grzeszczak and Terrett (n 1) 355. 
67 Pech, Wachowiec and Mazur (n 1) 20. 
68 Grzeszczak and Terrett (n 1) 355. See also Lavelle (n 10) 44. 
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the European Council. Accordingly, they argued that the UK would be disincentivised to put 
pressure on Poland or Hungary, in an attempt to protect the rule of law, owing to the threat 
this could have posed to any future trade agreement. As the authors predicted, the UK failed 
to illustrate concern with the rule of law crisis during the Article 7(1) hearings.69 The failure 
to unequivocally uphold the EU’s values may be attributed to a variety of considerations – the 
UK may have, for instance, not wanted to interfere in the affairs of another State given its 
intention to leave the EU. However, regardless of the reason, the intention here is to 
emphasise that the complete discretion left to these intergovernmental institutions makes it 
possible for political and diplomatic concerns to outweigh the responsibilities these Member 
States have under Article 7 TEU.70  
Sadurski may therefore have been right when he argued that the EU is ‘a community that 
avoids harsh language and sanctions directed at its own members.’ He highlighted that 
‘[v]oting against a fellow member state (and note that every Article 7 pathway envisages, at 
a certain point, votes by other member states in the Council) is politically costly and may easily 
be portrayed as a case of hostility towards the nation concerned, rather than vis-à-vis the 
government of the breaching state.’71 Member States must therefore consider whether their 
interferences and denouncements could be contrary to their interests and could therefore 
render the protection of the EU’s values a subsidiary consideration. Because of such 
diplomatic considerations, States do not often criticise each other, leading to a ‘habit of 
mutual indulgence’, already evident in States’ unwillingness to sue each other via Article 259 
TFEU.72 Therefore, by vesting sole decision-making in themselves, the EU’s Member States 
effectively limited the effectiveness of Article 7, as it is a mechanism which hinges directly on 
their will to openly and publicly condemn (and possibly sanction) another Member State.  
 
69 See Laurent Pech, ‘From “Nuclear Option” to Damp Squib? A Critical Assessment of the Four Article 
7(1) TEU Hearings to Date’ (Verfassungsblog, 13 November 2019) <https://verfassungsblog.de/from-
nuclear-option-to-damp-squib/> accessed 24 August 2021. 
70 See Grzeszczak and Terrett (n 1) 355.  
71 See Sadurski (n 18) 223. 
72 Armin von Bogdandy and others, ‘Rescue Package for EU Fundamental Rights – Illustrated with 
Reference to the Example of Media Freedom’ (UK Constitutional Law Association, 18 February 2012) 
<https://ukconstitutionallaw.org/2012/02/18/a-rescue-package-for-eu-fundamental-rights/> 
accessed 23 August 2021; Bugarič (n 5) 84.  
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3.3.2 Article 7’s incompatibility with the logic of the internal market 
Kochenov posits another reason as to why States may not be inclined to resort to Article 7, 
and attributes this to the EU’s commitment to the internal market.73 While his argument may 
not be determinative, it nonetheless helps draw attention to the problem with 
intergovernmental enforcement of the EU’s values. The argument can be explained as 
follows.  
The internal market was created inter alia ‘to socialise and intertwine the Member States’ 
economies to ensure a lasting peace and common prosperity’.74  The initial thinking was that 
such a process would then lead to a greater political integration as States would become more 
inter-dependent;75 that they would prefer to cooperate in order to continue with a process 
of further integration which would lead to greater economic prosperity.76 Accordingly, the 
internal market’s ‘very logic’ – as Kochenov puts it – was predicated on the desire to render 
any need for animosity between States unnecessary, or even ‘impossible’.77  
If this argument were true, and Member States bought into this idea, the assumption that 
these States would then risk their economic growth in the name of some legal or political 
principles is relatively slim.78 Indeed, attempting to enforce the rule of law in Poland via Article 
7’s sanctioning arm would likely require ‘stinging measures.’79 However, such financial 
sanctions could heavily undermine the operation of businesses from other EU states, in 
Poland.80 Accordingly, even if an imposition of sanctions under Article 7(3) TEU would not 
suspend the operation of the internal market itself, utilising the mechanism would likely 
create tension between States, and it could also create unwanted economic loss on the part 
of the EU’s Member States. As such, the stability and prosperity cultivated through the 
 
73 Kochenov (n 2) 130-132. See also Bugarič (n 5) 100-101. 
74 Kochenov (n 2) 132.  
75 ibid 131; Bugarič (n 5) 86. 
76 Lisa Conant, ‘Compliance and What EU Member States Make of It’ in Marise Cremona (ed), 
Compliance and the Enforcement of EU Law (OUP 2012) 3.  
77 Kochenov (n 2) 130. (emphasis added) 
78 See Bojan Bugarič, 'The Right to Democracy in a Populist Era' (2018) 112 AJIL Unbound 79, 82; Erin 
K Jenne and Cas Mudde, ‘Hungary’s Illiberal Turn: Can Outsiders Help?’ (2012) 23(3) J Dem 147. 




internal market would be put at risk through an inherently adversarial mechanism which pits 
States against each other over sensitive political matters.81  
Simply put, resorting to such an adversarial mechanism would be counterintuitive to any 
institution driven by the logic of the internal market.82 It would put at risk the desired stability 
by resorting to adversarial mechanisms, and possibly limit economic growth for States other 
than the one being sanctioned. The reluctance to resort to Article 7 is exacerbated by the fact 
that such sanctions need not be effective – Poland could try to ignore the sanctions and 
continue its backsliding as before – meaning that losses incurred by resorting to Article 7(3) 
TEU may not lead to the intended result. Therefore, as Kochenov puts it, ‘expecting too much 
of the Council – and, by extension, of Art. 7 TEU – would be naïve. Unless something truly 
terrible happens in a backsliding Member State, the Internal Market, after all, functions as 
designed.’83  
However, in response one could argue that the functioning of the internal market – and the 
financial rewards associated therewith – is also put at risk by rule of law backsliding.84 Indeed, 
backsliding threatens the very foundations of the EU’s legal system. As AG Bobek has put it: 
In a system such as that of the European Union, where the law is the main vehicle for 
achieving integration, the existence of an independent judicial system (both centrally 
and nationally), capable of ensuring the correct application of that law, is of 
paramount importance. Quite simply, without an independent judiciary, there would 
no longer be a genuine legal system. If there is no ‘law’, there can hardly be more 
integration. The aspiration of creating ‘an ever closer union among the peoples of 
Europe’ is destined to collapse if legal black holes begin to appear on the judicial map 
of Europe.85 
 
81 ibid 131.  
82 ibid. 
83 ibid. (footnotes omitted) 
84 See Laurent Pech and Patryk Wachowiec, ‘1095 Days Later: From Bad to Worse Regarding the Rule 
of Law in Poland (Part II)’ (Verfassungsblog, 17 January 2019) <https://verfassungsblog.de/1095-days-
later-from-bad-to-worse-regarding-the-rule-of-law-in-poland-part-ii/> accessed 24 August 2021.  
85 Joined Cases C‑748/19 to C‑754/19 Prokuratura Rejonowa w Mińsku Mazowieckim v WB and others 
EU:C:2021:403, Opinion of AG Bobek, para 138. 
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Therefore, a judiciary which is not independent is less likely (if not unable) to ensure 
compliance with EU law – that much we can see from PiS’s manipulation of the CT. In turn, if 
EU law is not complied with, this undermines the EU’s ability to legislate; it undermines the 
existence and functioning of the EU’s legal system.86 Lacking a legal system, the EU would be 
incapable of continuing the process of integration, of harmonisation of laws to ensure 
efficient trade. Simply put ‘for an internal market, an area of freedom, security and justice, a 
common fisheries policy, and so on, to exist at all, the assumption of compliance must be 
sustainable.’87  
Accordingly, if Member States were driven by their commitment to the internal market, they 
would be expected to have utilised Article 7 by now, if only to protect its functioning. The fact 
that they have not done so may therefore undermine the argument that the failure to utilise 
Article 7 by the EU’s intergovernmental institutions is attributable to their commitment to the 
internal market. Nonetheless, the point being made here is not to prove whether States are 
driven by the logic of the internal market, but to once again illustrate the various 
considerations which may render the protection of the EU’s values a subsidiary concern to its 
intergovernmental institutions. Ultimately, Article 7 has not been utilised. Whether this is 
because States are driven by the logic of the internal market, or whether they have other 
political considerations which they prioritise above the functioning and integrity of the EU, or 
for any other reason – the point is that enforcing and protecting the EU’s values does not 
seem to be a goal or a priority of the EU’s intergovernmental institutions.   
In sum, the intergovernmental challenge aims to bring attention to value-apathy which is 
likely to affect decision-making left to the complete discretion of Member States. Kochenov 
highlights that the Haider Affair teaches us that ‘ironically… the EU does not need any law or 
a formal legal basis if the political will is in place to act’.88 The problem with Article 7 may 
therefore be attributed to the ‘absence of the political will to use it’.89 Member States have 
various interests external to the functioning of the EU. Allowing for such political 
considerations in a procedure which is tasked with protecting matters of fundamental 
 
86 Bieber and Maiani (n 26) 1057-1058. 
87 ibid. 
88 Kochenov (n 2) 135. 
89 Bugarič (n 5) 84; Kochenov (n 2) 129. 
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concern to the EU’s functioning, arguably undermines the entire purpose of Article 7. The 
tool’s purpose and its construction therefore appear contradictory: the tool which exists to 
protect the EU’s values is left to bodies which are possibly least concerned with their 
protection. 
4. Conclusion 
Article 7 was to serve as the EU’s prime mechanism for the enforcement of its values, but 
both the way it was used and the way in which it was construed severely weakened its 
capacity to act as intended. Thus, while in theory the tool may have appeared as a powerful 
deterrent, capable of effectively protecting the EU’s values, its operation in practice has 
turned out lacklustre. It has been argued that this ineffectiveness is attributable to three 
reasons.  
First, the failure of the EU’s institutions to initiate the mechanism before the regimes had 
‘crossed the political Rubicon and burned its diplomatic bridges’90 – a creative way of saying 
that the regimes had entrenched themselves in power and it was going to be difficult to 
dissuade them from reverting their policies – limited Article 7’s softer, preventative arm’s 
enforcement capacity given that the mechanism was ‘not… designed to ensure regime 
change’ but for preventing a deterioration.91 Such delays also neutered the tool’s sanctioning 
arm given its unanimity threshold under Article 7(2) TEU. The tool is now arguably no longer 
capable of reverting the backsliding because of this failure to act.  
The second and third reasons relate to Article 7’s construction. The sanctioning arm’s 
unanimity threshold, and the difficulties associated with encouraging the Council to act have 
illustrated that Article 7 is an ineffective tool for policing the EU’s values in its current form.  
Article 7(2)’s unanimity threshold is unattainable when there are two violators (if they cannot 
be simultaneously subjected to the procedure). Some have suggested that to resolve this 
problem the EU should in the future consider lowering the threshold of Article 7(2) to match 
that of the four-fifths supermajority found in Article 7(1) TEU.92 But while it is argued that 
 
90 Grzeszczak and Terrett (n 1) 356. 
91 Kochenov (n 2) 144. 
92 Bonelli (n 37) 392. See also Bugarič (n 5) 91. 
117 
 
such a move would be a step in the right direction, with the tool becoming more accessible 
and the risks associated with over and under enforcement being somewhat ameliorated, it 
would still not respond aptly to the problem illustrated through the intergovernmental 
qualification. Indeed, for the EU’s values to be truly capable of enforcement, it is argued that 
the responsibility for their protection should not rest solely with the Member States as is the 
case at present. Member States have too many political and diplomacy-based considerations 
which may dissuade them from taking difficult decisions and prioritising the protection of the 
EU’s values over their own financial gain. As pointed out by Pech and Scheppele, it was bodies 
like the Commission that were purposefully created to ‘act independently and whose 
insulation from politics was institutionally organised to enable it to take “difficult” decisions 
in ensuring the uniform application of Union law’.93 By placing responsibility on the EU’s 
intergovernmental bodies, the effectiveness of Article 7’s enforcement capacity was 
therefore curtailed as it allowed for the possibility of other considerations being prioritised 
above the EU’s functioning and its foundational values. Thus, lowering of the unanimity 
threshold by itself is insufficient. The problem with Member States’ insufficient commitment 
to the EU’s values would also have to be addressed. 
But as we have acknowledged previously, despite the weakened efficacy of an enforcement 
tool left in intergovernmental hands, the input of Member States in such value-enforcement 
tools seems to be inseparable. Member States value their sovereignty and the EU – being 
based on cooperation – respects this. Thus, while from an efficacy perspective the EU’s lesson 
from Article 7’s ineffectiveness could be that enforcement tools should not be left to 
intergovernmental bodies, on a more pragmatic note we may simply note that 
intergovernmental decision-making should be limited or adequately balanced by inputs of 
other – and supranational – bodies. This could be achieved via improved accountability 
mechanisms, or by amending decision-making procedures.  
For instance, given that it is the Member States in the two Councils that control the procedure, 
to ensure that this does not undermine the tool’s efficacy, the CJEU’s jurisdiction could be 
expanded so as to bring inaction under Article 7 TEU under the jurisdiction of Article 265 TFEU. 
This could arguably be achieved by clarifying the obligations under Article 7 TEU, such as by 
 
93 Pech and Scheppele (n 6) 29.  
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imposing a duty on the Council to regularly scrutinise the Member State through its hearings, 
or by clarifying the criteria against which the Court could assess the Council’s inactivity. But 
even if such an accountability mechanism could compel States to vote – and coincidentally 
highlight the priorities of the Council and its Member States vis-à-vis the EU’s values – this 
still would not ensure the protection of the EU’s values as the process itself cannot change 
their priorities. If States are uncommitted to the EU’s values it is unclear if accountability tools 
could change this.  
Thus, from an efficacy perspective of values enforcement, a more appropriate alternative 
would be to ensure that powers under the enforcement mechanism are diffused.94 This could 
be achieved via reverse qualified majority voting,95 whereby the Commission would propose 
that a Member State has ‘seriously and persistently’ violated the EU’s values (Article 7(2)), 
and unless the European Council voted against this, by qualified majority, the determination 
would be made. This could equally apply to Article 7(1), and to its sanctioning stage under 
Article 7(3) TEU. Such an approach would still respect the need to have Member State input 
in enforcement mechanisms, and therefore respect institutional balance, but would also not 
sacrifice efficacy and the need to protect and enforce the EU’s values.  
In any case, it is very unlikely that Article 7 will be amended in the near future given that such 
a process would require unanimity among the Members of the European Council and the 
backsliding States are unlikely to support amendments strengthening a tool which would be 
used against them. Therefore, while in its current form Article 7 may not be an effective tool 
for constraining backsliding, we may nonetheless briefly summarise some general lessons the 
EU could draw from this experience.  
First, the EU must put adequate pressure on states violating its values, without delay. Failing 
to do so may indicate to other States that the EU is incapable or unwilling to resolve such 
problems and may encourage other violators. Thus, a failure to act allows for greater harm to 
be done to the EU. It may also weaken the EU’s ability to address such crises.  
 
94 See, more generally, Bieber and Maiani (n 26) 1068. 
95 On reverse qualified majority voting and its potential effectiveness see Bieber and Maiani (ibid) 
1066-1068, 1071, 1083. 
119 
 
Secondly, the EU cannot render its tools inaccessible. Finding consensus between States is 
difficult in any case. By requiring unanimity – in the context of an adversarial mechanism 
which requires states to openly condemn and sanction one another – the tool was possibly 
rendered inaccessible even before Poland joined Hungary in its backsliding. 




The argument in this thesis was prefaced by an assumption that rule of law backsliding poses 
an increasingly serious challenge to the EU. It was argued that Poland’s failure to recognise 
and enforce decisions of the CJEU, thereby undermining the key facets – such as supremacy 
or autonomy – upon which the EU’s legal order is based, challenges the very existence and 
integrity of the EU’s legal order, and thus the very future of the integration process. With that 
in mind, the thesis has attempted to illustrate some of the reasons as to why the EU’s hitherto 
approach to rule of law backsliding in Poland was ineffective. By examining the operation of 
the RLF and Article 7 TEU in Poland, a series of flaws were identified, and lessons drawn, with 
the aim of ascertaining how the EU could improve its response to backsliding. It is argued that 
the EU must be responsive to the following four lessons.  
Lesson 1: soft enforcement is ineffective against defiant, backsliding states 
Rule of law backsliding states are defiant and uncooperative. The EU must acknowledge that 
for such states, assumptions of compliance and an unwavering commitment to mutual trust 
may be unfounded. Because of this assumption, the EU’s current dialogic (soft enforcement) 
approach reflected through the RLF and Article 7(1) TEU has failed to halt backsliding. It is 
argued that, even if Article 7 had been used well by the Council – and it issued 
recommendations and a warning – the effectiveness of this approach still would not have 
been guaranteed. Poland has happily misled its peers in the Council and it is unlikely that its 
attitude would change unless significant pressure is exerted. Accordingly, for backsliding 
States, a case can be made in favour of harder means of enforcement, viz., enforcement which 
raises the cost of non-compliance so as to outweigh any benefits a State may gain from 
defiance. Ergo, the assumption of hard enforcement tools, which presupposes state 
selfishness, appears more appropriate against uncooperative states than the soft 
enforcement assumption that States will be cooperative and refrain from purposefully 
violating their obligations. That is not to say that effectiveness of hard enforcement is 
guaranteed, especially as the EU is incapable of forcing legislative change. Its sanctioning 
tools, be it via Article 7(3) TEU or Article 260 TFEU, rely on the ‘hope’ that this additional 
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pressure will be sufficient to induce change.1 Nonetheless, given the failure of the soft and 
dialogic approach, it is time for the EU to understand that defiant states need to be dissuaded 
from further defiance; they cannot simply be “talked out of it.” 
Lesson 2: rule of law crises are time sensitive 
The EU must acknowledge, and act on, the time-sensitivity of rule of law backsliding. The EU 
failed to activate Article 7 against Hungary for almost eight years. It gave Poland two years – 
during which Poland subordinated the CT and began to introduce legislation affecting the 
composition and functioning of the judiciary – before it activated Article 7. It is not guaranteed 
that an earlier activation of Article 7 would have prevented further deterioration in Poland or 
Hungary, and indeed an argument to that effect would represent a counterfactual. But we 
may nonetheless notice the obvious implications of the EU’s hitherto delays in escalating its 
response. For instance, by failing to exert sufficient pressure so as to deter further violations 
the EU gave PiS and Fidesz additional time to erode various checks and balances and thus to 
entrench themselves in power. In so doing, the EU has limited its own ability to resolve rule 
of law backsliding. The EU may not, for instance, restore the independence of a judiciary 
which has been continuously replaced by pre-selected regime supporters. The EU’s tools 
could prevent future deterioration, if adequate pressure is exerted, but they cannot revert 
damage done by a systemic, comprehensive, and continuous scheme to replace and 
subordinate the judiciary. The EU’s failure to exert sufficient pressure, in a timely manner, has 
therefore allowed for further deterioration and it has weakened the ability of the EU’s tools 
to resolve backsliding. Not to mention the fact that by failing to activate Article 7 against 
Hungary the likelihood of the tool’s sanctioning arm being activated became slim. Poland and 
Hungary are now willing and able to veto any Article 7(2) determination if the EU was to resort 
to it. Simply put, the EU cannot only speak of acknowledging the time-sensitivity of 
backsliding, as it has done,2 it must also act on it in a meaningful manner. This requires the 
EU to be pragmatic. If one method has failed the first time, the EU must move on and adapt 
 
1 Müller makes this point in the context of Article 7(3) TEU sanctions, but it is believed this point applies 
equally to any sanctions imposed by the EU. See Jan-Werner Müller, 'Should the EU Protect Democracy 
and the Rule of Law inside Member States' (2015) 21 ELJ 141, 144. 
2 Commission, ‘Strengthening the rule of law within the Union: A blueprint for action’ 
(Communication) COM/2019/343 final, 14. 
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as relying on it again is unlikely to yield a different result. There is no problem with trying 
dialogue at first instance – and it may even be warranted for legitimacy reasons, especially 
following the Haider Affair’s events. The problem occurs when the same method is resorted 
to continuously, without any substantial changes being seen. A failure to do so allows the 
regimes to further entrench themselves in power, which then weakens the EU’s ability to 
address the problem. 
Lesson 3: tools protecting the EU’s values must be accessible  
While this may seem obvious, the EU’s tools must be accessible. The values in Article 2 TEU 
are supposed to be shared by the EU’s Member States as without a shared commitment to 
these values the future of the integration project – and the EU project as a whole – is likely to 
be at risk. It therefore seems counterintuitive to create a tool – the purpose of which is to 
protect the very foundations of the EU – which is inaccessible. Yet Article 7’s sanctioning arm 
possesses a unanimity threshold which makes it so. Even absent the veto from Poland or 
Hungary, viz., if the mechanism was initiated against the two simultaneously, it would still 
require the 25 remaining Member States to openly and publicly denounce the actions of the 
governments in their fellow Member States. Such a widespread commitment from the EU’s 
Member States to the values in Article 2 TEU is absent at present.  
There may have been good reasons for locking away a tool as theoretically powerful as Article 
7’s sanctioning arm given the EU’s foundations in sincere cooperation and an assumption of 
the Member States’ commitment to the EU’s values. Indeed, if the EU’s Member States were 
truly committed to its values, there would be no need for a tool as powerful as Article 7. In 
turn restricting its use so as to make it an option of last resort makes sense. However, 
especially after backsliding began, the EU’s institutions must be aware that its Member States 
are not equally committed to its values. These values must therefore be protected, by a tool 
which is capable of activation. Creating a tool – no matter how powerful – which cannot be 
utilised, defeats its purpose. Poland does not perceive Article 7 as a deterrent, and Minister 
Czaputowicz even called it ‘dead’. The EU must recognise that its tools must be usable if they 
are to have a deterrent effect.  
This could take the form of lowering unreasonably high procedural thresholds. However, 
crucially, such a decision must come with another acknowledgment. Namely, it is that States 
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are reluctant to criticise and sanction one another – this is clear from inter alia Article 7’s 
proceedings, but also from the reluctance of States to resort to Article 259 TFEU inter-state 
infringements. Accordingly, in order to make its enforcement tools accessible and effective, 
the EU must go beyond rendering procedural thresholds attainable, it must also be responsive 
to problems associated with intergovernmental decision-making.  
Lesson 4: Member States lack adequate commitment to the EU’s values  
The final lesson refers to increasing the accessibility of a values enforcement tool by ensuring 
its effectiveness is not wholly dependent upon intergovernmental decision-making. Arguably 
a body tasked with protecting the EU’s values ought to prioritise the EU’s needs. It should 
desire the proper functioning of the EU, its legal order, and its development. Such a body 
should be committed to ensuring there is no deviation from the EU’s values, given the EU’s 
foundations in the concept of mutual trust, which depends upon a shared commitment by all 
actors and Member States in equally upholding and respecting the EU’s laws and values. 
Member States, however, appear to lack a strong commitment to this, and are likely to 
prioritise their own interests over those of the EU (even though it is likely that they will 
intersect at one point). They engage in assessments of political and diplomatic expediency; 
they understand that sanctions may not only be costly for the violating State but also for the 
body initiating the sanctions. Accordingly, it may be counterintuitive to make the 
effectiveness of a value enforcement mechanism depend solely on the political will to act of 
a body whose members may lose out if action is taken and values are protected. 
That is not to say that there should be no intergovernmental input in values enforcement 
mechanisms – and indeed such tools cannot exist without purchase from Member States – 
but a more appropriate balance can certainly be struck, viz., one which acknowledges the 
flaws of intergovernmental decision-making. For instance, reverse qualified majority voting 
could be resorted to in enforcement mechanisms. It is a procedure which would lead to the 
imposition of sanctions proposed by the Commission unless the Council voted against the 
sanctions (or amended them) by qualified majority. Such a mechanism would not sacrifice 
intergovernmental decision-making but would increase the efficacy of the tool. Importantly, 
it would also bring attention and scrutiny to the Council if it failed to sanction a situation 
posing a clear and obvious violation to the EU’s values. Therefore, another viable alternative 
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would be to ensure there exist greater accountability mechanisms – the current 
accountability mechanisms for failure to act appear inappropriate given the lack of clear legal 
obligations deriving from Article 7’s phrasing. The Council’s failure to act therefore cannot be 
sufficiently scrutinised or condemned, as the Council has complete discretion over when and 
how to act if the EU’s values are being violated.  
The point being made here is that Article 7 was created by Member States and vested the 
power of this very important tool in their hands. This ought to create a responsibility to act, 
as only the Member States can render the tool effective. Without this responsibility being 
enforceable as a legal duty or an obligation, the tool is unlikely to be effective owing to the 
nature of intergovernmental decision-making, even if the procedural thresholds of the tool 
are lowered. Simply put, in acknowledging the need to make its tools accessible, the EU also 
needs to acknowledge that intergovernmental bodies have other considerations which can 
outweigh and weaken values enforcement considerations. Thus, from an efficacy perspective 
this needs to be resolved. Member States cannot have their powers limited completely due 
to sovereignty considerations, but there should exist ways to scrutinise their inactivity or 
compel them to act. In short, power and responsibility should be meaningfully shared, 
especially at the enforcement stages.   
A light at the end of the tunnel  
The aforementioned lessons may be simple, but they are argued to be crucial if the EU is to 
become better equipped at addressing rule of law backsliding. That is not to say that 
supranational interference is the ultimate panacea; backsliding is a complex matter which 
requires a multi-faceted approach. Sanctioning and international pressure may slow down 
backsliding, with the regimes either refraining from certain violations, or introducing 
legislative amendments in order to create a façade of compliance, but it is unlikely to 
completely halt it. These are regimes committed to entrenching themselves in power and it 
is possible that the only way to truly resolve this crisis is through civic empowerment leading 
to transition of power via democratic elections.3 
 
3 See, e.g., Paul Blokker, ‘EU Democratic Oversight and Domestic Deviation from the Rule of Law’ in 




However, even if the EU cannot solve backsliding itself, it can play a crucial role in delaying 
the violations and in highlighting the problem. The EU may have failed to fulfil this role in the 
past, but we are seeing positive signs of development. The EU has recently introduced a 
conditionality mechanism which, while deficient in certain ways,4 represents a clear 
improvement on the two mechanisms assessed in this thesis.5 It is a sanctioning tool, 
possessing strict timeframes for escalation, at the end of which the Council will be obliged to 
vote on the matter (and therefore will not be able to indefinitely delay the mechanism’s 
conclusion). The Commission has also more recently illustrated it is willing to protect the EU’s 
values by threatening Poland with Article 260 TFEU sanctions for non-compliance with CJEU 
judgments, and by refusing to accept Hungary’s national resources plan thereby precluding it 
from claiming EU finances following its recent proposal of anti-LGBT legislation.6 
Jan-Werner Müller once said that the problem with the enforcement of EU’s values lies not 
in the EU’s lack of authority or legitimacy to act, but in the lack of suitable tools.7 By resorting 
to stronger means of enforcement we are possibly witnessing a new EU – one which is capable 
of and willing to protect its values.8 If it can secure the will to act, the EU can raise the stakes 
of non-compliance and contribute positively to halting or at least slowing down deterioration. 
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One can only hope – for the sake of the rule of law in the EU and in its Member States – that 
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